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I.
The Constitution is naturally acclaimed as the creative achievement
of statesmen bent on maintaining the co-operation of the States and on
forming "a more perfect Union." But in the creation lurked the seeds
of inevitable contest between the new Union and its constituent mem-
bers. Controversy over the spheres appropriate for action by States or
Nation began in 1789; it is rife today.' In 19oo the people of the
Australian States "agreed to unite in one indissoluble Federal Com-
monwealth",2 and for twenty-five years an uninterrupted process of
conflict, discussion, and adjustment has followed, centering around the
respective scope of action of States and Commonwealth.3  Only
yesterday the question of the extent of control over'industrial relations
by the Commonwealth government divided the High Court of Aus-
tralia and brought the States into sharp conflict with the Common-
wealth.4  Ever since the Canadian Provinces "federally united into
'Thus those who fully agree on the civilized standards for child-life that should
prevail in the United States are in disagreement as to whether State or Federal
action is the most sustained and fruitful method for-achieving the desired results.
See e.g. Frankfurter, Child Labor and the Court (July 26, 1922) 31 NEW
REPUBLIC, 248, and editorial reply thereto, States Rights and Children, ibid. 241;
editorial in Ar York World, Dec. 8, 1924; Waite, The Child Labor Amendment
(gz4) 9 MINN. L. REv. i79. See also Hearings before Subcommittee of Coln-
mittee on Judiciary of U. S. Senate, 67 Cong. 4th sess. Jan. 10-15, 1923, parsim;
Report No. 395, 68 Cong. 1st sess.; Abbott, The Child Labor Amendment (1924)
22o N. AMEP. REv. 223.
'Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (igoo) 63 & 64 Vict. c. 12;
Records and Debates of Australasian Convention (1898) passim.
'See Higgins, McCulloch v. Maryland ini Australia (1904) 18 HARv. L. Rv.
559; Haines, The Constitutinr Act of Australia (1917) 30 H~Av. L. REv. 595;
Keith, Notes on Imperial Constitutional Law (1924) 6 JoURN. Comp. La.
193; Moore, Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia (2d ed. i9io); I
Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudewce (1go9) 319; Atkinson, The Political
Systems of Australia (i92o) ch. 2.
'Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide S. S. Co. Ltd. (192o) 28
C. L. R. i9; Same v. Same (192) 29 C. L. R. 496, commented on in (192) 4
25 [68z]
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one Dominion," 5 the public, legislatures and courts have been grappling
with conflicts generated by the existence of two areas of author-
ity-the Provinces and the Dominion.
8 In the recent invalidation by
the Privy Council of the Canadian Industrial Disputes Investigation
Act of 19077 as ultra vires the Dominion Parliament has put on the
front page of the daily paper a striking manifestation of this persistent
problem.8 With the formation of the South African Union in 19o99
the powers of government were divided between the Provinces and
the Union; since 19o9, the history of South Africa has been partly
the history of adjustments between Provincial and Union assertion
of power.'0 Here then we have an obstinate problem common
to the four great systems of federated government in the English-
speaking world." The problem is inherent in the very conception of
federalism. Constitutional provisions and constitutional adjudica-
tions may, at a given time, represent the forms of specific adjustment.
But no matter how explicit the provisions nor how decisive the adjudi-
cations, they are not, because they cannot be, definitive answers to the
central problem. The legal issues are continuous because the human
difficulties -are continuous. And in their application to the United States,
behind all legalistic controversies lie deep issues of state-craft in the
practical government of a farflung empire.'
2
JouRN. Comn. LEa. Pt. 4, p. 1O7. Special leave for appeal to the Privy Council
was denied in [1923] A. C. 170, commented on in (1923) 5 JOURN. Comp. LEG.
Pt 3, p. 278.
"British North America Act (1867) 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3.
'See Kennedy, The Disallowance of Provincial Acts in the Dominion of Canada
(1924) 6 JouRN. Comp. LEa. Pt i, p. 81; Haines, Judicial Review of Legislation
in Canada (1915) 28 HARv. L. REv. 565. See also i Lucas, Lord Durham's Report
(1912) introd.; Pope, Confederation Documents (1895); Lefroy, Law of the
Legis lative Power in Canada (1897) ; Newton, Federal and Unified Constitutions
(1923); Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions (1912); Kennedy,
Constitution of Canada (1922) chs. 23-24, passin.
'Can. Sts. 1917, c. 2o.
'Toronto Electric Comm,. v. Snyder [1924] 2 D. L. R. (N. s.) 761. reversed by
the Privy Council, [1925] A. C. 396. See also A Privy Council Decision, The
London Times, Jan. 22, 1925. See the recent debate in the Canadian House of
Commons on the proposal of Mr. McLean to secure for the Dominion the right to
amend the British North America Act. Mr. McLean thus summed up the situa-
tion: "There is a dispute between the federal and provincial powers in thi;
country, as there is in Australia, and the same is the case in the United States."
See 6o HANSARD (1925, Can.) 300, 3o2, et seq.
'Const. of South Africa Act (i9og) 9 Edw. VII, c. 9. See Brand, Union of
South Africa (igog) passim.
"De Waal, N. 0. v. North Bay Canning Co. Ltd. [i92i, S. A,] A. D. 521;
Rex v. Amod [1922, S. A.] A. D. 217.
"Cf. Edgerton, Federations and Unions in the British Empire (igi) ; Smith,
Federalism in North America (1923) ; i Bryce, Studies in History and Jurispru-
dence (19O1) 216.
"Cf. Curtis, The Comnonwealth of Nations (1916) Pt. I, 61o-6ii: "Expo-
nents of mere centralization are forever harping on the vices of the State legisla-
tures as though they were bodies not bad by comparison, but like Sodom and
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II.
This is not the place to contend for the federal against the unitary
state.18 Suffice it to say that on the eve of the Great War one of
the most significant political thinkers of the Continent turned to
federalism as a cure for the disruptive tendencies of the Austria-
Hungarian monarchy.14 Federalism is again pressed as the solution
for the legacies of the Great War in the Danubian and Balkan
states. 5 The persistence of federalism in this country in substan-
tially its present form, namely, as a Union of States is, we sub-
mit, an assured fact. All fruitful political and legal discussion
centering about the actual workings of government in the immediate
future must accept its continuance as a presupposition. This assumption,
at any rate, underlies this paper-the continuance of the States approxi-
mately with their present legal autonomy, and not, like the departments
of France, mere administrative divisions of the central government.
We must face, therefore, two sets of legal authorities-the
individual States and the United States-with their respective fields of
action not definitively delimited by law and yet constantly interacting in
fact, particularly in crucial legislative areas. The challenge of
the situation is to make legal accommodations of these practical
impingements. Inasmuch as there are these two categories of law-
making agencies, State and Nation, the solution of the problem has
Gomorrah bad in themselves and past cure. In any state the local organs, when
dissected and viewed apart, nearly always suffer by comparisons with the organ
of the central government. What these critics forget, however, is that in a great
commonwealth it is the presence of these local organs which alone renders possible
the existence of the central government. If the State Governments were abolished
as things too rotten to reform, the government of all America through the central
organ at Washington would be wholly impossible." See also Thompson, Federal
Centralization (1923) p. v: "Social, economic and psychological factors, as well as
legal must be considered in attempting to find a workable division of functions
in the federal government and the states." Senator Root's famous speech
before the Pennsylvania Society on Dec. x2, 19o6, Root, Addresses qn Government
and Citizenship, 362; Laski, Sovereignty and Centralization (ig6) 9 NEw
REPumic. 176, and reply by Croly, The Failure of the States, ibid. 17o;
Croly, Promise of American Life (I9og) passim.
'The literature on federalism, as the key to the adjubtment of forces that
parade under the fighting slogans of centralization and decentralization, is volumi-
nous. By way of suggestive references we note, Bryce, American Commonuealth
(1913) chs. 29 & 30; 2 Bryce, Modern Democracies (892i) 435-6; Laski, Founda-
tions of Sovereignty (i92i) 30; Leacock, Limitations of Federal Government
(1908) 5 PRoc. Am. PoL. Scr. Assoc. 37; Dicey, Law of the Constitution (8th ed.
1915) lxxv, 517, 529; Thompson, Federal Centralizatian (1923) ch. 19.
See Redlich, "Austria-Hungary and Serbia" (July 25, 1914) 79 EcoN. Pt. i,
179. See also the extremely illuminating study of Popovici, Die Vereinigten
Staaten von Gross-Oesterreich. (We are indebted for this valuable teference to
Dr. D. Mitrany, the historian of South-Eastern Europe.)
" Compare Mitrany, The Unmaking of lugo-Slavia (Jan. 28, 1925) 41 NEw
REPUBLTC 253; Program of Croatian Peasant Party (Feb. 25, 1925) 12o NATION,
224-
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usually been conceived in terms of exclusive duality. Evils calling
for legislative redress, recognized subjects of administrative control,
governmental promotion of social ends, have throughout our history
divided men into two hostile camps, those seeking relief through State
action and those appealing for national intervention. As a result
legal inventiveness has been curbed and its resources largely confined
to an untrue antithesis. The comcbined legislative powers of
Congress and of the several' States permit a wide range of permu-
tations and combinations for governmental action. Until very
recently these potentialities have been left largely unexplored. Politi-
cal energy has been expended on sterile controversy over supposedly
exclusive alternatives instead of utilized for fashioning new instru-
ments adapted to new situations. ,Our rapid industrialization is gener-
ating an insistent variety of interaction in the affairs of the several
States. The exclusiveness of the traditional choice in governmental
intervention is becoming correspondingly inadequate. Creativeness
is called for to devise a great variety of legal alternatives to cope with
the diverse forms of interstate interests.
Intimations of fruitful direction are furnished by new technique"
and new machinery devised during recent years in the settlement of
problems which transcend State lines. Since 189o the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has promoted uni-
formity of State legislation on subjects beyond the power of Congress
and where, from the nature of the case, diversity of treatment is an
interstate evil. By this method a vast domain of the commercial
transactions of fhe country which do not respect State lines are sought
to be brought under common legal control."6 The scheme of reciprocal
legislation has been resorted to whereby the capacity of one State to harm
or advantage another, when conflicting interests need adjustment,
is exercised by creating immunities or handicaps conditioned upon
like treatment by sister States. The importance of a policy of com-
"Thus 51 jurisdictions have passed the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law,
48 jurisdictions the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, 26 jurisdictions the Uniform
Bills of Lading Act, 27 jurisdictions the Uniform Sales Act, i6 jurisdictions the
Uniform Partnership Act. See Handbook of National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws (1924) 28; Terry, Uniform Stateo Laws in the
United States (ig2o). See also Ilbert, Unification of Commercial Law (192o) 2
JouRN. Comp. Lm Pt i, p. 77.
"See Kane v. New Jersey (1916) 242 U. S. i6o, 167-168, 37 Sup. Ct. 3o, per
Brandeis, J.:
"The Maryland law contained a reciprocal provision by which non-residents
whose cars are duly registered in their own States are given, for a limited period,
free use of the highways in return for similar privileges granted to residents of
Maryland. Such a provision promotes convenience of owners and prevents the
relative hardship of having ;to pay the full registration fees for a brief use of the
highways. It has become common in state legislation."
See, e.g., the Act of Cong. of Mar. 3, 1917 (39 Stat. at L. io02), construed in
King v. District of Columbia (i922, C. A. D. C.) 277 Fed. 562. Insurance and
the control of foreign corporations offer familiar occasions for this type of legis-
lation. See Lindsay, Reciprocal Legislation (Igio) 25 PoT. Sci. Qtsar. 435.
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mon action in certain fields of legal control is again reflected in the
conscious practice of courts to base decisions in these fields on
grounds of needed harmony between jurisdictions legally independent
of each other.18 Conferences of governors and other State officials,
partly initiated by and partly in collaboration with Federal authorities,
have more or less stimulated common State action and have served as
a fruitful interchange of views on State policies essential to an under-
standing of common interests.19 Again, the States have been enabled(
1 See Queen Ins. Co. v. Globe Ins. Co. (1924) 263 U. S. 487, 493, 44 Sup. Ct.
175, 176, per Holmes, J.: "There are special reasons for keeping in harmony with
the marine insurance laws of England, the great field of this business . .
Commercial Bank v. Canal Bank (iq 6) 239 U. S. 520, 36 Sup. Ct 194.
" Thus, President Roosevelt initiated the Conference. of Governors in i9o8;
Proceedings of Conference of Governors (ixo8) v, at seq.; Roosevelt, Auto-
biography (1913) 445 et seq. The growing scope of this co6perative method is
revealed through the reports of the great variety of associations of state officials,
catalogued in the Monthly List of State Publications published by the Library.
of Congress since igio. These associations, collectively, cover the whole scope
of modem government. A partial list of them follows: Association of Govern-
mental Labor Officials of the United States and Canada, American Institute of
Park Executives, American Association of Port Authorities, American Associa-
tion of State Highway Officials, American Prison Association, American Uniform
Boiler Law Society, Assembly of Civil Service Commissions, Association of
American Dairy, Food, and Drug Officials, Association of Official Agricultural
Chemists, Conference of Art Commissions, Conference of Governors of the States
of the Union, Conference of New England Governors, Conference of State and
Territorial Health Officers, Conference of State Sanitary Engineers, Conference
on Weights and Measures in the United States, Federation of State Medical
Boards, International Association of Dairy and Milk Inspectors, International
Association of Factory Inspectors, International Association of Game, Fish, and
Conservation Commissioners, International Association of Industrial Accident
Boards and Commissions, International Association of Public Employment
Services, Joint New England Railroad Committee, National Association of
Attorneys General, National Association of Boards of Medical Examiners,
National Association of Commissioners, Secretaries and Departments of Agricul-
ture, National Association of Comptrollers and Accounting Officers, National
Association of Dental Examiners, . National Association of State Universities,
National Association of Railway and Utilities Commissioners, National Associa-
tion of State Libraries, National Association of Supervisors of State Banks,
National .Convention of Insurance Commissions, National Probation Association,
National Tax Association, New England State Tax Officials Association, Pacific
Coast Association of Port Authorities.
In Canada there has been a growing tendency to secure codperation between the
Dominion and the Provinces by means of similar conferences. Interprovincial
conferences were held in the years 1887, 1902, I9o6, 1910, 1913, and I919. Among
other matters the Conference of 1887 passed resolutions calling for unanimity in
Provincial legislation for the enforcement of debts, for the protection of officials
acting under the authority of laws that may afterwards be held to have been
beyond the legislative jurisdiction of Parliament, for the recognition by all the
Provinces of probates and letters of administration granted in any one of them.
See Minutes of the Proceedings in Conference of the Representaives of the
Provinces, 37-38. In 1gig a National Industrial Conference of the Representatives
of the Dominion and Provincial Governments was held in Ottawa to 'consider the
subjects of industrial relations and labor laws. A resolution was adopted calling
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to control more effectively matters predominately the concern of State
legislation by auxiliary Federal legislation.
20  Following the English
device of grants-in-aid,2 1 the Federal government has latterly sought
to stimulate through financial assistance State action in matters sub-
ject to State control but involving an interest common to the whole
country,22  Another method is seen in the regulation of interstate
preserves through the practical fusion of distinct State administrative
agencies by means of joint sessions and joint action in order to deal
as a unit with legally separate parts of a common interest.
221
for a further conference for the consideration of means and methods of unifying
and cobrdinating the existing Provincial legislation bearing on the relations
between employers and employees. See Official Report of Proceedings and Dis-
cussions, Appx. p. i. This conference met the following year and submitted its
report. See 20 LABOuR GAZEnTE (1920, Can.) No. 5. Further conferences .have
been held at Ottawa in 1922 on unemployment, in 1923 on the obligations of
Canada under the labor sections of the Treaties of Peace, and in 1924 on winter
employment.
We are greatly indebted for the Canadian data to H. H. Ward, Esq., Deputy
Minister of the Dominion Department of Labour, and to F. A. Acland, Esq.,
King's Printer.
* Liquor legislation and game statutes are illustrations of a resource of Federal
legislation complementing State action, which is by no means exhausted. See
Wilson Act of Aug. 8, i8go (26 Stat. at L. 313); Lacey Act of May 25, 19oo
(31 Stat. at L. i88); Webb-Kenyon Act of Mar. i, 191 (37 Stat. at L. 699).
The scope and validity of such legislation has been frequently before the courts.
In re Rahrer (891) i4o U. S. 545, ii Sup. Ct 865; CIrrk Distilling Co. v.
Western Maryland Ry. Co. (i917) 242 U. S. 311, 37 Sup. Ct 18; Rupert v.
United States (igio, C. C. A. 8th) 181 Fed. 87. See also United States v. Green
(I905, N. D, N. Y.) 137 Fed. i79; The Wilson v. United States (I820, C. C. D.
Va.) Fed. Cas. No. 17,846.
"Webb, Grants-in-Aid (1911).
"McDonald, Federal Subsidies to the States (1923); Beard, Ainerican Govern-
tnent and Politics (4th ed. 1924) 443; Arneson, Federal Aid to the States (i922)
16 PoL. Sci. R.. 443; Douglas, A System of Federal Grants-in-Aid (I9o) 35
PoL. Sci. QumRT. 255, 522. An interesting illustration of the combined use of
grant-in-aid and compact is furnished by the so-called Weeks Law of March I,
1911 (36 Stat. at L. 96I); see Annual Report of Dept. of Agriculture (1911)
4o2. The most recent use of this power is the Sheppard-Towner Act of Mar. 23,
1921 (42 Stat. at L. 224), which was before the Court in Massachusetts v. Mellon
(1923) 262 U. S. 447, 43 Sup. Ct. 597. See Corwin, The Spending Power of
Congress (1923) 36 HARv. L. Rav. 548; Burdick, Federal Aid Legislation (1923)
8 Com. L. QUART. 324. See also Budget Message of President Coolidge (1924)
66 Cong. Rec. 33, 35; Report on Federal Subsidies to States (Wash., Dec. i924)
Editorial Research Rep.
a In 1895 the States of New York and New Jersey appointed commissions to
devise a scheme looking towards the acquisition and administration by the United
States of the Palisades as a national park. N. Y. Laws, 1895, ch. 97; N.J. Laws,
1895 ch. 415, P. 8o2. In accordance with this plan, New Jersey passed an act
ceding jurisdiction over the park to the United States. N. J. Laws, i896, ch. 23,
p. 47. The United States, however, failed to undertake the administration of this
park, and the act was repealed. N. J. Laws, 1905, cl. 56, p. 91. *Consequently, in
igoo, both States enacted statutes authorizing the appointment of ten commissioners
by each GoVernor, and creating this commission into "a body politic" with power
to acquire and condemn land for the purposes of the park. Out of these -ten
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These six instances illustrate extra-constitutional forms of legal inven-
tion for the solution of problems touching more than one State. They
were neither contemplated nor specifically provided for by the Constitu-
tion.
Two other modes of adjustment have their source in constitutional
provisions. Through jurisdiction over "Controversies between two or
more States128 the Supreme Court is building up a body of law for the
settlement of interstate problems susceptible of judicial disposition.'
Finally, the Constitution authorizes a State to "enter into any Agree-
ment or Compact with another State" with "the Consent of Con-
gress."25  Although, on very restricted occasions, availed of from the
beginning, the pressure of modem interstate problems has revealed
the rich potentialities of this device. Constitutional problems raised
by this mechanism of State compacts are the concern of this essay.
'Il.
While a notable study has been made of the employment of State
compacts in the past and of their future possibilities, 26 the history of
commissioners, only five are required to be residents of the State, and each
Governor is thus 'at liberty to appoint five commissioners who are residents of a
different State. N. Y. Laws, I9oo, ch. 17o, as amended by N. Y. Laws, igoi, ch.
5o4; N.Y. Laws, 1966, ch. 691; N.Y. Laws, i9io, ch. 361; N.Y. Laws, 1917, ch. 251;
N. J. Laws, igoo, ch. 87, as amended by N. J. Laws, i9oI, ch. 112; N. J. Laws,
i916, ch. 81. The practical result is that each Governor appoints five members to
the commission from the other State, who have already been appointed by the other
Governor. Thus, a single commission of ten members constitutes the administra-
tive body with control over the area of the park embracing a section of both
New York and New Jersey. See Annual Report of the Commissioners of Pali-
sades Interstate Park (i924) pussim.
' U. S. Const Art. III, Sec. 2.
"Smith, The American Supreme Court as an International Tribunal (x92o);
Caldwell, The Settlement of Inter-State Disputes (i92o) 14 Am. JoURN. INT.
L. 38.
"The Constitution puts this power negatively in order to express the limitation
imposed upon its exercise. By putting this authority for State action in a section
dealing with restrictions upon the States, the significance of what was granted has
probably been considerably minimized. The entire applicable provisions of the
Constitution, contained in Section io of Article I, follow:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance or Confederation...
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress ..... enter into any
Agreement or Compact with another State....
The Constitution of the Confederate States adopted the provisions of the United
States Constitution on this subject with interesting modifications. The relevant
clauses (Art. I, Sec. io) of the Confederate Constitution follow:
i. No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation....
3. .... Nor shall any State.. . . enter into any agreement or compact
with another State, or with a foreign power, . . . But when any river
divides or flows through two or more States, they may enter into compacts
with each other to improve the navigation thereof.
'Report of the Committee on Inter-State Compacts to the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (i92i) 297.
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the constitutional provisions providing for this resource of state-craft
has received scant attention. In fact, however, the Compact Clause
has its roots deep in colonial history. It is part and parcel of the long
and familiar story of colonial boundary controversies.2 7  Almost all
of the colonial charters, it will be recalled, were necessarily vague and
expansive. They had to be applied to strange and ill-surveyed terri-
tory. We are also familiar with the surrender by the sea-board colonies
of extravagant claims to remote stretches of the continent. More
important, however, for our purposes were the conflicts ensuing from
the claims of colonies to territory along the Atlantic sea-board.27a
As the populations of bordering colonies began to impinge upon one
another the settlement of boundaries became one of their predominant
problems. The story of these disputes, their final outcome and the
resulting territorial changes, concern 'the historian; the methods
evolved for settlement are of prime importance to the lawyer.
The records reveal two peaceful modes of settling these disputes.
Negotiation between the contending .colonies was the obvious way out,
carried on usually through joint commissions.28 If an agreement was
reached, not infrequently after years of tortuous discussion, the fur-
ther approval of the Crown was required.2 9  If negotiations failed or
"See Aplx. B, I, infra,
'aSee. e.g. Adams, Founding of New England, 1665-1667 (1921) 216, 227, 320,
328; Nevins, The American States (1924) 547, 578 et seq.
"See e.g. the Connecticut and New York negotiations of 1664, 1683, i7oo, and
1725, Appx. A, I, (3), (4), (7).
"That the determination of boundary disputes was -subject to the prerogative of
the King is evident from the opinion of -Lord Mansfield, as Sir W. Murray,
Attorney-General, in the second controversy between Massachusetts and Connect-
icut: "I apprehend His Majesty will confirm their agreement, which of itself is
not binding upon the Crown .. .," quoted in South Australia v. Victoria (Igr1)
12 C. L. R. 667, 704. Agreements between the Colonies were made subject to the
approval of the Crown. The instructions to the Massachusetts Commissioners
appointed to treat with the New York commissioners at Albany in 2754 provide
that the "line (is) to be immediately submitted to his Majesty for his Royal
Approbation & Confirmation..." See 15 Mass. Prov. Acts, 157. The Act of
April ii, 1729, appointing the Massachusetts commissioners to treat with the
New Hampshire commissioners, provides that "upon confirmation. . . His
Majesty be humbly addressed by both Governments for his Royal Approbation."
See ii Mass. Prov. Acts, 396. With the appointment of new commissioners in
173o they were directed to determine the boundary so that it might "be indis-
putable in all times to come, Upon its receiving the Royal Sanction." See ii
Mass. Prov. Acts, 517. The Act of Dec. 7, 1754, appointing commissioners on the
part of New York, specifically recognizes the paramount character of the King's
prerogative: "And altho' his most Gracious Majesty hath the Sole and Absolute
Right of ining and Determining Such Line of Jurisdiction as Aforesaid. ."
See 3 N. Y. Col. Laws, lO36. The prerogative character of the royal sanction
was only recently recognized in an Australian case, South Australia v. Victoria,
supra. Again, the exercise of the royal power might be asserted through the
appointment of a Royal Commission to determine a disputed boundary question.
This was the practice adopted in the disputes between New Hampshire and
Massachusetts (12 Mass. Prov. Acts, 392), between Massachusetts and Rhode
Island (4 R. I. Col. Rec. 586, note), between Massachusetts and New York
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in lieu of such direct settlement, the second mode of procedure was
invoked. This was an appeal to the Crown, followed normally by a
reference of the controversy to a Royal Commission. In effect such
a controversy before a Royal Commission bore the characteristics of a
litigation. From the decision of the Commission an appeal lay to the
Privy Council."' These two forms of adjustments became common
practice for a hundred years preceding the Revolution. An appeal
in a boundary dispute between New York and New Jersey appears in
the records of the Privy Council as late as 1773.2
The Revolution found a large number of these disputes still unde-
termined. The Articles of Confederation were framed by statesmen
deeply alive to these contentions and familiar with the colonial methods
for their adjustment. But the framers of these Articles were also
familiar with the New England Confederacy of 1643, the Temporary
Congress of i69o, the Plan of Union of 1754; they were in the midst
of a political struggle against the might of Great Britain, which could
be successfully carried on only through the united political action of
the Thirteen Colonies. While, therefore, provision had to be made
for the settlement of boundary and other disputes, which now emerged
between the new independent States, in case of failure of direct nego-
tiations between them, it was perhaps even more important to protect
the new Union of States established by the Articles of Confederation,
from the destructive political combination of two or more States. The
Articles, therefore, specifically provided for an appeal to Congress
"in all disputes and differences now subsisting or that hereafter may
arise between two or more states concerning boundary, jurisdiction
or any cause whatever." At the same time, they endeavored to secure
the authority of the Confederacy against political rivalry by the
following limitation upon the "sovereignty, freedom and independence"
"retained" by each State:
(4 N, Y. Col. Laws, 948), and between New York and New Jersey (4 Acts of
Privy Council, Col. Ser., 686). Appeals from the decision of such a commission
lay to the King in Council. Appeals were taken from the decision of the Royal
Commission in the New Hampshire-Massachusetts Controversy and the Massa-
chusetts-Rhode Island Controversy. See 12 Mass. Prov. Acts, 4o7, 4o9; 13 ibid.
24. The decision on appeal, though in form proceeding from the King, due to
pressure of business was usually delegated to the Privy Council. See 2
Batchellor, Laws of Nw Hampshire (1913) 790. The King's prerogative over
boundary disputes between the Colonies must be distinguished from resort to
Chancery to enforce boundary agreements between proprietary owners, upon the
analogy of decreeing specific performance of contracts to convey land. See Peni
v. Lord Baltimore (1750, Ch.) i Ves. 444, 446.
" See e.g. the Massachusetts and New Hampshire Settlement of i74o, Appx.
B, I, (I), infra.
'It will, of course, be recalled that the Privy Council was not formally set
apart through its Judicial Committee as a judicial organ until (1833) 3 & 4 Will.
IV, c. 41. See Dicey, Priv)y Council (1887) passim. ,
'5 Acts of the Privy Council, Col. Ser. 45. See also Appx. B, I, (3), infra.
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"ARTICLE VI. No state without the Consent of the united states
in congress assembled, shall send any embassy to, or receive any
embassy from, or enter into any conference, agreement, alliance or
treaty with any King, prince, or state ......
"No two or more states shall enter into any treaty, confederation
or alliance whatever between them, without the consent of the united
states in congress assembled, specifying accurately the purpose for
which the same is to be entered into, and how long it shall continue."
The absence of any powerful national capabilities on the part of
the Confederacy, except in the conduct of foreign affairs, underlines
the significance of these clauses as insurance against competing poli-
tical power.. This curb upon political combinations by the States
was retained almost in haec verba by the Constitution.
But the Constitution also authorized agreements between the States
with the consent of Congress. Obviously the framers contemplated
adjustments among the States which did not involve political entangle-
ments embarrassing to the national government. The records of the Con-
stitutional Convention furnish no light as to the source and scope of this
compact provision of Article I, Section io. Nor does the Federalist help.
But the history of the times furnishes an ample commentary. "It is a
part of the public history of the United States ..... that at the adoption
of the Constitution there were existing controversies between eleven
states respecting their boundaries, which arose under their respective
charters, and had continued from the first settlement of the Colonies."38s
In addition, -the States had resorted to agreements among themselves,
adjusting controversies other than boundary disputes.34 The framers
were familiar with the modes of settlement prior to the Revolution-
that controversies were determined partly through agreements con-
firmed by the Crown, and partly by litigation on appeal to the Privy
Council. The Philadelphia Convention wrote both methods practised
by the Colonies into the Constitution. Controversies between the
Colonies which came before the Privy Council were, in effect, pre-
cursors of the types of litigation over which the Supreme Court
assumed jurisdiction 5 under Article III extending "the judicial
Power" to "Controversies between two or more States." The power
to negotiate settlements between the Colonies, subject to the sanction of
the royal prerogative, was written into Article I, Section-8. (0.
Historically the consent of Congress, as a prerequisite to the valid-
ity of agreements by States, appears as the republican transformation
of the needed approval by the Crown. But the Constitution plainly
had two very practical objectives in view in conditioning agreement by
States upon consent of Congress. "8  For only Congress is the
- See Rhode Island v. Massachusetts (1838, U. S.) 12 Pet 657, 723. See also
Beer, British Colonial Policy, r754-1765 (i9o7) 50, note.
_ "See Appx. B, III, infra.
"The power of the Court was first canvassed in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,
supra, and jurisdiction was assumed over the dissent of Chief Justice Taney.
" Madison in his retrospect on the framing of the Constitution reverts to these
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appropriate organ for determining what arrangements between States
might fall within the prohibited class of "Treaty, Alliance, or Con-
federation", and what arrangements come within the permissive class
of "Agreement or Compact.' 3 7 But even the permissive agreements
may affect the interests of States other than those parties to the
agreement: the national, and not merely a regional, interest may be
involved. Therefore, Congress must exercise national supervision
through its power to grant or withhold consent, or to grant it under
appropriate conditions. The framers thus astutely created a mechan-
ism of legal control over affairs that are projected beyond State lines
and yet may not call for, nor be capable of, national treatment. They
allowed interstate adjustments but duly safeguarded the national
interest.
Iv.
What has been the history of this clause in action? We hae set forth
in an appendix a detailed catalogue of the compacts to which Congress
has given its. sanction, the action of the State legislatures in nego-
tiating, ratifying and enforcing agreements, the administration of
agencies created by compacts, and adjudications involving them.38
In addition, the appendix contains an enumeration of agreements
which became operative without Congressional consent and litigation
under them, proposals for agreements which were never concluded,
and, finally, important pending projects for compacts awaiting State
or Congressional ratification. 9
Despite the relatively limited resort to this constitutional machinery
in the adjustment of interstate relations, its use to date reveals the
possibilities of the wide scope of legislative problems for which it is
available. Difficulties in the following fields of legislation have elicited
application of the Compact Clause:
considerations: "In other cases the Fedl authy was violated by Treaties &
wars .... by compacts witht. the consent of Congress as between Pena. and
N. Jersey. and between Virga. & Maryd. From the Legisl: Journals of Virga. it
appears, that a vote to apply for a sanction of Congs. was followed by a vote
agst. a cormnunication of the Compact to Congs." Madison, Preface to Debates
in the Convention of 1787, 3 Farrand, Records of the Constitutional Convention
(191I) Appx. A, CCCI, 548.
'There is no self-executing test differentiating "compact" from "treaty."
Story and other writers have attempted an analytical classification. Story, Consti-
tution (5th ed. 189i) secs. i4o2-i4o5. The attempt is bound to go shipwreck
for we are in a field in which political judgment is, to say the least, one of the
important factors. The considerations that led the Supreme Court to leave Con-
gress the determination of what constitutes a republican form of government as
guaranteed by the Constitution (Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon [1912]
223 U. S. I18. 32 Sup. Ct. 224) are equally controlling in leaving to Congress to
circumscribe the area of agreement open to the States.
' See Appx. A, III, infra.
' See Appx. A, IV-VI, infra.
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(i) Boundaries 'and cessions of territory.
(2) Control and improvement of navigation.
() Penal jurisdiction.
(4) Uniformity of legislation.
(5) Interstate accounting.
(6) Conservation of natural resources.
(7) Utility regulation.
(8) Taxation.
(i) Boundary disputes were the earliest as they have been the
most continuous occasions for invoking the Compact Clause. Here is
a type of controversy, one would suppose, which is readily amenable
to judicial settlement. In a dozen or so cases the judicial power of the
Supreme Court was in fact invoked. Yet litigation in notable instances
did not settle, or settle permanently, contentions between the States.' 0
Compacts furnished the solution."1 The Supreme Court itself has more
than once adverted to the inadequacy of the judicial process, and
counselled the parties to-this more fruitful method of settlement 4 2
(2) Community interest in navigation upon common waters of
adjoining States gave rise to difficulties prior to the Constitution,'4
are pressing today,4" and are bound to manifest themselves in the
future. We find negotiated agreement between the affected States
'Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, supra, note 33; Washington v. Oregon (igog)
214 U. S. 205, 29 Sup. Ct 631; Minnesota v. Wisconsin (1920) 252 U. S. 273, 40
Sup. Ct. 3i3.
' See Compact between Massachusetts and Rhode Island of i859, Appx. A,
III, (7), infra. In Missouri v. Nebraska (i9o5) 197 U. S. 577, 25 Sup. Ct. 58o,
the Supreme Court entered a decree in accordance with a stipulation of the parties
agreeing to a former survey as determining the boundary line. This suggestion
of a stipulation was made by the Court in the earlier case of Missouri v. Nebraska,
(19o4) 196 U. S. 23, 25 Sup. Ct. 155, where it was held that avulsion had not
worked any change in the boundary. In Iowa v. Illinois (1893) 147 U. S. I, 13
Sup. Ct. 239, the Court decided that the boundary line between the two States
was the middle of the Mississippi River and ordered that a commission be appointed
to ascertain and designate this line. The commissioners filed a report which the
Court ordered to be confirmed, but which in Iowa v. Illinois (i894) x5i U. S. 238,
14 Sup. Ct. 333, the Court set aside on the showing that Illinois had not concurred
in the motion for the approval of the report as the Court believed it had. In
Iowa v. Illinois (i9o6) 202 U. S. 59, 26 Sup. Ct. 57i, both States moved to set
aside the two prior decrees of the Court, and asked the Court to enter as a final
decree the boundary line agreed upon between the parties, which request the Court
so ordered. See also Nebraska v. Iowa (i8gi) 143 U. S. 359, 12 Sup. Ct 396;
Nebraska v. Iowa (1892) 145 U. 9, 519, 12 Sup. Ct. 976.
' "It seems appropriate to repeat the suggestion, made in Washington v. Oregon,
supra 217, 218, that the parties endeavor with the consent of Congress to adjust
their boundaries." Minnesota v. Wisconsin (i92o) 252 U. S. 273, 283, 40 Sup.
Ct 3X3, 319. See also State v. Faudre (1903) 54 W. Va. 122, 136, 46 S. E.
269, 275.
I See e.g. the agreement between Virginia and Maryland concerning the
Potomac River, Appx. A, II (3) infra.
"New York Port Authority Agreement, Appx. A, III (35) infra.
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the key to such difficulties in pre-Constitution days; State com-
pacts give the most successful answer to similar problems of today.
The history of the New York Port Authority furnishes a most
hopeful story of effective treatment of interstate relations.4 6 New
York and New.Jersey have a special interest in the Port of New York.
But the greatest harbor in the United States is of vital commercial
importance to the whole country. About half of the foreign com-
merce of the country passes through this port. The flow of commerce
into New York from the West and the vast flow of importations from
abroad entail an infinite complexity of transactions, facilities and
processes in order to achieve an economic, efficient and continuous
movement of commerce. This implies an alert regulation of traffic
on the water, a steady attention to the engineering needs of the harbor,
an adequate supply of terminal facilities, both on the New York and
on the New Jersey side, the wise utilization of such facilities, quick
means for loading and unloading, and speedy distribution. 7 Plainly
these are the factors that make or mar a harbor.
From the point of view of geography, commerce, and engineering,
the Port of New York is an organic whole. Politically, the port is split
between the law-making of two States, independent but futile in their
respective spheres. The scarcity of land and mounting commerce
have concentrated on the New York side of the Hudson River the
bulk of the terminal facilities for foreign commerce, while it has made
the Jersey side, to a substantial extent, the terminal and breaking-up
yards for the east-and west-bound traffic. In addition, both sides of
the Hudson are dotted with municipalities, who have sought to satisfy
their interest in the general problem through a confusion of local regula-
tions.4 In addition, the United States has been asserting its
guardianship over interstate and foreign commerce. What in fact
was one, in law was many. Plainly the situation could not be
adequately dealt with except through the co6rdinated efforts of New
York, New Jersey, and the United States. The facts presented a
problem for the unified action of the law-making of these three
governments, and law heeded facts.
In 1917 New York and New Jersey established commissions "to
negotiate or agree upon a joint report recommending a policy to be
pursued by the State of New York, the State of New Jersey, and the
United States by legislative enactment or treaty or otherwise" for
the Port of New York.49 After comprehensive study and tentative
proposals submitted for public discussion, the Joint Commission in
'See South Carolina and Georgia Agreement, Appx. A, II (4) infra. See
also note 43.
"See Reports listed in Appx. A; III (35)-(d) infra.
See the comprehensive plan contained in N. Y. Laws, 1922, ch. 43, p. 6i.
"4Joint Report of New York, New Jersey Port & Harbor Cornission (i920)
p. 6.
,ON. Y. Laws, 1917, ch. 426, p.. 1325; N. J. Laws, i917, ch. 130, p. 288.
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192o submitted reports to the Governors of New York and New
Jersey.50 The recommendations of this report led to further legisla-
tion in 1921, for the appointment of commissioners by the two States
to negotiate a compact between them.51 A compact was agreed upon,
ratified by the States, and consented to by Congress.5 2 In brief, the
agreement established an interstate administrative agency known as
the Port of New York Authority, which is empowered to own or
operate transportation facilities in conjunction with municipalities
and private owners, to procure co-operation among existing agencies,
and, most important, to formulate a comprehensive plan for the
development of the port, the administration of which, approved by the
Legislatures of the two States,53 is entrusted to the Port Authority.
(3) Controversies over boundaries furnish loopholes for defend-
ants in criminal cases where the locus of the crime is committed in
disputed territory. Similar jurisdictional claims arise in prosecutions
for crimes committed on boundary waters. To avoid the difficulties
of proof compacts have been resorted to, giving penal authority to
adjoining States.54 The most striking illustration of this mode of
accommodating interstate problems is the consent given by Congress
for the formulation of some agreement by Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana
and Michigan for the trial of crimes committed on Lake Michigan. 55
(4) Diversity of legislation among the several States as to some
matters is inevitable and desirable. We have all too few social
experiments carried on "in the insulated chambers afforded by the
several States." 56 But in other fields uniformity of legislation among
the several States is equally necessary. Uniformity is being pursued
with rimarked achievement through the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws by securing the independent enactment
by the individual States of the same measure. 7 In one instance, at least,
the Compact Clause had been relied upon for uniformity.58 Attaining
this end through compact assures maintenance of uniformity during
the life of the compact. But the scope of this" type of law-making
through rigid contracts between States is necessarily restricted.
(5) The solution of the intricate problem of apportionment of
a State indebtedness following division of a State gave rise, in part,
to another application of the Compact Clause. By agreement West
.Joint Report, supra note 48.
N. Y. Laws, I921, ch. I54, p. 492; N. J. Laws, i921, ch. 151, p. 412.
'Act of Aug. 23, 1921 (42 Stat. at L. 174) ; N. J. Laws, 1921, ch. 151, p. 412;
N. Y. Laws, I92i, cl. 203, p. 841.
"N. Y. Laws, i922, ch. 43, p. 6i; N. J. Laws, 3922, ch. 9, p. 25. See also Act of
July 1, 1922 (42 Stat at L. 822).
"See Appx. A, III (4), (I9)-(23), (25), (32) infra.
"See Appx. A, IV, (25) infra.
"Holmes, J., dissenting, in Truax v. Corrigan (1921) 257 U, S. 312, 344, 42
Sup. Ct. 124, 134; Taft, Popular Government (1913) 155.
See supra note I6.
"See Appx. A, III, (i) infra.
A STUDY IN INTERSTATE ADJUSTMENTS
Virginia, upon its separation from Virginia, assumed its share of the
old State debt. Even so, it required forty years of negotiation after the
Civil War, followed by twelve years of litigation in the Supreme Court
of the United States, to translate the general obligation into dollars
and cents.59 The erection of new States does not appear on the hori-
zon and, therefore, the particular form of interstate accounting in
which compact played a part between Virginia and West Virginia is
not likely to arise in the near future. But it is not difficult to foresee
other interstate financial entanglements for which a contract between
States would be serviceable.
(6) What is now called the conservation of natural resources
makes its early appearance in the regulation of fishing rights on
boundary waters. Even before the Constitution we find that the
common interest in natural resources, of a region embracing two
States, was furthered by an agreement between such States.60 As
the frontier moved westward, as the free lands became absorbed and
the Thiiteen Colonies of thiee and a half million became a continent
of a hundred and ten million no longer predominantly agricultural
and, therefore, pressing more and more upon the food supply, habits
of extravagance and waste acquired in the earlier days of apparently
illimitable resources had to be supplanted by wise husbandry and
systematic development. Conservation of natural resources is thus
making a major demand on American statesmanship. An explora-
tion of the possibilities of the compact idea furnishes a partial answer
to one of the most intricate and comprehensive of all American
problems.
The protection of fish on boundary waters becomes increasingly
urgent. Here is a field for regulation which constitutionally seems
beyond the scope of the Federal government.61 Regional control is
the practical answer to wasteful non-action or wasteful conflict.
Vigilance by one State, though based on scientific direction, may be
thwarted by inaction, or lax administration, in an adjoining State.
6 2
The practical effect may threaten an important food supply. These
considerations are reflected in the constructive treatment by Washing-
ton and Oregon of the conjoint fisheries problems raised by the great
salmon resources of the Columbia River. By compact the two States
"See Appx. A, III, (9) infra.
"See Appx. A, II, (3) infra.
' The doctrine of Missouri v. Holland (920) 252 U. S. 416, 4o Sup. Ct. 382,
opens up possible vistas of Federal regulation through the exercise of the treaty-
power.
"Of course compact is not an automatic remedy. It requires vigorous and
wise action by the contracting States. Referring to the Washington-Oregon
compact, the Oregon court -notes Washington's failure to enact suitable legislation
to carry into effect its provisions: "That the usefulness of the act as a protec-
tive measure is largely impaired by the failure of the State of Washington to
enact similar legislation is patent." Union Fishermen's Co. v. Shoemaker
(921) 98 Ore. 679, 68o, 194 Pac. 854, 855.
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have a policy of co-operation based on minimum requirements for
the protection of fish within the common area."3 A similar arrange-
ment prevails between Delaware and New Jersey.64 The country
turiishes ample opportunity for the extension of this mode of regu-
lation in the safeguarding of our fish supply.6"a
The conservation movement gained its initial momentum through
a recognition of the irreplaceable destruction of our forests. Chemis-
try may invent new forms or new uses of food; unknown fuel may
still be hidden in the earth. But new forests cannot be created except
through very slow growth, nor can their need be replaced by substi-
tutes. Climatic conditions, flood control, navigation, as well as our
food supply, depend upon the range and density of our forests.
Here again, we encounter situations for adjustment which cut across
State lines and, therefore, necessitate interstate treatment. Legal
authority is not coterminous with the needs for its exercise. Power
to deal with the problem rests partly with the States and partly with
the Federal Government as dominus of the public domain and as
guardian of interstate navigation. The need for such a co-operative
solution has been recognized by Congress in giving a general consent
for future agreements between the States and the United States "for
the purpose of conserving the forests and the water-supply of the
States entering into such agreements."85
The reclamation of arid territory through irrigation and the fullest
possible satisfaction of the competing demands on a limited water-
supply by an increasing population, present one of the most permeating
aspects of the conservation problem. To a dramatic extent it is an
ever-present concern in the daily lives of the people in one region,
See Appx. A, III, (29) infra.
U See Appx. A, III, (19) infra.
"a See Secretary Hoover's call for a conference on co-operation by the coastal
States to conserve fisheries along, the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. New York
Times, April 30, 1925.
'Act of Mar. 1, 191 (36 Stat at L. 961) amended by Act of Mar. 3, 1925,
68th Cong. 2d sess. Public No. 59r; Appx. A, III (26), infra. See also Report
of Dept. of Agriculture (191) 4Ol-4O4; House Rep. No. IO36, 6ist Cong. 2d
sess. The possibilities of the compact idea in another field of conservation have
recently been adumbrated by President Coolidge: "Many proposals have been put
forward for exterminating the weevil, among which it seems 'probable that the
most effective would be to starve it out of existence by absolutely discontinuing
the growth of cotton year by year in successive zones. But there are great
ractical difficulties. The program would require the co-operation of the States
throughout the cotton belt and of the cotton raisers in them.
A suggestion was made to a convention of the cotton-growing interests three
or four years ago that the foundation for such co-operation might be laid if the
cotton States would enter into a treaty among themselves pledging co-operation
in executing it. There are several examples of such interstate treaties for the
accomplishment of ends which could not be attained by the States acting separately.
I believe the suggestion has much of practical value, and that if the cotton States
would act upon it they would find the National Government prepared to give all
possible assistance and encouragement to the program."-New York Times,
April 7 1925.
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while it hardly touches the imagination, let alone the lives, of millions
of people in other parts of the country. Wherever the pressure is felt
one answer is clear: no one State can control the power to feed or
to starve, possessed by a river flowing through several States. 8 A
great number of our streams have this potency. Moreover, there can
not be a definitive settlement. Population, engineering, irrigation con-
ditions constantly change; they cannot be cast into a stable mould by
adjudication or isolated acts of administration. The whole economic
region must be the unit of adjustment; continuity of supervision the
technique. Agreement among the affected States and the United
States, with an administrative agency for continuous study and con-
tinuing action, is the legal institution alone adequate and adapted to
the task.
The Colorado River is the Nile for the Southwest; the State of
Colorado its Soudan. At first there was no collision among the various
users because nature was adequate to their scattered needs. The
earlier Imperial Valley development could be made without sacrifice
elsewhere. The irrigation projects by Arizona and Colorado could like-
wise draw freely on the available surplus. But when, in course of time,
the United States proposed enormous projects on the public domain
within this basin, and when the abutting States planned further works,
with the increasing need of water for domestic and industrial uses,
the cumulative demands upon the river put an end to laissez faire.
Conflicts followed, with the conventional resort to courts. But litiga-
tion added confusion, not settlement. The judicial instrument is too
static and too sporadic for adjusting a social-economic issue con-
tinuously alive in an area embracing more than a half a dozen States.
The situation compelled accommodation through agreement for con-
tinuous control of these continuously competing interests. Initiated by
the Governor of Utah in i919, a movement, participated in by the Colo-
rado River Basin States in collaboration with the United States Recla-
mation Service, was started for the interstate study and solution of the
problems presented by the utilization of the water supply of the
Colorado River and its tributaries. After a series of conferences,
the necessity of settlement by compact was agreed upon in principle.
6
T
The consent of Congress for such a compact accelerated its realiza-
tion.6 A second series of conferences of the accredited commissioners
of the seven States, in which the special claims of each State were
voiced at public hearings, and the concern of the United States was
represented by Secretary Hoover, evolved the details of the plan now
known as the Colorado River Compact.8 9 In sum, the compact formu-
Colorado v. Kansas (19o7) 2o6 U. S. 46, 27 Sup. Ct. 655.
The story of this movement is probably best related by D. E. Carpenter,
Commissioner for Colorado, in his Report to the Governor of Colorado, submitted
to the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, Hearings in re H. R.
6821 (192i) i6-2o, 67 Conge ist sess.
"Act of Aug. ig, 1921 (42 Stat at L. 17).
'Report of Sec. of Commerce (r92") io.
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lates the terms of a policy for the present equitable apportionment
of the waters of the Colorado River System, and also provides
machinery and method for continuous supervision and adaptations of
policy to changing conditions. The compact has cleared the hurdles
of six legislatures and will come into effect if and when Arizona
ratifies.70 Measured by the vastness of the region and the magnitude
of the interests regulated, the Colorado Compact represents, thus far,
the most ambitious. illustration of interstate agreements.
The widespread public discussion elicited by the evolution of the
Colorado River Compact has served to educate the irrigation States
to the possibilities of the compact idea. Six projects for like settle-
merkt of other interstate irrigation difficulties followed. One has
been perfected by recent consent ,of Congress ;71 another has been
embodied in an agreement, ratified by one State; 72 the terms of a
third have been agreed upon ;78 for three others commissioners to
formulate a compact have been appointed.
7 4
The control of floods through drainage works is a growing subject
of controversy between States. Litigation, when resorted to, has been
long drawn out, costly and inconclusive. Again the States turn to
compact. Surveys of drainage areas affecting more than one State
and looking toward regulation by agreement are being undertaken
through the joint action of the interested States, in collaboration
with the Secretary of War.75 Flood control through irrigation and
drainage work is bound to demand attention through the increasing
development of our inland water ways. The geographic unit of a river
or lake basin is itsdrainage area. The legal unit must correspond to the
geographic or engineering unit. Control will frequently have to be
interstate; compact is apt to be its most effective form.
An adequate water supply.f or our teeming city populations presents
one of the most exigent problems of conservation. Throughout the
country cities are seeking to tap water for their inhabitants at distances
remote from city limits. Los Angeles contemplates tapping the Colo-
rado River over miles of desert; New York, fearing the exhaustion
of the Catskill supply, is exploring the upper regions of the Delaware:
Philadelphia aims toward a purer supply at remoter points on the
Delaware River; the Jersey cities must draw on the same reservoir.
Plainly here is a complexity which litigation cannot resolve, nor legis-
lation by any one State through which a common stream happens
to flow or which contains the common reservoir. The elaborate
agreement just concluded by New York, Pennsylvania and New
Jersey, now awaiting State action and Congressional sanction, repre-
sents the legal solution of the interests of three States dependent upon a
"'See Appx. A, III, (34) infra. See Appx. A, IV, (I) ilfra.
" See Appx. A, III, (38) infra. "See Appx. A, IV, (3) infra.
"See Appx. A, IV, (2), (3), (4), infra.
See Appx. A, III, (28), (8); VI, (ii) infra.
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common supply of water."8 Like the Colorado River Compact it for-
mulates a policy for the apportionment and.. preservation of water
and the adaptation of such policy to the -future, secured through con-
tinuous study and supervision by a permanent joint administrative
agency. The variety of powers proposed fo- this commission reveals
the interrelation of the problems with which it is to deal and the scope
of the proposed agreement. Priority of use, forest regulations,
hydraulic constructions, sewage control, condemnation, riparian claims,
all are inextricably bound up with the regulation of the water-supply..
They are all aspects of a single problem and have to be dealt with as an
entirety.
(7) Public utility regulation discloses a steady contraction of
control by individual States and a corresponding absorption of authority
by the Federal Government. More and more, in a growingly national
system of transportation transactions -which in their isolation consti-
tute intrastate commerce have had their repercussion upon interstate
commerce. 77  Even here, however, the transfer of power from the
States to the Federal Government has been piece-meal, step by step.
In its present far-reaching extension the localized interests of the
individual States have been scrupulously written into law78 and insisted
upon by the Supreme Court.7 9  Apart from the railroads, however,
there is still left a wide and vital sphere of interstate communications
which project beyond State lines but are nevertheless predominantly
regional rather than national in their penetration. Congress has left a
considerable part of this field unregulated just because it is essentially
local or regional in its significance and because the burden of national
oversight would be excessive and ineffective. Here, again, there is
need for regulation by the unified action of the affected region. Again
we find resort to compact. Early in our history such action was
resorted to for the building of a canal between Virginia, Maryland and
the District of Columbia, and incidentally affecting Pennsylvania."0 A
recent analogue of this method enabled New York and New Jersey
to secure under-water communication through the Hudson Tunnels.8 '
"See Appx. A. IV, (2) infra.
" This phenomenon may be traced more particularly in the legislation beginning
with the Hepburn Act of June 29, i9o6 (34 Stat. at L. 584) as applied in such
cases as the Minnesota Rate Cases (1913) 230 U. S. 35P 33 Sup. Ct. 724; the
Shreveport Case (1914) 234 U. S. 342, 34 Sup. Ct. 833; the Wiscon.sin Rate Case
(1922) 257 U. S. 563, 42 Sup. Ct. 232; the New England Dvisions Case (1923)
261 U. S. x84, 43 Sup. Ct. 27o; the Recapture Clause decision, Dayton-Goose
Creek Ry. v. United States (1924) 263 U. S. 456, 44 Sup. Ct. 169; the Los Angeles
Terminal case, R. R. Comnn. of California v. Southern Pac. Co. (i924) 264 U. S.
331, 44 Sup. Ct 376.
" Interstate Commerce Act, secs. 13 (2), 13 (3) as amended by the Transporta-
tion Act of 192o (4 Stat. at L. 456).
See Wisconsin Rate Case, supra note 77, at 590-591.
"See Appx. A, III, (3) infra.
' See Appx. A, III, (31) infra.
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Throughout the country local utilities cross State lines and raise irri-
tating difficulties over regulation.8 2  State compact furnishes an effec-
tive answer. Kansas and Missouri have drawn on it to master such
a situation.8 3  Here is a ready means for avoiding undue congestion
at Washington and the ineffectiveness of individual State control.
(8) The tax burden of this country is not comparable to the drain
upon the national income of Great Britain, whose taxes absorb close
to a fourth of its annual income, compared with about ten per cent. in
this country.84 But all political parties are agreed that our situation
also calls for relief, however they may differ in their views as
to the proper distribution of the incidence of taxation. Our own problem
is complicated by the overlapping taxing powers of States and Nation
as well as the opportunity for reciprocity and retaliation between
States. Certainly as between the States there is much need for
simplification, for avoidance of litigation, for equitable apportionment
of common taxing resources, which, to some extent, may affect the
total of taxation and the inconveniences incident to the administration
of our tax laws.8 5 An intimation of a field hitherto unexplored is
furnished by the compact between Kansas and Missouri for the
taxation of interstate municipal activities.8 6  The taxing power is the
most jealous power of government; it is also least amenable to the
scientific process. Nevertheless, no one can scan the flood of cases
dealing with "jurisdiction" to tax, rules for apportionment and the
like, without realizing that the opportunities for taxation open to the
States against common resources might find a more economic and
more effective solution through negotiation than through litigation.
At all events, in view of the growing burden upon time and feelings,
as well as the cost in money due to the conflicts and confusion arising
from the administration of independent systems of State taxation, the
possibilities of amelioration and economy realizable through an alert
use of the Compact Clause call for more intensive study, as part
of a disciplined attack upon the entire tax problem.
We have passed in rapid review the concrete occasions which have
evoked resort to compact, and the facts of life to which they were
addressed. From this r~sum6 it appears that the instances for which
compact was found serviceable fall into two broad types of situations.
2- See e.g. Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky (1894) I54 U. S.
204, 14 Sup. Ct. 1094; Port Richmond & B. P. Ferry Co. v. Freeholders of
Hudson County (1914) 234 U. S. 317, 34 Sup. Ct 22i; ef. New York Cent. R. R.
Co. v. Freeholders of Hudson County (1913) 227 U. S. 248, 33 Sup. Ct. 269.
See Appx. A, II, (36) infra.
Seligman, Comparative Tax Burdens in the Twentieth Century (1924) 39 PoI..
Sci. QutART. io6, 143.
' See e.g. Proceedings of National Tax Associttion (1922) passim. See e.g.
Judson, Interstate Comity in Taxation (i907) PRoc. NAT. TAx Ass'N 3g; Reed,
A Council of States, ibid. 2o; Dix, State County and Taxation (ig1) ibid. 45;
Report of Commission on Uniform Insurance Tax (191o) ibid. 291.
' See Appx. A, III, (36) infra.
A STUDY IN INTERSTATE ADJUSTMENTS
First, controversies between two or more States that abstractly may
be fit subjects for litigation but which, because of the nature of the
issues-the range, the intricacy, the technicality of the facts-make
a court a very ill-adapted instrument for settlement; the second class
,comprises situations which are wholly beyond the process of adjudi-
cation.
Boundary controversies, one would suppose, furnish" the most fami-
liar opportunity for judicial action. But when a boundary controversy
concerns two States we are at once in a world wholly different from
that of a law-suit between John Doe and Richard Roe over the metes
and bounds of Blackacre. The scale of the litigation, for one thing,
makes a heavy drain upon the Supreme Court's time and, therefore,
affects the quality of judgment which the Court is capable of exer-
cising-a powerful consideration as the pressure upon the Court's
energies becomes one of the most obvious as well as one of the sub-
tlest factors in its work. 7  Again, the political implications of the
"A summary story of the progressive impact of business upon the resources of
the Supreme Court down to i88o was thus put by Ex-Justice Strong: "In 18oi.
when John Marshall was appointed Chief Justice of that court, the number of cases
brought into it for adjudication was only ten. The entire number during the five
next following years, including both writs of error and appeals, was only one
hundred and twenty, or an average of twenty-four each year. Thence forward
the business of the court increased slowly until, in the period between 1826 and
i83o, the aggregate number of cases brought into it was two hundred and eighty-
nine-the average being about fifty-eight a year. In 1836, when Roger B. Taney
succeeded Marshall as Chief Justice, the number was only thirty-seven. From
1830 to i85o, the increase was also very gradual. Within the five years ending
with 185o, the number of cases brought into the court, including those docketed
and dismissed without argument, was three hundred and fifty-seven, or an average
of seventy-one a year. The court was then able to dispose of its entire docket
during a session of three months. But, since the year 185o, the increase has been
much more rapid. Within the five years ending with 188o, the number of new
cases has been nineteen hundred and fifty-five, averaging more than three hundred
and ninety-one each year. This exhibits, certainly, a very remarkable increase,
serious in its consequences.' Strong, The Needs of the Supreme Court (188I)
132 N. A~m. REv. 437. For the last forty years the increase of business has been
even more marked. The steady increase in pressure during the last decade has
been authoritatively set forth in the testimony of Mr. Justice Van Devanter as
Chairman of a Sub-Committee of the Court seeking legislative relief: "The
summary shows that from 1913 to 1923 the number of new cases coming into
the court increased from 526 to 72o, and that the number of cases disposed of
during those years increased from 597 in 1913 to 765 at the October, 1922, term."
Hearing before Sub-Committee of Committee on the Judiciary of U. S. Senate,
68 Cong. ist sess., on S. 2060 and S. 2o6i, Feb. 2, 1924, pp. 27-28, 43-45.
The desired relief was granted by Congress in the so-called Judges Bill, which
became law on Feb. 13, 1925 (68 Cong. 2d sess. Public No. 415).
Against this background of the Court's pressure and its capacity adequately to
dispose of its task, must be projected the enormous drain on the Court's time and
energy involved in these intricate interstate boundary disputes. Thus the Rhode
Island-Massachusetts case was pending in the Court for fourteen years (1832-
1846) ; and appears eight times in the reports. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,
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controversy are not readily satisfied through litigation. The area for
sensible compromise, not following strictly legal lines, is fairly cir-
cumscribed even in the spacious body of legal doctrine which the
Supreme Court has been working out in interstate litigation. Social
traditions, political loyalties, extensive economic interests begin to
manifest themselves, which are wholly absent in a case of Doe v.
Roe. We strike here serious limits to effective judicial action.8 8  It
is not surprising, therefore, to find that Massachusetts and Rhode
Island, after experiencing one long drawn-out irritating litigation over
their boundary, disposed another phase of that conflict by compact.8 "
Still more significant, the Supreme Court, conscious of its practical
limitations, in two boundary cases counselled States to seek settlement
through compact rather than by judicial decree. 0
Boundary .disputes being so obstinate to litigious treatment, we
naturally find that more complicated interstate controversies are still
(1833, U. S.) 7 Pet. 65I, (837, U. S.) ii Pet. 226, (1838, U. S.) 12 Pet. 657,
(1838, U. S.) 12 Pet. 755, (1839, U. S.) I3 Pet. 23, (1840, U. S.) 14 Pet. 210,
(1841, U. S.)_15 Pet. 233, (1846, U. S.) 4 How. 59I. The Florida-Georgia Case
was pending for four years. Florida v. Georgia (1850, U. S.) ii How. 293,
(1854, U. S.) 17 How. 478. The Alabama-Georgia Case was pending four years.
Alabama v. Georgia (1859, U. S.) 23 How. 505. The Missouri-Kentucky Case
was pending for eleven years. Missouri v. Kentucky (187o, U. S.) ii Wall. 395.
The Missouri-Iowa Case, instituted in 1848, after one disposition by the Court
in 185o, was re-opened for final disposition forty years later. Missouri v.
Iowa (1849, U. S.) 7 How. 6o; (85o, U. S.) io How. 1; (1896) 16o U. S. 688,
16 Sup. Ct. 433; (1897) I65 U. S. 118, 17 Sup. Ct 290. The Indiana-Kentucky
Case, after a decisionin i8go sustaining the claim of Kentucky, remained on the
docket of the Court for six years before final disposition. Indiana v. Kentucky
(i89o) 136 U. S. 479, io Sup. Ct 1o51; (1895) i59 U. S. 275, 16 Sup.'Ct. 320;
(1897) 67 U. S. 270, 17 Sup. Ct. 999. The Maryland-West Virginia Case, in
which the bill was filed in 1891, was not disposed of until 1912. Maryland v.
West Virginia (910) 217 U. S. I, 577, 30 Sup. Ct 268, 630; (1912) 225 U.
S. I, 32 Sup. Ct. 672. The Oklahoma-Texas litigation, begun in 1919, is only
now being wound up. Scarcely a term of the Court went by without the entry
of a decree or an order of some nature. Oklahoma v. Texas (920) 253 U. S.
465, 40 Sup. Ct. 58o; (192D) 254 U. S. 28o, 6o3, 6o9,,615, 41 Sup. Ct 12, 146, 317;
(1921) 256 U. S. 70, 602, 41 Sup. Ct. 420, 539; (1922) 257 U. S. 308,6O9, 611, 616,
621, 42 Sup. Ct 46, 49, 94, I67, 187; (1922) 258 U. S. 574, 6o6, 42 Sup. Ct 314,
406; (1922) 259 U. S. 565, 42 Sup. Ct 594; (r923) 260 U. S. 6o6, 705, 711, 43
Sup. Ct 166, 221, 251; (923) 261 U. S. 340, 345, 606, 43 Sup. Ct 364, 376;
(1923) 262 U. S. 505, 724, 43. Sup. Ct 7Ol, 7o4; (1924) 264 U. S. 565, 44 Sup.
Ct 455; (924) 265 U. S. 76, 490, 493, 500, 505, 513, 573, 44 Sup. Ct. 457, 460,
571, 573, 604, 6o7, 608; .(1924) 266 U. S. 298, 303, 546, 583, 45 Sup. Ct l1, 122,
195, 198, 355, 356. The North Dakota-Minnesota controversy, in which the bill
was filed in 1916, was argued in 1921, restored again to the docket, reargued in
1923 when a decision was rendered. North Dakota v. Minneirota (1923) 263 U. S.
365, 583, 44 Sup. Ct. 138, 2o8. The New Mexico-Colorado controversy, in which
the bill was filed in 1919, was not decided until 1925. New Mexico v. Colorado
(1925) 266 U. S. 586, 45 Sup. Ct 127, 202, 353. See Warren, The Supreme
Court and the Sovereign States (1924) 87.
S Cf. Pound, The Limits of Effective Legal Action (i916) PA. BAR Ass'N
REP. 22i
See Appx. A, II, (7) ; Appx. B, I, (2) infra. See also. note 41, supra.
See supra note 42.
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less amenable to court control. The attempt to make an equitable
apportionment of water among States within a given region has been
sought through litigation as though it involved the riparian rights of
neighboring individuals. 91 The most informed professional opinion
registers the failure of this attempt 2 and the present movement
towards solution by interstate treaties is a decisive recognition that
the instrument of state-craft in this field is not court but compact.9 3
While assuming jurisdiction over these complicated and pervasive
interstate difficulties the Supreme Court has recognized its own ina-
dequacy to give relief. Continuous. and creative administration is
needed; not litigation, necessarily a sporadic process, securing at best
merely episodic and mutilated settlements, which leave the central
problems for adjustment unsolved. Thus, the futility of asking the
Supreme Court to devise a scheme for sewage disposal for the cities
bordering on the waters of New York Bay, simply because cast in the
form of suit between New York and New Jersey, has been exposed by
the Court:
"We cannot withhold the suggestion, inspired by the consideration
of this case, ,that the grave problem of sewage disposal presented by
the large and growing populations living on the shores of New York
Bay is one more likely to be wisely solved by co-operative study and
by conference and mutual concession on the part of representatives
of the States which are vitally interested than by proceedings in any
court however constituted." 9'
But most questions of interstate concern are beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court; they are beyond all court relief. Legisla-
tion is the answer, and legislation must be coterminous with the region
requiring control. We are dealing with regions, like the Southwest
clustering about the Colorado River, or the States dependent upon
the Delaware for water, which are organic units in the light of a com-
mon human need like water-supply. The regions are less than the nation
and are greater than any one State. The mechanism of legislation
must therefore be greater than that at the disposal of a single State.
National action is the ready alternative. But national action is either
unavailable or excessive. For a number of interstate situations
Federal control is wholly outside the present ambit of Federal power,
wholly unlikely to be conferred upon tle Federal government by
constitutional amendment and, in the practical tasks of government,
'See e.g. Kansas v. Colorado (I9o7) 2o6 U. S. 46, 27 Sup. Ct. 655; Wyoming
v. Colorado (1922) 259 U. S. 419, 496, 42 Sup. Ct. 552, 594; (1922) 260 U. S.
1, 43 Sup. Ct 2.
2Bannister, Interstate Rights in Interstate Streams in the Arid West (1923)
36 HARV. L. REv. 96o, 968-977; Rogers, Some Problems of Interstate Water
War (T923) CoLo. BAR Ass'N REP. io7, i14-ii6.
" See supra notes 71-74- See also i Wiel, Water Rights (3d ed. i9I1) 372;
Carpenter, Application of Reserve Treaty Powers of the States to Interstate
Water Controversies (1921) CoLo. BAR Ass'N REP. 45, 82-88.
"New York v. New Jersey (1921) 256 U. S. 296, 3X3, 41 Sup Ct. 492, 498.
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wholly unsuited to Federal action even if constitutional power were
obtained. With all our unifying processes nothing is clearer than that
in the United States there are being built up regional interests, regional
cultures and regional interdependencies." These produce regional
problems calling for regional solutions. Control by the nation would
be ill-conceived and intrusive. A gratuitous burden would thereby
be cast upon Congress and the national administration, both of which
need to husband their energies for the discharge of unequivocally
national responsibilities. As to these regional problems Congress could
not legislate effectively. Regional interests, regional wisdom and
regional pride must be looked to for solutions.
The regional economic areas demand continuity of administrative
control in so far as control is to be exercised through law. The
central problem of law, it is becoming clearer every day, is enforce-
ment. Experience overwhelmingly demonstrates that the demands of
law upon economic enterprises, like the modem utilities, cannot be
realized through the occasional explosions of law-suits but call for
the continuity of study, the slow building-up of knowledge, the
stimulation of experiments, the initiative in enforcement which can
only be secured through a permanent, professional administrative
agency. The inventive powers exacted from modem State legislatures
must grapple with problems whose stage is an interstate region.
Collective legislative action through the instrumentality of compact
by States constituting a region furnishes the answer.
V.
Perhaps the sharpest emergence of this problem is due to the wide-
spread development of electric power. Engineering advances, a
diminishing coal supply, the growing burden of transportation costs,
the resulting stimulation of new forms of cheaper power, in its turn
promoting industry, the pressure of war in accelerating the movement,
have all combined to make the "electrical age" an apt characterization
of our times. The primitive beginnings of this era lie less than forty
years behind us. But probably no other material influence has had
anything like such penetrating economic and social consequences- in
so short a time. It is not our province, nor within our competence, to
tell the engineering details which are in process of affecting so drastic-
ally our social life. But we must take account of these engineering
facts; legal inventiveness cannot operate in vacuo. It must deal with
the realities of a world transformed by engineering science.
Thus far three stages mark the work of the engineer. At first a
small independent plant, generating electricity mainly from coal, was
the center of power for a *limited local market. Soon progress was
made in the art of transmitting energy at a small cost over longer
Turner, Sections and Nation (1922) 12 YALE REv. (N. s.) r.
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distances. Plants multiplied freely. They were haphazard in their
conception and frequently wasteful through needless duplication of
equipment. The effort of each plant to extend its area of distribution
led to cut-throat competition and reckless expansion. This gave rise
to the familiar devices for division of territory among competitors.
Often this division was wholly arbitrary and paid no heed to the
economics of a situation.96 Gradually competitors resorted to consoli-
dation in its various forms.8 a These tendencies, feverishly stimulated
by the war,97 bring us to the second stage of interconnection. By this
method the surplus energy of an independent generating station may
be tapped for use beyond the distributing area of such a station. The
extension of this system, known as the superpower movement, was
proposed as the means of developing the necessary power resources
of the country.98 So rapid has been the development, however, that
new and different projects are already to the fore. From intercon-
nection we are passing to the third stage, which now confronts us under
the rather hynoptic designation of Giant Power.91
"Pennsylvania, for example, hdopted a system of granting corporate charters,
with the approval of the Public Service Commission, to an electric company with
the exclusive right of distributing electric current to customers within a limited
territory. Some of the companies acquired territory separated from each other
by the territory that had been assigned to competing companies. In order to
permit interconnections transmission lines had to be built across this intervening
territory. A system of "strip charters" was thereby introduced, whereby the
company was permitted to operate only over a strip of ground ioo feet wide, thus
permitting transmission but denying any sale of the current en route. This
practice, it is urged, has obstructed the pooling of demands for current, the
development of generating stations to their full capacity, and is, in general, an
uneconomical mode of meeting consumers' needs. See Cooke, Report of the Giant
Power Survey Board to the General Assembly of Pennsylvania (1925) pp. 23-25.
"a Stewart, Consolidation in the Electric Utility Industry (1925) xo8 Ai. AcAD.
Pot. Sci. AxN. i49.
"Cooke, op. cit. supra note 95, P. 23.
In 192o the Department of the Interior at the instance of the engineering pro-
fession undertook an exhaustive study of the possibilities of a co~rdinated develop-
ment of electrical energy in the Northeastern States. In 1921 a report, by W. S.
Murray and others, containing an extensive survey of this region and recommend-
ing a plan for its development, was published. (Superpower System for the
Region between Boston and Washington, Dept. of Interior, Prof. Paper 123.) In
1923 Secretary Hoover held a conference of the Public Utilities Commissions of
the eleven Northeastern States upon the superpower question. A Northeastern
Superpower Committee was formed, consisting of members of these Commissions
and members appointed by the United States Geological Survey, the Federal Power
Commission, and the United States Army. A report, embodying portions of both
the super power and the giant power schemes of development, was submitted on
April 14, 1924. Super Power Studies for the Northeast Section of the United
States, published by the Northeastern Super Power Committee.
" See Report of the Giant Power Survey Board, supra note 96. See also
Giant Power Number (924) 4 Survey Graphic, No. 6. Giant Power (i925)
io8 Am. AcAD. PoL. Sci. AxN. No. 2o7. Stimson, Public Operation vs. Private
Operation of Public Utilities. Address delivered Jan. 24, x925, at the National
Republican Club, New York City.
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In brief, an integration is proposed of a vast net-work of generating
plants, transmission lines and distributing stations, heretofore inde-
pendent in their operations and therefore individually confined to their
territorial radius. This movement, sponsored by Governor Pinchot'00
and the Giant Power Survey Board of Pennsylvania, aims at a con-
centration of the sources of generation, a pooling of power supply,
elimination of smaller generating stations and their transformation
into centers of distribution. Giant Power, in Governor Pinchot's
words, "proposes to create, as it were, a great pool of power into which
power from all sources will be poured, and out of Which power for all
uses will be taken."''1 Inerconnection seeks " the disposal of sur-
plus"; integration is based on "the pooling of supply." 0 2
The supply contemplated by these proposals is to be derived both
from waterfalls and coal. At present, partiiularly in the Eastern
States, coal is the predominant source for the development of electrical
energy.03 This large dependence on coal will, in the main, continue.' 0'
Giant Power, however, proposes radical changes in the system of carbo-
electric generation by the establishment of powerful generating plants
close to the centers of coal-production, as contrasted with the existing
condition which finds smaller stations widely scattered at remote dis-
tances from the coal fields. Significant economic and social benefits
are claimed for this change,--the saving of freight charges, the pro-
ductive utilization of cheap grades of coal, the recovery of its valuable
by-products through large scale consumption, continuity of production
with its vast implications to the great coal communities.10  This so-
' Governor Pinchot's Message, Report of Giant Power Survey Board, supra
note 96, at pp. iii-xiii.
Ibid. vii.1Q"Interconnection is essentially an exchange of surplus between existing
generating plants... The process is very much like a chain of reservoirs, perhapstwenty on the line from Mexico to Billings. Each reservoir represents a separateelectrical system filled with current generated within that system. Suppose anelectric drought strikes Billings and the current reservoir there gets low, Theinterconnection tap between that system and the next one in the chain is openedand current flows into the Billings tank. But that lowers the current level in thenext reservoir. The interconnection tap between the next two is then opened, andthe procedure.is repeated. The same process can be carried on indefinitely up tothe limit of interconnection. The next move was inherent in the logic of the situa-tion. Why not pump new current into all these interconnected system reservoirs
from giant generating stations with all the economies of large scald production?
And whynot place these stations not only at water power sites but also-for thosethat burn coal-at the mine mouth? Obviously, it is far easier to transportcurrent than to transport either water or coal" Clark, Giant Power Transform-
ing America's Life (Feb. 2z, 1925), New York Times.10'Voskuil, Water-Power Situation in the United States (z925) i JouaR-. LAND
& PuB. UTI. EcoN. 89; Cooke, op. cit. supra note 96, at pp. i8-ig.
"' Cooke, op. cit. supra note 96, at p. 2o.
' Coleman, Miners Turn to Giant Power (925) io8 Am. AcAD. PoL.Scr. ANN. 6o. See also Dickerman, Pretreatment of Bituminous Coals, Report of
Giant Power Survey Board, supra note 96, at p. i17.
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called mine-mouth movement is to be correlated to the development
of available water power sites. The high installation costs of major
hydro-electric projects, such as are contemplated, presuppose extensive
markets for the distribition of this energy. This, in turn, according
to the Giant Power program, requires that the instruments of genera-
tion, transmission and distribution be knitted together into a compre-
hensive system.
Time alone can tell the extent to which these plans will be realized
and the exact forms which they will take. This is not the occasion
to express either one's hopes or one's fears. But legal pre-vision may
certainly presuppose a vast interrelated network of electric power
freely playing across State lines, serving industrial centers and affecting
scattered communities which themselves constitute individualized
industrial and social units.108 Such an integrated system, it is urged,
will make for great social gains by cheapening power, minimizing
waste, and above all, checking urbanized congestion by a wide diffusion
of modem economic activities.107 However, the terrific concentration
of the electrical industry thus foreshadowed is certainly no less pregnant
with far-reaching and pervasive dangers.108 Every student of social
economics recognizes the baffling problems raised by modern large-
scale industry. All the familiar difficulties will be present 'in an
intensified form should monopolized control determine the community's
dependence upon p6wer. The proponents of Giant Power, therefore,
couple their engineering schemes for private development with a
demand for a comprehensive legal control over rates, services, finances,
construction and interconnections. An intricate integrated system for
regulation is thus contemplated.
The system involves three distinct processes: generation, trans-
mission and distribution. These three processes raise distinct problems
for the electrical engineer; equally do they raise distinct problems for
the social engineer. Hydro-electric generation concerns selection of
water power sites on navigable and non-navigable waters, the capacity
of plants at selected sites, the natre and range of public control over
'"Developments are now being undertaken in the Lehigh Valley region looking
forward to supplying the great industrial district centering around Newark, N. J.,
with power. The construction of a plant at Conowingo, Md., on the Susquehanna
River is now under way. The power there generated is to be supplied to the city
of Philadelphia, iSo miles distant. See Fourth Annual Report of Water Power
Commission (1924) Project No. 405, p. 210.
1" Cooke, Report of Giant Power Survey Board, supra note 96, at pp. 29-4o;
Bradford, Influence of Cheap Power on Factory Location and on Farming
(1925) io8 Am. Ac.n. Poi. Sci. ANN. 91; Fisher, Decentralization and Sub-
urbanization of Population, ibid. 96.
' See e.g. the early warning of President Roosevelt: "The movement is still
in its infancy, and unless it is controlled the history of the oil industry will be
repeated in the hydro-electric industry, with results far more oppressive and disas-
trous for people." James River Veto Message of Jan. x5, 59o9, 16 Messages and
Papers of Presidents, 7,51-7,54, 43 Cong. Rec. 978-979, and the recent debate
on S. Res. 286, 68 Cong. 2d sess., 66 Cong. Rec. 939, 1IO et seq., 2200 of seq.
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such plants. But, as we have seen, electric generation draws more
heavily on coal than on water. The process of carbo-eleqtric genera-
tion in its turn raises a new series of problems. Apart from the
exertion of eminent domain and the adaptation of capacity of plants
to market needs, novel questions are presented, affecting the economic
consumption of coal, allocation of supply to different uses, and the
subjection of the coal industry to new and extensive public supervision.
The process of transmission involves rights of way, interconnections,
parallel lines, and the standardization of equipment. Finally, distri-
bution introduces -the sale-problems of this industry, bringing, in an
accentuated form, the brood of difficulties familiar in the regulation
of rates and services of utilities. Generation, transmission and distri-
bution are, then, distinct parts with tlieir special problems. But, plainly,
they are parts of a whole; and legal control, while adjusted to the
parts, must be co-extensive with the system as an entirety. Secretary
Hoover has thus stated the practical situation which confronts lawyer
and legislator:
"All this "means the liquidity of power over whole groups of States.
At once power distribution spreads across State lines and into diverse
legal jurisdictions. We are, therefore, confronted not only with prob-
lems of the co-ordination in the industries of their engineering, financial,
and ownership problems, but also with new legal problems in States
rights and Federal relations to power distribution.'
' 9
The shallow answer to this plethora of problems is Federal control,
predicated on the surface fact that we are in the field of interstate
commerce. There is proposed a Federal Commission with authority
over power, analogous to that exercised by the Interstate Commerce
Commission over railroads."0  History, policy, and law are alike
disregarded by such a remedy. The Interstate Commerce Aot is not a
full-blown' exertion of Federal power, but the story of a long travail
of empirical legislation. Even now, despite the absorption by Federal
authority of powers heretofore exercised by the States, the capacity of
the Interstate Commerce Commission to discharge competently the vast
burdens placed upon it is a subject of common concern, and the
Supreme Court, Congress, and the Interstate Commerce Commission
have been alive to the necessity of observing the limits to effective
legal action by the Federal Government and of preserving the
specialized local interests of the States. But apart from considerations
of practical statesmanship in administration, the facts governing
supervision of railroads are decisively different from those which
"Report of the Secretary of Cotmerce (1924) 14.
"'This project is embodied in the so-called Norris-Keller Super-Power Public
Ownership Bill introduced into the House of Representatives at the first session
of the Sixty-eighth Congress. See S. 2790, H. R. 7789, 68th Cong. ist
sess., 65 Cong. Rec. 3874, 3936. See Tripp, Some Political Aspects of Super-
Power Development (I924) 34 Stone & Webster Journ. 689.
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characterize the electric power problem."1  The differences present
issues of policy as well as of constitutional law. For the three processes
of generation, transmission and distribution, interrelated though they
be as a single network, give rise practically to separate emphases and
separate social concerns. For this reason, as well as because of certain
assumptions underlying our dual system of government, the problems
of legal authority must be analyzed critically as to the scope of its
operation over thedifferent parts.
When dealing with hydro-electric development we are sharply faced
by the constitutional authority of Congress over water power sites on
navigable waters and the public domain, and the reservation of that
authority to the States over sites on non-navigable waters. About eighty-
five per cent. of the available sites are thus under Federal control,
1 12
now lodged in the Federal Power Commission,"' leaving fifteen per
cent. of the sources of this energy within the authority of the States.
Even more dependent upon State action is the success of the mine-
mouth movement. For, thus far, the widest scope of State authority
over the coal fields has been sanctioned by the Supreme Court, even
though production within the States inevitably flows into the channels
of interstate commerce." 4 Not only are many aspects of electric gen-
'Statement of Secretary Hoover* to the Super Power Conference, New York,
Oct. 13, 1923; Hard, Giant Negotiations for Giant Power (924) 4 Survey
Graphic, 577.
"Second Annual Report of Federal Power Commission (922) 7.
"'The grave evils of unregulated exploitation of water power resources by private
capital were forcibly brought to public attention by President Roosevelt in vetoing
the James River Project. See note io8. The movement for safeguarding the
public interest was given impetus by President Taft's veto of the Coosa River
Project. (62d Cong. 2d sess., 48 Cong. Rec. 11796; Report of Secretary of War
for 19r, 32-35, 179.) The Federal Water Power Act of 1920 (41 Stat. at L. io63)
is the legislative culmination of this eff6rt. See Conover, Federal Power Commis-
sion, U. S. Gov't Ser. Monographs, No. 17, pp. 47-64. Congress, un.der its power
over navigable streams, assumed control over the surplus water in these streams. See
Howell, Federal Power of Legislation as to Development of Water Power (i916)
50 Am. L. REv. 883; First Annual Report of Federal Power Commission (1921)
43. The Act seeks to promote water-power development on terms sufficiently
attractive to private capital and also duly protective of the public interest. Permits
are required of all hydro-electric enterprises on navigable streams. Such licenses,
for which an annual rental charge is made, are conditions precedent to the con-
struction of any hydro-electric plant. The license runs for fifty years. The
Commission is further authorized to investigate, alone or in co6peration with State
agencies, the water resources of the nation and publish data concerning them. The
conduct of hydro-electric plants is placed to a large extent under the supervision
of the Commission. Accounting methods can be prescribed, renewals and replace-
ments required. An amortization fund for the reduction of the net investment, to
be established out of the surplus earned by the enterprise after the first twenty
years, is part of the plan under which these projects are authorized. See Merrill,
Federal Water Power Act and its Administration (592o) 12 Stone & Webster
Journ. 251; Shields, Federal Power Act (1925) 73 U. PA. . REv. i4.
"'Cf. United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co. (1922) 259
U. S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 587; United Leather Workers International v. Herkert &
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eration within the zone of legal control left to the States by Supreme
Court decisions, but it is extremely doubtful if these aspects are not
within exclusive State control, forbidding Federal intervention.
Again, the problems of transmission are not capable of being drawn
completely within the area of solution by Congress, even if such a
course were advisable. To be sure, the transmission of electricity
across State borders is interstate commerce and as such.subject to the
Federal power evolved for the control of such commerce with its
immunity against discrimination by State action." 5 'But to a consider-
able extent the future will have to deal, as does the present, with trans-
mission and its facilities limited entirely to the confines of a single
State. Yet some co-ordination of policy between these State-wide
transmission systems and interstate transmission will call for a
mechanism of control regional and not merely State-wide in its
operation, in order to secure interconnection, exchange and distribution
of power. Standardization of equipment may be found either neces-
sary or desirable, not merely on interstate transmission lines but also
on transmission systems confined to separate States. For all these
purposes the Federal authority does not cover the field. The need
for interstate co-operation must find expression through a continuous,
dependable and flexible interstate arrangement.
The same need is revealed in the control of distributing agencies.
Distributors of electric energy are localized in area. The interests of
the consumer-what he gets and what he pays for-has a segregated
local aspect, and is, therefore, a matter of local State concern311 In
the conventional phrases of constitutional law, these are matters not
within the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution but within the
police power of the State. In interstate transportation of goods or
passengers, the service that is rendered and the service that is paid for
is the carriage from State to State; but the distributor of electrical
energy, itself the product of interstate transmission, sells, and the
consumer buys, not the transmission but the power secured through
transmission. The cost of transmission is an element in .the cost paid
per kilowatt hour by the consumer just as a similar item enters into the
cost of goods transported from one State to another. But the
essence of the transaction is local. Manifold local considerations
affecting costs, social habits and standards, applicable to the local area
of distribution, make this a local as distinguished from a national
problem and subject to local as against national control.117
Neisel Co. (1924) 265 U. S. 457, 44 Sup. Ct. 623; Heisler v. Thom= Colliery
Co. (1922) 260 U. S. 245, 43 Sup. Ct. 83; and Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord
(z923) 262 U. S. 172, 43 Sup. Ct 526.
'Pennsylvania v. West Virginia (1923) 262 U. S. 553, 43 Sup. Ct. 658.
"'Public Utilities v. Landon (1919) 249 U. S. 236, 39 Sup. Ct. 268; Penna. Gas
Co. v. Public Service Comm (I920) 252 U. S. 23, 40 Sup. Ct. 79; cf. Missouri v.
Kansas Natural Gas Co. (1924) 265 U. S. 298, 44 Sup. Ct. 544.
" "The pipes which reach the customers served are supplied with gas directly
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Our system of constitutional law compels a close analysis of the
differentiated aspects of such a vast phenomenon as is presented by
the modern development of electric power. Applying merely the
familiar legal patterns, the practical difficulties would have to be fitted
into the exclusive alternatives of independent separate State action or
Federal action. How adequate are these alternatives? The con-
stitutional limitations upon Federal authority have already been noted.
The inadequacy of independent State action is equally clear. The
States disclose wide divergence of views. Governor Smith is insistent
on New York's ownership of its water power;118 Governor Pinchot
urges upon Pennsylvania private development with stringent public
regulation.'19 Several States aim chiefly to retain their resources.
Maine, for instance, has prohibited the development of hydro-electric
energy for transmission beyond its borders.2o These policies repre-
from the main of the company which brings it into the State, nevertheless the
service rendered is essentially local, and the sale of gas is by the company to local
consumers who are reached by the use of the streets of the city in which the pipes
are laid, and through which the gas is conducted to factories and residences as it is
required for use.... It may be conceded that the local rates may affect the inter-
state business of the company. But this fact does not prevent the State from
making local regulations of a reasonable character." Penna. Gas Co. v. Public
Service Comm. (1920) 252 U. S. 23, 31, 40 Sup. Ct. 79, 281. The local character
of rate regulation in the distribution of electrical energy is recognized by Congress
in the Federal Water Power Act, where the Commission is given power to
prevent licensees from charging unreasonable rates, only in the absence of State
regulation. Act of June io, I92o, sec. 20 (21 Stat at L. Io63).
'See Message to New York Legislature (z924) LEa. Doc. No. 3; Smith,
Stake of the Public (I924) 4 Survey Graphic, 574.
Governor's Message, Report of Giant Power SurveW Board, supra note 96, at
pp. viii-ix.
h' Me. Rev. Sts. i916, ch. 6o, sec. i, p. 985. In I919 a Water Power Commis-
sion was created to investigate the water power resources of the State and its
rights in storage reservoirs, and was charged with the duty of reporting violations
of the laws forbidding the transmission of electric current beyond the State. See
Me. Laws, igig, ch. 132, p. I3, as amended by Me. Laws, 1921, ch. 203, p. 219.
Adherence to the policy against transportation of electric energy beyond the State
has been vigorously urged by Governor Baxter and by the newly-elected Governor
Brewster. See Inaugural Address of Governor, Me. Laws, 1923, p. 855; Procla-
mation of Governor, Me. Laws, 1923, 924, 93,; Message of Governor, Me. Laws,
1923, 1o57, 1o63; Address of Senator Brewster, Maine and Its Water Resources
(19z4). To prevent this policy from being disturbed by an attack upon the validity
of the legislation under the doctrine of Pennsylvania v. West Virginia (1923) 262
U. S. 553, 43 Sup. Ct. 658, the charters of Maine power companies have recently
been amended by the State so as to prevent them from taking power out of the
State, in accordance with the policy of the so-called "Baxter Amendment." See
Message of Governor, Me. Laws, 1923, io57, io65. A fear that the Federal
Power Commission Act would interfere with the successful pursuance of this
policy of non-exportation led the legislature of Maine on February I6, ig2i, to
address a memorial to Congress urging an amendment to that Act in order that
there should "be no federal interference with and control of the water powers
lying within the borders of the State of Maine." See Me. Laws, 1921, 638.
Maine's power problem has been further complicated by an advisory opinion of the
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sent various answers to legitimate concern by the States for conserva-
tion of precious resources within their borders. Diversity of policy,
as a means of realizing these important ends, is both natural and desir-
able in a field where experimentation is essential if we are to base
future action on "a judgment from experience as against a judgment
from speculation.' 121  But the range of experimentation must not
Supreme Court denying the Legislature power to authorize the construction of
water storage reservoirs for water power development Opinio;z of the Justices
(1919) 1I8 Me. 503, io6 Atl. 865. That the key to the development of Maine's
water power resources lies in water storage development, is generally recognized.
See e. g. Message of Governor, Me. Laws, 1923, 1057, Iw67; Inaugural Address
of Governor, Me. Laws, 1923, 841, 855; Remarks of Representative Brewster in
the House, 1921, Me. Leg. Rec. 557, 1257. Proposals have been made to overcome
the opinion of the Supreme Court by a constitutional amendment. See Debates,
1921, Me. Leg. Rec. 557, 1257; 1923, Me. Leg. Rec. 733. The problem has
been further embarrassed by divergent views as to whether the policy to he adopted
by the State is to conform in general to the federal policy under the Water Power
Commission Act of long term leases to private corporations upon guaranteed
rentals, or of outright sales of the State's water power rights to private corpora-
tions. These divergent views came into direct conflict with the questions center-
ing about the Kennebec Reservoir Charter and the Dead River Storage Bill, the
Legislature and the Governor taking opposite stands in a bitter fight that led
eventually to an appeal by the Governor to the people against the Legislature. See
Proclamation of the Governor, Me. Laws, 1923, g4; Communication of Governor
to Legislature, Me. Laws, 1923, 1021, 1043, io47; Debates 1923, Me. Leg. Rec.
r34, 1153-I164. Governor Brewster has followed his predecessor in support of a
policy of long term leases. See Inaugural Address of Jan. 8, 1925, p. 44. See
also the special message of Governor Brewster on the New Brunswick Water
Power Developmertt, and Hydro-Electric Development in Passama-Quoddy Bay,
on April I, 1925. For much of this material we are indebted to the kindness of
Governor Brewster of Maine.
In New Hampshire the transmission of electric power without the State
is prohibited save, by permission of the Public Service Commission. N. H.
Laws, x9ii, ch. 164, sec. 7-(e), p. 193. See also N. H. Laws, 1913, ch. 145, sec.
17, p. 674; N. H. Laws, 1917, ch. 356, p. 936. West Virginia similarly requires
a permit and provides also that the corporation in order to secure such a permit
must agree that the State at its election may require the power generated within
the State to be distributed solely within the State. Barnes, West Va. Code, 1923,
ch. 54B, sec. I5. Many States provide for the issuance of perrmits as a condition
precedent to the development of power sites and the maintenance of dams. See
e.g. Wis. Sts., 1923, ch. 31, secs. 31.0I-31.33; N. Y. Laws, i92i, ch. 579; Pa. Sts.
i92o, secs. 594o, 5943; Pa. Sts. Supp. 1924, sec. 1113oa; Neb. Const. 1875, Art.
XV, sec. 7. Quebec has dealt with the problem in the same fashion. Quebec Rev.
Sts. 19o9, sec. 7:291, as amended by (i92o) io Geo. V, c. 74. For the Ontario
solution of the problem, see Beck (1924) 4 Survey Graphic, 585. See also Ont.
Rev. Sts. 1914, c. 39; (914) 4 Geo. V, c. 16; (1914) 5 Geo. V, c. ig; (1916) 6
Geo. V, c. 19, 21; (1917) 7 Geo. V, c. 2o, 22; (1918) 8 Geo. V, c. 20; (1918) 9
Geo. V, c. 16; (I92O) io-ii Geo. V, c. 18, I9; (1922) 12-13 Geo. V, c. 3. The
Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario has become the subject of contro-
versy. Wyer, Niagara Falls: Its Power Possibilities and Preservation (1925);
Reply by Sir Adam Beck, Re Wyer-Walcott Report (i925); the Beck pamphlet,
in turn, has elicited rejoinders from the Smithsonian Institution and Dr. Wyer.
67 Cong. Rec. 338 if.
I Tanner v. Little (1916) 24o U. S. 369, 386, 36 Sup. Ct. 379, 384.
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exclude the capacity for co-operation between States. An effective
response to the complex of forces loosed by electric power must adapt
or devise legal instruments and safeguards adequate to cope with the
phenomenon as an entirety. And while electric power development
does not present a nation-wide system, it does break through the con-
fines of individual States.
Here, as elsewhere in the domain of public law, the legal mechanism
should evolve from actualities.' Despite all mechanical invention and
depressing forces for standardization, the United States by virtue of
its size reveals distinct regions with differences of climate, geography,
economic specialization, and social habits. The integration of the
power industry is likewise assuming regional forms. Secretary
Hoover has thus drawn the picture:
"There is a phase of this whole public relationship that seems to me
to be slowly emerging and that is that the United States will naturally
divide itself into several power areas. For instance, the barren areas'
of power consumption formed by the Adirondacks on the east and the
character of natural resources along the Mason Dixon line on the
South create a natural district in the New England and Mid-Atlantic
States. Another power district lies to the west of the Alleghanies and
east of the Mississippi River. Still another district lies in the South-
eastern States, again in the Southwestern States, and still another in
the Northwestern States. The problems in each of these power districts
are essentially different as to the origins of power, the character of
their industries, and are affected by the rate of probable industrial
development in some States. And if we are to make a rightful
solution of national problems we should consider their development as
essentially separate problems." 2
From this analysis issues the legal answer. The regional character-
istic of electric power, as a social and engineering fact, must find a
counterpart in the effort of law to deal with it. No single State in
isolation can wholly deal with the problem. The facts equally exclude
the capacity of the Federal' government to cover the field. Co-ordi-
nated regulation among groups of States, in harmony Vith the Federal
administration over developments on navigable streams and in the
public domain, must be the objective. Regional solutions in such new
and complicated demands upon law must necessarily be empiric and
cautious in their unfolding. The exact form of future legal devices
will have to be modified from time to time and from region to region,
adapted to varying conditions and, it is to be hoped, built on a growing
body of experience. The vehicle for this process of legal adjustment
is at hand in the fruitful possibilities inherent in the Compact Clause of
the Constitution. It is this solution which Governor Pinchot is press-
'"Statement of Secretary Hoover to the Super Power Conference, New York,
Oct. r3, x923. See also Hoover, Governmeitt Policies in Relation to Power
Development and Distribution, address before World Power Conference (Lon-
don, July 1924).
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ing upon his own and neighboring States.123  Only most painstaking
study by lawyers saturated with the practical problems, in collaboration
with engineers and social economists, can bring the proposal to fruition.
But at the very -threshold the central idea encounters opposition drawn
from doctrines of coristitutional law. In the scope of the Commerce
Clause lie fatal obstructions, it is urged, to co-operation among the
States, through compact, in the regulation of interstate movement of
power. These constitutional objections must be faced.
VI.
Specifically, may a regional group of States especially affected by a
project for electric power development enter into an agreement, with
the consent of Congress, for the effective utilization of such energy
generated in one State and transmitted for distribution to neighboring
States? All aspects of this problem, as we have seen, are not included
within the conception of interstate commerce. But to the extent that
the process of electrification crosses State lines we are in a field open
to Federal regulation. If it chooses, Congress may act and pre-empt
State control.124  Even without Federal action, no State may discrimi-
nate against,125 or obstruct, 28 the transactions in interstate commerce.
Between these limits-what Congress may do and the States obviously
may not do-lies the field in which compact would operate. Its avail-
ability, as a matter of law, depends on whether the constitutional grant
to Congress of power to regulate commerce among the several States,
however unused, excludes all State action, however reasonably con-
ceived and restricted to the interests of a region of States immediately
affected.
A simple syllogism is supposed to furnish the answer. Congress
alone can regulate interstate commerce; the flow o.f energy from State
to State is interstate commerce; therefore, its control is beyond the
authority of the States. In the elaboration and application of the argu-
ment there are.recognized exceptions and qualifications, but the lowest
terms to which we have reduced it is the guiding mode of approaching
a conception of the Commerce Clause. 27 The mode of approach is
everything in constitutional controversies; it is largely decisive in the
solution of specific problems under the Commerce Clause. And the atti-
Governor's Message, Report of Giant Power Survey Board, supra note 96, at
p. vi. Governors Smith of New York and Silzer of New Jersey have embodied
the same suggestion in their special messages to their State Legislatures. See
New York Times, Mar. 28, 1925, and message of Governor Silzer of March ii,
1925 to the New Jersey Legislature.
'See e.g. New York Central R. R. Co. v. Winfield (1917) 244 U. S. 147, 37
Sup. Ct. 546; Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co. (1922) 258 U. S. 50, 42 Sup. Ct 244.
' See e.g. Welton v. Missouri (1875) 9! U. S. 275; Cook v. Pennsylvania
(1878) 97 U. S. 566; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District (1887) I2O U. S.
489, 7 Sup. Ct. 592.
See e.g. Buck v. Kniykendall (1925) 45 Sup. Ct. 324.
1" See e.g. Cooke, Commerce Clause (i9o8) pp. iv-vi.
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tude which we.have summarized will work mischief in concrete situa-
tions because it embodies the fallacy of over-simplification.
The frequent resort in recent years to the Commerce Clause as a source
of regulatory power by Congress, 2 ' has blurred its historic purpose and
its continued use as a veto power on obstructive and discriminatory
State action. It is a reservoir of Federal power and not a dam against
State action, as State action. The experience which evoked the Com-
merce Clause, its contemporaneous construction, and the course of
judicial decision, compel the conclusion that the States are not excluded
from dealing with interstate commerce as long as Congress itself has
not legislated, provided that State action neither discriminates against
interstate commerce nor unreasonably hampers it. These provisos are
not self-enforcing conditions. They imply a process of adjustment
by the Supreme Court between State and national interests. Their
application is difficult and is bound to result in variable judgments.
But the process is an accommodation of actualities; it deals with real
interests and is not intended for exercises in logomachy. These real
interests are the stuff of the decisions and determine their results.
2 9
But the line they prick out is too often dimmed by expansive or vague
language, which constitutional controversies too frequently provoke.
Terms like "exclusive" and "concurrent," "direct" and "indirect," have
only served to confuse. To discard them will tend to clarify. They
are labels of a result, and not instruments for the solution of a problem.
See e.g. Interstate Commerce Act of Feb. 4, 1887 (24 Stat at L. 379) ; Sher-
man Act of July 2, i8go (26 Stat. at L. 2o9) ; Clayton Act of Oct. 15, 1914 (38
Stat at L. 73o); Bills of Lading Act of Aug. 29, I916 (39 Stat. at L. 538);
Federal Employers' Liability Act of April 22, i9o8 (35 Stat at L. 65); Federal
Trade Commission Act of Sept. 26, 1914 (38 Stat at L. 717); Packers and Stock-
yards Act of Aug. i5, 1921 (42 Stat at L. i59) ; Grain Futures Act of' Sept. 21,
i922 (42 Stat. at L. 998); Federal Water Power Commission Act of June io,
1922 (41 Stat. at L. io63); Pure Food and Drugs Acts (34 Stat. at L. 768, 32
Stat. it L. 194, 632, 29 Stat. at L. 253, 26 Stat. at L. 414) ; Lottery Act of Mar.
2, i895 (28 Stat. at L. 963).
'Cf. Davis v. Farmers' Co6perative Co. (1923) 262 U. S. 312,315,43 Sup. Ct.
556, 557, per Brandeis, J.: "That the claims against interstate carriers for per-
sonal injuries and for loss and damage of freight are numerous; that the amounts
demanded are large; that in many cases carriers deem it imperative, or advisable,
to leave the determination of their liability to the courts; that litigation in States
and jurisdictions remote from that in which the cause of action arose entails absence
of employees from their customary occupations; and that this impairs efficiency
in operation, and causes, directly and indirectly, heavy expense to the carriers;
these are matters of common knowledge. Facts, of which we, also, take judicial
notice, indicate that the burden upon interstate carriers imposed specifically by
the statute here assailed is a heavy one; and that the resulting obstruction to
commerce must be serious. (A message, dated February 2, 1923, of the Gov-
ernor of Minnesota to its Legislature, recites that a recent examination of the
calendars of the district courts in 67 of the 87 counties of the State disclosed
that in those counties there were then pending 1,o28 personal injury cases in
which non-resident plaintiffs seek damages aggregating nearly $26,ooo,ooo from
foreign railroad corporations which do not operate any line within Minnesota.)"
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The history of the Commerce Clause is a thrice-told tale. But the
nature of the mischief against which it was devised and which has
shaped its development is too frequently overlooked. Madison makes
it perfectly clear that behind the grant to Congress lay not exclusion of
action by the States, but restrictions upon them:
". .. It is very certain that it [the power to regulate commerce
among the several States] grew out of the abuse of the power by the
importing States in taxing the non-importing, and was intended as a
negative and preventive provision against injustice among the States
themselves, rather than as a power to be used for the positive purposes
of the General Government, in which alone, however, the remedial
power could be lodged."130
A hundred years have inevitably brought greater reliance on "the reme-
dial power" of the general government; they have not altered the power
of the States in default of action by Congress.
At the core of the whole problem is the fact that the regulation of
the infinite expanse of interstate commerce cannot be subjected to one
legislative authority. Continuously since 1789, State legislation has
busied itself with interstate commerce. 18' The States may regulate
"commerce among the States" because they must-always with the
power of Congress to gainsay through legislation, and the power of the
Supreme Court to annul through litigation. Policy undisguised invokes
Congressional action; the form and temt~er of adjudication disguises
the large measure of policy implicit in judicial determination. In this
field of constitutional adjustment the traditional technique of judicial
empiricism" 2 is peculiarly appropriate. It has been freely exercised.
Of course, from time to time a succession of particulars has developed
into tentative generalizations. Always the generalization involved judg-
ment about practical affairs, and, as such, subject to the impact of new
facts soliciting judgment."
And so, for a hundred years, we find exertions by State authority
within the field of interstate commerce successively passing the scrutiny
of the Supreme Court. Where a State law conflicts with an act of
2
3 Letter of Madison to J. C. Cabell of Feb. I3, 1829, 3 Fariand, Records of
the Constitutional Convention (i9ii) 478.
See e.g. infra notes 136, I39-I42.
Pound, Spirit of the Common Law (I921) ch. 7.
"Thayer, Cases on Constitutional Law (1895) pp. v-vi: "Even under the most
favorable circumstances, in dealing with such a subject as this, results must often
be tentative and temporary. Views that seem adequate at the time, are announced,
applied, and developed; and yet, by and by, almost unperceived, they melt away in
the light of later experience, and other doctrines take their place." See e.g. the
trend of decision from Woodruff v. Parham (1869, U. S.) 8 Wall. 123, to Sonneborn
Bros. v. Cureton (x923) 262 U. S. 5o6, 43 Sup. Ct. 643, and the qualification in the
latter case of the tendencies developed in the earlier cases of Standard Oil Co. v.
Graves (I919) 249 U. S. 389, 39 Sup. Ct. 32o; Askren v. Continental Oil Co.
(1920) 252 U. S. 444, 40 Sup. Ct. 355; Bowmam v. Continental Oil Co. (1921)
256 U. S. 642, 41 Sup. Ct. 6o6; Texas Co. v. Brown (1922) 258 U. S. 466, 42
Sup. Ct. 375.
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Congress regulating interstate commerce the State law must, of course,
yield; there is then no difficulty except an occasional difference of
opinion as to the existence of a conflict.
134 But, when Congress has not
passed an act in execution of its power to regulate commerce, much
more complicated considerations come into play. The decisions turn,
as Marshall made clear from the beginning, on "all the circumstances
of the case.'13 5  The "circumstances" at bottom are the practical adjust-
ments of State and national needs, interests and capacities. The "cir-
cumstances" which, in the silence of Congress, allow State action have
been summarized, in one large series of cases, as matters that warrant
a treatment non-uniform throughout the country.
1 3 6 But this formula
in sustaining State action, familiar as the doctrine of Cooley v. Board
of Wardens, s 7 neither enumerates the considerations which permit or
exclude non-uniformity, nor does it avoid the crucial exercise of judg-
ment by the Court upon these considerations. The decisions constitute
evaluations of these factors. Reviewing the streams of adjudication
for a hundred years, Judge Cardozo is forced to conclude that "no
general formula can tell us in advance where the line is drawn."
38
The only fixed datum of constitutional doctrine is that the States may
act. But how, when, to what extent and under what safeguards, will
be found in each instance to depend on the Court's judgment whether a
given State action discriminates in favor of State business as against
interstate business or casts unreasonable burdens upon interstate com-
"' Cf. Brandeis, J., dissenting in New York Central R. R. Co. v. Winfield, supra
note 124; Clarke, J., dissenting in Penna. R. R. Co. v. Pub. Service Commission
(1919) 250 U. S. 566, 40 Sup. Ct. 36; Brandeis, Holmes, Clarke, JJ., dissenting in
Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co., sapra, note 124.
' Marshall, C. J., in Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co. (180g, U. S.) 2 Pet
245, 252.
' See e. g. State regulations for the improvement of navigation: Wilson v.
Blackbird Creek Marsh Co. supra,- note I35; Manigault v. Spings (19o5) 199
U. S. 473, 26 Sup. Ct. 12'7; County of Mobile v. Kimball (i88o) 1o2 U. S. 691;
Huse v. Glover (1886) 119 U. S, 543, 7 Sup. Ct. 313; Sands v. Manistee River
Imp. Co. (1887) 123 U. S. 288, 8 Sup. Ct 213; State regulations concerning traffic
over bridges crossing navigable waters: Escanaba Co. v. Chicago (1882) 107
U. S. 678, 2 Sup. Ct. 185; State authorizations for the building of bridges across
navigable waters: Gilman v. Philadelphia (865, U. S.) 3 Wall. 713; Cardwell v.
Am. Bridge Co. (1885) 113 U. S. 205, 5 Sup. Ct 423; Hamilton v. Vicksburg,
S. & P. R. R. Co. (1886) 119 U. S. 28, 7 Sup. Ct. 2o6; The Passaic Bridges
(1865, C. C..D. N.J.) 3 Wall. 782, Appx.; State police regulations over harbors:
Owners of Brig James Gray v. Owners of Ship John Fraser (1858, U. S.) 21
How. 184; State quarantine regulations: Morgatns R. R. & SS. Co. v Louisiana
(1886) I4i8 U. S. 455, 6 Sup. Ct. 1114; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Haber
(1898) I69 U. S. 613, 18 Sup. Ct. 488; Smith v. St. Louis & S. W. R. R. Co.
(9o) 181 U. S. 248, 21 Sup. Ct. 6o3; Compagnie Francaise v. La. Board of
Health (192o) 186 U. S. 38o, 22 Sup. Ct 811; Reid v. Colorado (1902) 187 U. S.
137, 23 Sup. Ct 92.
(851, U. S.) 12 How. 299.
See Penna. Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission (1919) 225 N. Y. 397, 405,
122 N. E. 260o, 262.
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merce. Extremely practical considerations, it cannot too often be
insisted upon, decide the fate of State legislation when challenged
merely by the dormant power of Congress. State necessities, the adap-
tability of State relief as against nation-wide action, the limited mani-
festation iof a given evil or the limited benefit of its correction, the
actual interest of the whole country in a phenomenon especially viru-
lent in a particular State or region, the advantage of a local regulation
balanced against the cost or inconvenience to interests outside the
States-these and like questions are involved in the process of delimit-
ing in the concrete the interacting areas- of State and national action
when Congress has not legislated."8 9
'That the judicial process in tis field is not the unfolding of logical inevita-
bilities, but a conscious balancing of practical considerations in permitting or
excluding State action, is strikingly illustrated by the characteristically candid
language of Judge Cardozo in Penna Gas. Co. v. Pub. Ser. Comm. supra note i38:
"We think the line must be drawn here so as to bring the attempted regulation
within the power of the State." Thus the validity of a State regulation ordering
the stoppage of an interstate train turns on the specific facts attending each
situation in their relation to the general flow of interstate commerce. Contrast
Lake Shore & Michigan So. Ry. Co. v. Ohio (1899) 173 U. S. 285, i9 Sup. Ct.
s65; Gkrdson v. Minnesota (1897) 166 U. S. 427, 17 Sup. Ct. 627; Gulf, C. &
S. F. Ry. Co. v. Texas (1918) 246 U, S. 58, 38 Sup. Ct. 236, upholding the validity
of such regulation, with Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Illinois (igoo) i77
U. S. 514, 2o Sup. Ct. 722; Miss. R. R. Comm. v. Ill. Cent. 1. R. Co. (i9o6) 2o3
U. S. 335, 27 Sup. Ct. go; Herndon v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (191o) 218
U. S. 135,30 Sup. Ct. 633; Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Wis. R. R. Comm. (i915)
237 U. S. 220, 35 Sup. Ct. 56o; St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Mo. Pub.
Service Comm. (1923) 261 U. S. 369, 43 Sup. Ct. 38o, which found such regu-
lations unreasonably burdensome. Other illustrative cases are Missouri, K. & T.
Ry. Co. v. Texas (i918) 245 U. S. 484, 38 Sup. Ct. 178, invalidating State
regulation of train stops for interstate transit; Seaboard Airline Ry. v.
Blackwell (1917) 244 U. S. 310, 37 Sup. Ct. 64o, invalidating State regu-
lation of speed at grade crossings for all trains; Hennington v. Georgia
(i896) 163 U. S. 299, 16 Sup. Ct. io86, upholding a State statute for-
bidding all freight trains to run on Sunday; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Kentucky
(i896) x61 U. S. 677, i6 Sup. Ct 714, upholding a State statute for-
bidding railroads to consolidate their lines or pool their earnings; Atlantic Coast
Line R. R. Co. v. N. C. Corp. Comm. (i9o7) 2o6 U. S. i, 27 Sup. Ct. 585, uphold-
ing the order of a State commission requiring railroads to re-arrange their
schedules so as to make connections with other through trains; Wisconsin, M. &
P. R. R. v. Jacobson (igoo) i79 U. S. 287, 21 Sup. Ct II5, Michigan Central
R. R. v. Michigan R. R. Comm. (i915) 236 U. S. 615, 35 Sup. Ct 422, Seaboard
Air Line Ry. v. Ga. R. R. Comm. (i916) 240 U. S. 324, 36 Sup. Ct 26o, uphold-
ing, and Oregon R. R. & Nov. Co. v. Fairchild (1912) 224 U. S. 510, 32 Sup. Ct
.535, denying the validity of orders of State commissions requiring railroads to
establish connections; Ill. Central R. R. Co. v. Mulberry Hill Co. (Igi5) 238
U. S. 275, 35 Sup. Ct. 76o, upholding a State statute requiring railroads to furnish
cars within a reasonable time after demand; Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v.
Iowa (914) 233 U 5. 334, 34 Sup. Ct. 592, upholding the validity of a State com-
mission's order requring a connecting carrier to use the equipment of a prior
carrier in shipping cars from without the State to their final destination; Grand
Trunk Ry. v. Michigan R. R. Comm. (913) 231 U. S. 457, 34 Sup. Ct. 152,
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The same central issue has appeared in hundreds of cases, and the
recurrence of analogous situations has woven a few clear patterns for
judgment. Certain interests, although embraced under interstate
commerce and open to Congressional control, are of such special con-
cern to the individual States that State action in regard to them has
been sanctioned. Thus laws affecting pilotage," health,
141 safety,'4
public works,143 taxation,'
4 although indisputably regulating the
currents of interstate commerce, have been permitted to the States.
State action is not barred, but by no means is all State action free.
The exact form and incidence of State legislation is tested. Frequently.
upholding the order of a State commission requiring the interchange of traffic on
the terminal tracks of an interstate carrier, compared with Ill. Cdnt. R. R. v.
Louisiana R. R. Comm. (,915) 236 U. S. 157, 35 Sup. Ct. 275. Other illustrative
cases are classified in notes i4o-i45, infra.
'Cooley v. Board of Wardens (1851, U. S.) 12 How. 2-99; Ex parte McNiel
(1871, U. S.) 13 Wall. 236; Wilson v. McNamee (i88o) io2 U. S. 572; Olsen v.
Smith (1904) 195 U. S. 332, 25 Sup. Ct. 52.
"'Plundey v. Massachusetts (1894) i55 U. S. 461, 15 Sup. Ct. i54, upholding
a State statute prohibiting the sale of deleterious oleomargerine imported in
original packages; N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. v. New York (1897) i65 U. S. 628,
17 Sup. Ct. 418, upholding a State statute regulating heating on interstate trains;
Rasmnussen v. Idaho (igoi) i81 U. S. i98, 21 Sup. Ct. 594, upholding-a State
statute authorizing the governor to prohibit the importation of sheep from locali-
ties in other States where he has reason to believe an epidemic exists. See also
quarantine cases collected supra in note 136.
4 Smith v. Alabama (i888) 124 U. S. 465, 8 Sup. Ct. 564, upholding State
statute requiring the licensing of interstate engineers; Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry.
v. Alabama (I888) 128 U. S. 96, 9 Sup. Ct. 28, upholding State statute requiring
interstate engineers to undergo color blindness tests; Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry.
Co. v. Solan (i898) i69 U. S. 133, i8 Sup. Ct 289, upholding- State statute invali-
dating a contract of a carrier that exempts him from his ordinary common law
liability; St. Louis Iron Mountain & So. Ry. v. Arkansas (1916) 240 U. S. 518,
36 Sup. Ct. 443, upholding State statute forbidding switching over crossing 
except
by a train crew of specified numbers; Kane v. New Jersey (1916) 242 U. S. i6o,
37 Sup. Ct. 30, upholding State statute requiring the registration of automobiles
of non-resident owners and providing for service of process upon them; Van-
dalia R. R. Co. v. Ind. Pub. Service Comm. (1916) 242 U. S. 255, 37 Sup. Ct.
93, Atlantic Coast Like R. R. Co. v. Georgia (1914) 234 U. S. 280, 34 Sup.
Ct. 829, upholding State statutes regulating the headlight equipment of railroad
locomotives; Erie R. R. Co. v. Board of Pub. Util. Commissioners (921) 254
U. S. 394, 41 Sup. Ct. i69, upholding a State statute requiring the abolition of
grade crossings.
1" See cases collected supra in note 136; also Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v.
Hatch (1888) 125 U. S. i, 8 Sup. Ct. 811, upholding State statute authorizing
construction of bridge across navigable waters; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United
States (1893) 148 U. S. 312, 13 Sup. Ct. 622, upholding State authorization allow-
ing a corporation to exact tolls for the use of improvements constructed by it
in a navigable stream; Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry. Co. v. Ohio (1897) 165
U. S. 365, 17 Sup. Ct 357, upholding State order requiring removal of a bridge
as obstruction to navigation.
'"The numerous cases on this subject are collected by Powell, Indirect
Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing Powers of the States
(917-IS) 31 HAv. L. REV. 321, 572, 721, 932; (1918) 32 ibid. 234, 374, 634, 902.
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it appears that, while a State may deal with a subject that is part of
interstate commerce, it has in fact dealt with it unfairly 4 5 or imposed
an unreasonable burden upon commerce beyond the State line.148 Again,
conditions change and the inadequacy of State regulation provokes
exercise of the Federal power. Local pilotage laws are displaced by a
national pilotage act;147 aspects of transportation, theretofore left to
local regulation because of the presumed predominance of local
significance, are absorbed into a Federal system of control;148 diverse
local laws governing injuries incident to work in interstate commerce
are supplanted by nation-wide legislation."49 In fine, from time to
time what was of local concern, and therefore wisely left to local
action, becomes a national concern vindicated through national regula-
tion. But always the concrete issues-whether of adjudication or of
legislation-turn on the concrete circfimstances.
The practical necessities and the shrewd judgments about practical
matters which underlie the decisions are conveyed in recurring phrases
of the opinions-"the diversified regulation which was necessary," 150
"diversity of treatment according to the special requirements of local
conditions,"' 5 ' "under all the circumstances of the case,"'152 "distinctly
local in character although embraced within the Federal authority,"' 53
"the superior fitness and propriety, not to say the absolute necessity,
of different systems of regulation, drawn from local knowledge and
experience, and conformed to local wants."'154 These practical consid-
erations of majority opinions gain significance from dissents which
were rejected because they insisted on doctrinaire views leading to an
arbitrary and impracticable division between State and national author-
ity over interstate commerce. 5 5 The cases that invalidate State
See e. g. Cook v. Pennsylvania (1878) 97 U. S. 566.
m See e. g. the train stoppage cases collected supra in note 139.
1 U. S. Rev. Sts. 1878, secs. 4237, 44oi, 4426, 4442-4444; Act of Mar. 4. 1907
(34 Stat. at L. 141) ; Act of Mar. 24, i9o8 (35 Stat. at L. 46).
" See e.g. R. R. Comm. of California v. Southern Pqc. Co. (1924) 264 U. S.
331, 44 Sup. Ct 376.
' See e.g. New York Central R. R. v. Winfield, supra; Erie R. R. Co. v4
Winfield (1916) 244 U. S. 170, 37 Sup. Ct. 556; New York Central R. R. Co. v.
Tonsellito (917) 244 U. S. 360, 37 Sup. Ct 62o.
'Hughes, J., in Port Richmond & B. P. Ferry Co. v. Freeholders of Hudson
County (1914) 234 U. S. 317, 327, 34 Sup. Ct 821, 824.
15 Hughes, J., in Port Richmond & B. P. Ferry Co. v. Freeholders of Hudson
County, supra note 15o, at p. 330, 34 Sup. Ct. 825; Hughes, J., in Minnetsota Rate
Cases (1913) 230 U. S. 352, 399, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 739.
" Marshall, C. J., in Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., supra, note 135,
at p. 252.
58 Hughes, J., in Wilmington Transportation Co. v. R. R. Comm. of California
(1915) 236 U. S. 151, 154, 35, Sup. Ct. 276, 278.
... Curtis, J., in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, supra note i4o, at p. 320.
See, e.g. McLean, J., dissenting in Cooley v. Board of Wardens. supra note
14o, at p. 324: "In this case, the power to regulate pilots is admitted to belong to
the commercial power of Congress; and yet it is held, that a State, by virtue of
its inherent power, may regulate the subject, until such regulation shall be
annulled by Congress .... And it is in this light that the decision is chiefly
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legislation, as well as those that sustain it, recognize that our consti-
tuti6nal system not only sanctions, but in its practical workings
necessitates State treatment of phases of interstate commerce.
Where Congress is silent, then, State action may cope with State
needs, so long as it does not minister to State interests at the expense
of commerce among the States. But our constitutional system
permits even greater flexibility in the regulation of interstate commerce.
Federal legislation is sometimes exercised not to supplant State action
but to support it. We have seen that States may deal with those phases
of interstate commerce which, as a matter of practice, peculiarly affect
them. But this local interest may be defeated by currents of interstate
commerce which a State cannot effectively control. Therefore, Con-
gress may draw upon its power over commerce to effectuate local State
policies. Congress may forbid movements in interstate commerce
solely to prevent the defeat of local laws-although those laws vary
in different parts of the country because based on different views of
local policy. In all these cases, and there have been a number of them,
Coigress has recognized the local emphasis in the interplay of State
and national interests involved in commerce among the States. The
regulation of liquor,155 food,
157 drugs, 158 game,1 59 have all invoked the
Commerce Clause to sustain local or regional social policies.
The predominant State or regional interest may, then, be left to
State action through Congressional abstention. Also, Congress
may exert its own powers to re-inforce the segregated interests of a
State or a region of States. Surely, then, the predominant interest of a
region may constitutionally be recognized by Congressional assent
to the protection of a regional interest through interstate compact. If
State action over a phase of interstate commerce is permitted where
the specific facts justify "diversity of treatment according to the
to be regretted. The power is recognized in the State, because the subject is
more appropriate for State than Federal action; and consequently, it must be
presumed the Constitution cannot have intended to inhibit State action. This
is not a rule by which the Constitution is to be construed."
' Wilson Act of Aug. 8, i8po (26 Stat. at L. 313), sustained In re Rahrer
(1891) 14o U. S. 545, 11 Sup. Ct. 865, construed in Rhodes v. Iowa (1897) 17o
U. S. 41A 18 Sup. Ct. 664, and Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Cook Brewing
Co. (1912) 223 U. S. 70, 32 Sup. Ct. 189; Webb-Kenyon Act of Mar. 1, 1913
(37 Stat at L. 699), sustained in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry.
Co. (1917) 242 U. S; 311, 37 Sup. Ct. i8o.
" Act of May g, 1902 (32 Stat. at L. 193), sustained in United States v. Green
(19o5, N. D. N. Y.) 137 Fed. i79. See also Act of June 3o, i9o6, sec. 1o (34
Stat at L. 8o4).
I* U. S. Rev. Sts. 1878, sec. 4280.
"Lacey Act of May 25, 19oo (3i Stat. at L. 188), carried into Fed. Crim.
Code, secs. 242, 243, 244, sustained in Rupert v. United States (191o, C. C. A. 8th)
181 Fed. 87. See also Wilson v. United States (182o, C. C. D. Va.) 30 Fed.
Cas. No. 17,846, inferentially sustaining Act of Feb. 28, 18o3 (2 Stat at L. 2o5) ;
Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses (1902) 186 U. S. 181, 22 Sup. Ct 857. Compare
Bradley, J., in The Lottawanna (1874, U. S.) 21 Wall. 558, 581.
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special requirements of local conditions," then the Constitutional issues
turn upon the facts of the specific situation of our immediate problem,
the regulation of electric power; or, to put it more accurately, they
turn upon a judgment on such facts which Congress, as the guardian
of the national interest, may reasonably entertain. The constitutional
issues, therefore, bring us back to the facts presented by the electric
power situation, and the facts determine the constitutional issues.
If the country "naturally divides itself into several power areas"6 0
and "the problems in each of these power districts are essentially
different" and if "a rightful solution" demands that we consider them
as "essentially separate problems" affecting distinct regions with
distinct necessities and distinct resources, the Constitution opposes no
barrier to solution through agreements between the States of a given
region supported by Congressional approval.
In no wise does this solution imply a transfer by Congress of its
duty towards national affairs. On the contrary, it is a deliberate
recognition by Congress that a particular electric power situation is
predominantly the concern of the region .limited by the radius ?f a
specific electric power development and outside the regulative concern
of the nation. In a zone for legislation open both to Congress and
the States, the controlling facts justify, at least for the time being,
co-operative State adjustment. Congress does not surrender any of
its powers; it merely finds no occasion for its present exercise of them.
There is, therefore, no "delegation" of its power in any legally signifi-
cant use of the term.161 But Congress does not foreclose the future.
See supra note 12.
It is now clear that the cases in notes 156 and x59 involve no "delegation" of leg-
islative power from Congress to the States. They merely illustrate the process of
Congressional delimitation of the respective areas of Federal and State control
over a field, such as interstate commerce, subject to the legislative authority of
both State and Nation. This conception of the true nature of the issue thus
presented was set forth by the Court in sustaining the Wilson Act: "Congress
did not use terms of permission to the State to act, but simply removed an
impediment to the enforcement of the state laws in respect to imported packages
in their original condition, created by the absence of a specific utterance on its
part. It imparted no power to the State not then possessed, but allowed imported
property to fall at once upon arrival within the local jurisdiction." In re Rahrer,
supra note 156, at p. 564, 11 Sup. Ct. 870. The misconception about "delega-
tion" was exposed again, by White, C. J., in sustaining the validity of the Webb-
Kenyon Act: "The argument as to delegation to the States rests upon a mere
misconception.... Or, in other words, stating the necessary result of the
argument from a concrete consideration of the particular subject here involved,
that because Congress in adopting a regulation had considered the nature and
character of our dual system of government, State and Nation, and instead of
absolutely prohibiting, had so conformed its regulation as to produce co6peration
between the local and national forces of government to the end of preserving the
rights of all, it had thereby transcended the complete and perfect power of regu-
lation conferred by the Constitution. And it is well again to point out that this
abnormal result to which the argument leads concerns a subject as to which both
State and Nation in their respective spheres of authority possessed the supremest
authority before the action of Congress which is complained of, and hence the
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If and when circumstances which now call for solution through
compact change, Congress is wholly free to assume control.16 2  Our
constitutional history, as we have noted, records numerous instances of
control by the States over phases of interstate commerce subsequently
replaced by national control because the facts of life had shifted the
center of predominance from State to national interest. The exercise
of authority as between the States and Congress, in the field of inter-
state commerce, is necessarily an empiric process, simply because it may
invoke the exertion of legislative power both by the States and by the
Nation, and, through the expedient of compact, by a combination of
the two.
We are thus dealing with a very different grant of power to the
Federal government than that which is embodied in the Admiralty
Clause of the Constitution. Because of the international aspect of mari-
time commerce,163 control over ;idmiralty matters is vested in the
Federal Government to an extent very different from that which per-
tains to interstate commerce.' 4  Therefore the doctrines of "uni-
argument virtually comes to the assertion that in some undisclosed way by the
exertion of congressional authority, power possessed has evaporated." Clark
Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co. supra, note 156, at p. 33, 37 Sup.
Ct. 185. The source of the misconception as to "delegation" is a misinterpretation
of Leisy v. Hardin (i8go) 135 U. S. ioo, io Sup. Ct. 68I. This case, widely
criticized by judges and the profession, has been "restrained in its application to
the case actually presented for determination." See Plumley v. Massachusetts,
supra note 141, at p. 474, I5 Sup. Ct. at p. 159. For our purposes, the decisive
case is In re Rahrer, supra note I56. The effect of that decision is to put a
quietus on any question of "delegation." Recent writers on .the Webb-Kenyon
Act have demonstrated the myth of "delegation" in the field of interstate com-
merce. See Denison, States' Rights and the Webb-Kenyon Liquor Law (1914)
14 COL. L. REv. 321; Rogers, State Legislation under the Webb-Kenyon Act
(1915) 28 HARv. L. REv. 225; Powell, Validity of State Legislation under the
Webb-Kenyon Law (917) 2 So. L. QUART. 112; contra, Cooke, Commerce Clause
(I908) sec. 99.
" See e.g. the New York-Connecticut Boundary Agreement of 1925, supplant-
ing the agreement of 1879, Appx. A, III, (37), (3), infra.
" McReynolds, J., in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen (1917) 244 U. S. 205, 216,
37 Sup. Ct. 524, 529: "And plainly, we think, no such legislation is valid if it con-
travenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress or works material
prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes
with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and inter-
state relations," and Bradley, J., in the Lottawanna (1874, U. S.) 21 Wall. 558, 573:
"The common maritime law of the world . . 1" (Italics ours.)
' It is significant that in the contest over the establishment of inferior Federal
courts under the Judiciary Act of 1789, the opponents of inferior Federal courts
always conceded the propriety of such courts with a jurisdiction confined to
cases of admiralty and maritime law. A motion reducing their scope of jurisdic-
tion to this class of cases was made by Richard Henry Lee in the Senate on
June 22, 1789. Edward Carrington wrote to Madison on Aug. 3, 1789: "The
State courts where they are well established might be adopted as the inferior
Federal Courts, except as to maritime business. . . ." Tucker in the House pro-
posed a substitute plan for that established by the judiciary Act, confining the
inferior courts to courts of admiralty. Fisher Ames wrote to Minot on Sept. 3,
1789: "The question whether we shall have inferior tribunals (except Admiralty
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formity" and "delegation," developed in the recent series of admiralty
decisions, 18 5 are restricted to a special and independent branch of con-
.stitutional law, and are irrelevant to the historic applications of the
Commerce Clause. The decisive differences in the considerations
applicable to the commerce cases compared with those that govern the
admiralty decisions are strikingly'illustrated in a recent dissent by Mr.
Justice McReynolds, the spokesman of the Court for the admiralty
doctrine. 66 The only question of "uniformity" which is raised by Con-
gressional assent to regional control of electric power is the practical
question whether the proposed regional control is in fact confined to
a regional problem. Being a question of fact it must be adjudged as
a question of fact, not by any technical or pedantic presuppositions.8 7
The circumstances of the individual situation control. Being a judg-
ment on practical affairs its exercise is primarily and persuasively for
Congress, not for the courts. The process which is invoked and the
profound reasons for deference to the Congressional judgment have
been put in classic language by James Bradley Thayer:
"Now the question whether or not a given subject admits of only
one uniform system or plan of regulation is primarily a legislative
question, not a judicial one. For it involves a consideration of what,
on practical grounds is expedient, possible, or desirable; and whether,
being so at one time or place, it is so at another; as in the cases of
Courts, which were not denied to be necessary).. . ." 'See Warren, New Light
on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 (1923) 37 H.Av. L. REv. 49,
67, 1IO, i 9, 123. Hamilton in the Federalist, No. LXXX, writes: "The most
bigoted idolizers of State authority have not thus far shown a disposition to deny
the national judiciary the cognizances of maritime causes. These so generally
depend on the laws of nations, and so commonly affect the rights of foreigners,
that they fall within the considerations which are relative to the public peace.
The most important part of them are, by the present Confederation, submitted
to federal jurisdiction."
"Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen supra note 163. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.
Stewart (ipi) 253 U. S. i6o, 4o Sup. Ct 438; Union Fish Co. v. Ericksom'(igig)
248 U. S. 308, 39 Sup. Ct. 1i1; Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co. (1918) 247
U. S. 372, 38 Sup. Ct 501; Washington v. Dawson & Co. (1924) 264 U. S. 219,
44 Sup. Ct 3o2. The series of decisions has been severely criticized by writers
bred in the admiralty tradition. See Hough, Admiralty Jurisdiction-Of Late
Years (1924) 37 HAv. L. REv. 529; Palfrey, Common Law Courts and the Law
of the Sea (923) 36 HAEv. L. REv. 777; Uniformity in the Admiralty Law
(924) 37 H~Av. L. REv. ii 4. See also Fell, Recent Problems in Admiralty
Jurisdiction (I922) passim.
" See McReynolds, J., dissenting in Buck v. Kuykendall (1925) 45 Sup. Ct 327:
"Interstate commerce has been greatly aided-amazingly- facilitated, indeed-
through the legislation and expenditures of the States ... .As the Federal
Government has not and cannot undertake specific regulation, local control must
continue; otherwise chaotic conditions will quickly develop. The problems are
essentially local and, until something is done which tends really to hinder inter-
state commerce, should be left to the local authorities . .. Manifestly, the
situation cannot be met by gneral Federal rules."
'Cf. Holmes, J., in Swift & Co. v.. United States (9o5) 196 U. S. 375, 398,
25 Sup. Ct 276, 29o: "Commerce among the States is not a technical legal con-
ception, but a practical one, drawn from the course of business."
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quarantine and pilotage laws, and laws regulating the bringing in and
sale of particular articles, such as intoxicating liquors or opium. As
regards the last-named drug, the desirable rule for California, where
there are many Chinamen, and for Vermont, where there are few,
may conceivably be different. It is not in the language itself of the
clause of the Constitution now in question or in any necessary construc-
tion of it, that any requirement of uniformity is found in any case
whatever. That can only be declared necessary, in any given case, as
being the determination of someone's practical judgment. The
question, then, appears to be a legislative one; it is for Congress and
not for the courts--except, indeed, in the sense that the courts may
control a legislative decision, so far as to keep it within the bounds of
reason, of rational opinion."
168
VII.
Resort to the Compact Clause in regulating electric power develop-
ment demands a discriminating technique in applying commonplaces
of constitutional law governing interstate commerce. But occasions
for the use of the Compact Clause, as its history abundantly reveals,
will arise in fields not presenting any possible collision between States
and Nation, but affecting concerns wholly outside the scope of Federal
legislation. These concerns may increasingly transcend the boundaries
of a single State, and yet be confined to a regional group of States like
New England. An enlargement of the Federal power through con-.
stitutional amendment may, in specific instances, be the answer; but
this need not be, and ought not to be, our only relief from State impo-
tence or State inadequacy.
The imaginative adaptation of the compact idea should add con-
siderably to resources available to statesmen in the solution of
problems presented by the growing interdependence, social and eco-
nomic, of groups of States forming distinct regions. It may well be
that the New England States, the Middle Atlantic States, the Pacific
Coast States, and similar groupings will each evolve, through compact,
common industrial standards, thereby recognizing diversities not
coincident with the capricious boundaries of forty-eight States nor yet
to be resolved by a flat common denominator nation-wide in its
operation. Time and circumstances alone must determine the existence
of such diversities and common needs and the wisdom of regional
rather than national treatment. The overwhelming difficulties con-
fronting modern society must not be at the mercy of the false antithesis
embodied in the shibboleths "States-Rights" and "National Supre-
macy." We must not deny ourselves new or unfamiliar modes in
realizing national ideals. Our regions are realities. Political think-
ing must respond to these realities. Instead of leading to
parochialism, it will bring a fresh ferment of political thought whereby
national aims may be achieved through various forms of political
adjustments.




THE LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF
INTERCOLONIAL AND INTERSTATE AGREEMENTS*
I.
AGREEMENTS OF THE COLONIAL PERIOD
(I) Connecticut and New Netherlands Boundary Agreements of
1656:
The Treaty of Hartford, concluded between the United Colonies and
New Netherlands on September 19, I65O, dealt in part with the
boundary between the two Colonies.' These provisions were con-
firmed on the part of New Netherlands by the States General of the
United Netherlands on January 22; 1656.2
(2) Rhode Island and Connecticut Boundary Agreement of 1663:
On April 7, 1663, an agreement to abide by the decision of arbi-
trators, to whom both parties had submitted the dispute, was signed by
the agents of Connecticut and Rhode Island.3 The claim was later
resisted by Connecticut on the ground that Governor Winthrop, its
agent, had entered into the agreement without authority from its
General Court.3
(3) New York and Connecticut Boundary Agreement of r664:
An agreement dealing with the respective claims of New York and
Connecticut to Long Island was concluded on November 3o , 1664.4
A supplemental settlement was concluded on December I, 1664 .
"
* This Appendix 'aims to give an inventory of agreements undertaken by the
Colonies and the Thirteen States prior to the Constitution, and of compacts con-
cluded or proposed under the Constitution, covering a period from 1656 to the
prospective Columbia River Compact, consented to by Congress on Mar. 4, 1925.
A summary of the legislative, judicial and administrative history of these agree-
ments has been based on investigation of the material in the Harvard Law School
and Widener Libraries. Undoubtedly mistakes have crept in, and omissions will
be revealed. Partly, of course, inaccuracies and errors are unavoidable as long
as our Colonial Records remain so deplorably inaccessible. In any event, we
hope that the defects of this summary will stimulate further study.
We have been greatly aided in the collection of recent documents, as yet
unavailable in the libraries, by the ready help of J. H. Cohen, Counsel for the
Port of New York Authority, M. L. Cooke, Director of the Pennsylvania Giant
Power Survey, and E. E. Hunt, of Secretary Hoover's Staff.
'Laws of New Netherlands, 1638-1674, 215, 455.
'Ibid. 38.
"R. I. Col. Rec. 518. A collection of documents bearing on this agreement is
contained in Conn. Col. Rec. 526-541. See also Adams, Founding of New Eng-
land, 1665-1667 (192) 320-321.
a Conn. Col. Rec. 1665-1667, 527.
'Report of the Regents of the University on the Boundaries of New York,
x873, 24. See 3 Osgood, American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century (19o7)
175-177; Dickinson, American Colonial Government (1912) 288-29o.
'aReport of the Commissioners on New York-Connecticut Boundary, N. Y.
Sen. Doc. 1857, No. 165, p. 1o2.
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(4) New York and Connecticut Boundary Agreement of 1683:
Encroachment by New York upon Connecticut was protested
against as a violation of the earlier agreement of 1664.1 Commis-
sioners were appointed to negotiate for the settlement of these
difficulties6 and an agreement was concluded between the governors
of the two Colonies on November 28, I683.7 It was confirmed by
the General Court of Connecticut on May 8, 1684.8 A supplemental
agreement dealing with the same boundary was concluded between
the commissioners of the two Colonies on March 28, i7oo.9
(5) Connecticut and Rhode Island Boundary Agreement of 17o3:
Commissioners were appointed by the two Colonies in 1699 ° and
1702,11 and concluded an agreement on May 12, 1703.12 The com-
missioners that were appointed to run the line in accordance with this
agreement failed after numerous attempts to come to any acceptable
decision. 3 Finally in 172o an appeal was taken to the King. . In
1726 he confirmed the earlier agreement of 1703.25 After further
minor disputes the line was run in accordance with this agreement.16
(6) Massachusetts and Rhode Island Boundary Agreements of 1710
and 1719:
A partition line agreed upon by commissioners of the two Colonies
on January 19, 1710, was accepted by Massachusetts on March 16,
1710.7 Commissions appointed to run the line thus determined were
given powers to make a full and final settlement of the controversy.1 8
Such an agreement was entered into on May 14, 1719, and in the same
year was approved by the legislatures of the two Colonies.19
'Letter of Governor and Council of Connecticut to Governor Dongan of New
York on Oct 5, 1683, and Reply of Governor Dongan on Oct. 9, 1683. See
Conn. Col. Rec. I678-I68g, 326, 327, 328.
6Conn. Col. Rec. 1678-1689, x4o.
'Conn. Col. Rec. 1678-1689, 330; Reports of Commissioners of Now York-
Connecticut Boundary, N. Y. Sen. Doc. 1857, No. 165, p. -43; 2 Report of the
Regents of the University on the Boundaries of New York, 1873, 244.
"Conn. Col. Rec. 1678-1689, 140.
9 i Repqrt of the Regents of the University on the Boundaries of New York,
1873, 58. By the Act of June 25, 1719, New York appointed a commission to
run this line again, providing that the line thus established should be invalid
until the King should assent thereto. The Royal Assent was given on Jan. 23,
1723. See i N. Y. Col. Laws, ch. 384, p. 1O39. The agreement of 1683 was the
basis of the present line, which was run in 1878. See Thwaites, The Colonies
(I.i) 267. 103 R- I. Col. Rec. 378.
Conn. Col: Rec. I689-17O6, 399. "3 R. I. Col. Rec. 474.
1 4 R. I. Col. Rec. 175, 251, 273. 144 R. I. Col. Rec. 283.
134 R. I. Col. Rec. 370; Conn. Col. Rec. 1726-1735, 178.
1 Conn. Col. Rec. 1726-1735, 156, 178; 4 R. I. Col. Rec. 4o5. See also 2 New
and Complete History of the British Empire in America (1756) 138 (author
unknown).
179 Mass. Prov. Acts, 164.
Mass. Prey. Acts, 399, 499, 535, 562, 573; 4 P. I. Col. Rec. 2o6, 218.
9 Mass. Prov. Acts, 655; 4 R. I. Col. Rec. 253. A preliminary settlement had
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(7) New York and Connecticut Boundary Agreement of 1725:
Commissioners were appointed by Connecticut on October 8, 1724,20
and by New York on June 24, 1784, and given extensive powers by
the Act of April 8, 1724.1 Preliminary articles of agreement were
entered into on April 29, 1725,22 and a final settlement was concluded
on May 12, 1725.3 This agreement was approved by Connecticut
on October 8, 1730.24 A survey made according to the terms of the
agreement had been confirmed by the commissioners on May 14, 1730.25
(8) North Carolina and South Carolina Boundary Agreement of
1735:
The negotiation of an agreement between the Governors of these two
Colonies is recorded as of April 23, 1735.6
(9) New York and Massachusetts Boundary Agreement of 1773:
Commissioners were appointed to negotiate an agreement by
Massachusetts on February 3, 1773, 2 and by New York on March 8,
I77S.2s The agreement was to be binding when signed by the govern-
ors of the two Colonies, subject to approval by the King. An agree-
ment was concluded between the commissioners and signed by the
respective governors on May 18, 1773.29
II.
COMPACTS UNDER THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
(I) Pennsylvania and Virginia Boundary Agreement of i78o:
(a) An agreement between commissioners of the two States was
been approved by Rhode Island on Oct. 29, 1718. See 4 R. I. Col. Rec. 243. See
also Rhode Island v. Massachwretts (1838, U. S.) 12 Pet. 657, 665-666.
Conn. CoL Rec. 1717-1725, 496.
'Report of the Commissioners on New York-Connecticut Boundary, N. Y.
Sen. Doc. 1857, No. 165. Appx. T.
Ibid. Appx. U. See also 2 Conn. Priv. Laws, 1789-1836, p. 1527.
Report, supra note 21, Appx. V.
Conn. Col. Rec. 1726-1735, 294.
22 Report of the Regents of the University on the Boundaries of New York,
1873, 355; Report of the Commissioners on New York-Connecticut Boundary,
N. Y. Sen. Doc. No. 165, 1857, 5o-55.
25 N. C. Col. Rec. 374; I Cooper, S. C. Sts. 407. This agreement was an
attempt to settle a controversy between Governor Burrington of North Carolina
and Governor Johnson of South Carolina in 1732. A dispute over the boundary
arose again in 1763 and was referred to the King for settlement. The boundary
line was run during the years 1764-1772 pursuant to the royal instructions. See
I Cooper, op. cit. 4o8.
218 Mass. Prov. Acts, 68o.
n 5 N. Y. Col. Laws, ch. i6oi, 522.
i 1 Report of the Regents of the University on the Boundaries of New York,
1873, 211. No evidence of royal assent has been found, but the agreement was
thereafter treated as binding by New York. See Act of Mar. 24, 1795, N. Y.
Laws, 1789-1796, ch. 33, P. 577.
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negotiated on August 31, 1779.30 Pennsylvania ratified this agree-
ment on November 19, I779.31 Virginia took no action looking forward
to ratification, and remonstrances against this delay and Virginia's con-
tinual encroachments upon Pennsylvania's territory were made by
President Reed of Pennsylvania to Virginia
32 and to the Continental
Congress.33 The latter body adopted a resolution counselling amicable
settlement of the controversy and protesting against disturbance of the
possession of the land-owners upon the disputed territory.
34 Under
this pressure Virginia's ratification was secured on June 23, 178o.35
Pennsylvania again ratified the agreement on September 23, 1780.38
The agreement looked forward to joint action by the States in running
the boundary line. Proposals to run the line were deferred for
several years37 and a temporary line was accepted.
3 8  In 1783 a pro-
posal to run the permanent line was made
3 9 and commissioners were
appointed by the two States,40 who ran a line that was adopted by both
legislatures.
(b) Cases in which this compact has come up for judicial con-
struction are Sims, Lessee v. Irvine (1799, U. S.) 3 Dall. 485 ;.Marlaft
v. Silk (1837, U. S.) II Pet. I.
(2)" Pennsylvania and New Jersey Agreements of 1783 and 1786:
(a) An agreement dealing with the respective claims of the two
States to jurisdiction over certain islands in the .Delaware River was
concluded between commissioners on April 31, 1783. This was ratified
by Pennsylvania on September 2o, 178341 and by New Jersey on May
30 io Hening, Va. Stat. at L. 534.
a lo ibid. 533.
' Letter of Pres. Reed to Scott, boundary commissioner for Virginia, on Dec.
29, 1779, and the reply of Scott on Jan. 21, 178o. See 8 Pa. Archives, 63, 91.
'Letter of Pres. Reed to Continental Congress on Dec. 15, 1779. See 8 Pa.
Archives, 46.
'Res. of Dec. 27, 1799, 15 Journ. of Cont Cong. 1411.
"3 IO Hening, op. cit. 535; 8 Pa. Archives, 352-
"8 Pa. Archives, 570.
"Letters of Gov. Jefferson to Pres. Reed on April 17 and June 3, 178r. See
9 Pa. Archives, 78, 189. See Res. of Assembly on Mar. 2. 1782, 9 ibid. 5o6.
'Letter of Gov. Harrison to Pres. Moore on Mar. 22, 1782. See 9 Pa.
Archives, 518. Virginia appointed a commission for this purpose on June 6,
1782. See 9 ibid. 562. The report of the boundary commissioners was accepted
by Pennsylvania on Mar. 22, 1783. See io ibid. 8. See also Letter of Pres.
Dickinson to Gov. Harrison on Mar. 27, 1783, 11 ibid. 497.
'Letter of Gov. Harrison to Pres. Dickinson on June 12, 1783, IO ibid. 497.
'Virginia appointed a commission on June 27, 1783. See IO ibid. 171. Penn-
sylvania appointed a commission on Aug. 28, 1783. See 3o ibid. 95. See also io
ibid. 223, 230; 1i ibid. 499. Pres. Dickinson suggested that the Continental
Congress should also appoint a commissioner. See Letter of Pres. Dickinson to
Cont. Cong., April I1, 1785, IO ibid. 44o. See also the reports of the Commission,
io ibid. 373, 374, 438, 5o6.
41 II Pa. Stat at L. 1782, ch. 1035, p. 151.
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27, 1783.42 Commissioners appointed under the terms of this agree-
men 3 contemplated oa further agreement between the States looking
forward to the improvement of navigation on the Delaware River and
its branches." Such an agreement was reached on December 2, 1785,
and ratified by New Jersey on March I6, I787.44a Pennsylvania by
the Act of September 25, 1786, made effective those terms of the com-
pact that applied to her.44b Further legislation under the terms of the
agreement of 1783 was undertaken by Pennsylvania in I786,45 and by
New Jersey in 1856.
(b) This agreement was considered in Comm. v. Frazee (1856, Pa.)
2 Phila. 191; State v. Davis (1856, N. J.) i Dutch. 386; Att'y Gen'l v.
Dela. & Bound Brook R. R. Co. (1876) 27 N. J. Eq. I.
(3) Virginia and Maryland Agreement of x785:
(a) This agreement, concluded between commissioners of the two
States on March 28, 1785, dealt.with the regulation of navigation and
of fishing, and the exercise of jurisdiction over the waters of the
Potomac River. It was confirmed by Maryland in November, 1785, 7
and by Virginia in October, 1785.8
(b) This compact was considered in Georgetown v. Alexandria
Coal Co. (1838, U. S.) 12 Pet. 91; Wharton v. Wise (1894) 153
U. S. 155, 14 Sup. Ct. 783; Ex parte Marsh (1813, E. D. Va.) 57 Fed.
719; Hendricks v. Commonwealth (1882) 75 Va. 934.
(4) South Carolina and Georgia Agreement of 1788:
(a) This agreement concluded on February I, 1788, dealt with the
boundary between fhe two States and-the navigation of the Savannah
River. It was confirmed by Georgia on February I, 1788,49 and by
South Carolina on February 27, 1788.50
(b) This compact was held to have no limiting effect upon the
power of Congress over commerce, since both States had thereafter
adopted the Constitution. South Carolina v. Georgia (1876) 93 U. S. 4.
4'N. J. Rev. Sts. 1847, tit. III, ch. 5, p. 41; Nixon, Dig. N. J. Laws, 1709-1855
(2d ed. 1855) 824.
49 Pa. Archives, i29.
" The Pennsylvania Commission was authorized to co-operate with the New
Jersey Commission. See 9 Pa. Archives, 71o. This authorization was com-
municated by Pennsylvania to the Governor of New Jersey. See 9 ibid. 458. See
also Letter of Pres. Dickinson to Governor of New Jersey, on Dec. 14, 1783, 9
ibid. 366.
"a N. J. Rev. Sts. 1847, tit. III, ch. 6, p. 43.
"b 12 Pa. Stat. at L. 1786, ch. 1245, p. 3o4.
12 Pa. Stat. at L. 1786, ch. 1245, p. 3o4.
"N. J. Laws, 1856, ch. 123, p. 242.
i Dorsey, Md. Laws, 1692-1839, 187.
12 Hening, Va. Stat. at L. 5o.
Prince, Dig. Ga. Laws, 53.
i Cooper, S. C. Sts. 411.
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III.
COMPACTS WITH THE CONSENT OF CONGRESS SINCE 1789*
(I) Virginia and Kentucky Compact of 1789:
(a) The assent of Congress is found in the Act of February 4,
I79I, 5' admitting Kentucky into the Union.
(b) The Virginia Act of December 18, 1789, sec. 7,52 by which
Kentucky was severed, provides:
"Third, that all private rights and interests of land within the said
district, derived from the laws of Virginia prior to such separation,
shall remain valid and secure under the laws of the proposed state,
and shall be determined by the laws now existing in this state."
Section ii of the same act53 provided that the jurisdiction of
Kentucky over the Ohio River should be concurrent only with those
States who might possess the opposite shore of the river. Both
provisions of this Act were accepted by Kentucky and embodied in its
Constitution.5
(c) The compact created as a result of the seventh section was
considered in Green v. Biddle (1823, U. S.) 8 Wheat. I; Hawkins v.
Burney's Lessee (1831, U. S.) 5 Pet. 457; Kentucky Union Co. v.
Kentucky (1911) 219 U. S. 140, 31 Sup. Ct. 171.
The compact created under the eleventh section was considered in
Wedding v. Meyler (1904) 192 U. S. 573, 24 Sup. Ct. 322; Niconlin v.
O'Brien (1918) 248 U. S. 113, 39 Sup. Ct. 23; State v. Faudre (19o3)
54 W. Va. 122, 46 S. E. 269.
(2) Kentucky and Tennessee Boundary Compact of 182o:
(a) Congressional assent was given by Resolution of May 12,
1820.
55
* The first attempt, so far as we are aware, to enumerate the Congressional
consents to compacts formed under the Constitution was made by Judge A. A.
Bruce in (ii8) 2 MINN. L. R~v. 5oo. This, in turn, became the foundation for
a list of such Acts of Congress in the report of the Committee on Inter-State
Compacts made on May I, i92i to the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws at its Thirty-first Annual Meeting. Mr. Charles Warren
in his Stafford Little Lectures (The Supreme Cowrt and the Sovereign Stata
[1924]) has drawn upon the Bruce List, adding a few of the later consents.
The lack of a scientific index to Federal legislation does not make it surprising
that all these lists are incomplete for ihe periods which they cover. None of
them, moreover, (with negligible exceptions in the Warren list) refers to the
very important State legislation concerning these compacts. The story is obviously
incomplete without a recital of such legislation. We have, therefore, attempted
a comprehensive list of the compacts to which. Congress consented and not
confined ourselves to corrections and additions of prior lists. Undoubtedly we
have not escaped inaccuracies and omissions.
I Stat at L. i89.
"13 Hening, Va. Stat. at L. 17, I9.
See note 39, supra.
"Ky. Const. Art. VIII, sec. 7, i Litt. Ky. Laws, 32.
53 Stat. at L. 6og.
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(b) Commissioners were appointed at various intervals by both
States during the period of 18o1-i82o in an attempt to secure a settle-
ment of the boundary line favorable to both States.5 6 By the Act of
November 23, 1819"7 the Tennessee legislature appointed two com-
missioners with authority to enter into a binding agreement with
Kentucky. By the Act of January i, 182o,58 Kentucky appointed
commissioners to negotiate an agreement to be submitted to the legis-
lature for ratification. The agreement thus concluded, after slight
modifications to comply with the request of the Kentucky legislature,59
was ratified by that State by the Act of February ii, 182o.6 0
(c) This compact was considered in Poole v. Fleeger (1837, U. S.)
ii Pet. 185, affirming Fleeger v. Poole (1832) Fed. Cas. No. 4,86o.
'(3) Incorporation of C. & 0. Canal Company in 1825:
(a) The requisite Congressional assent for the incorporation of
the Company was given by the Acts of March 3, 1825.1 May 23,
1828,62 and July 14, 1832.
63
(b) By the Act of January 27, 1824,64 Virginia incorporated the
C. & 0. Canal Company with the privilege of exercising the right of
eminent domain, on condition that assent would be given, together
with similar rights of eminent domain, by Congress, Maryland, and the
Potomac Company. Maryland by the Act of January 31, 1825,65 gave
its assent on the condition of assent being given by the other named
States, together with Potomac Company, and also requesting the assent
of Pennsylvania. Congressional assent was given by the Acts enumer-
ated above. On May 16, 1825, the Potomac Company gave its assent.66
On February 9, 1826,67 Pennsylvania gave its assent.
(c) In C. & 0. Canal Co. v. B. & 0. R. R. Co. (1832 Md.) 4 Gill
& J. i, it was held that this was a binding compact between the States
" Commissioners were appointed by Tennessee on Nov. 3, 1803. See I Scott,
Tenn. Laws, ch. 63, p. 8ol. The so-called Walker's line was then run, and
confirmed by Tennessee with a request that Kentucky should do the same, on
Oct. 21, 1812. See 2 Scott, op. cit. ch. 61, p. gi. Kentucky had appointed com-
missioners on Dec. 14, i8Oi. See Tomlinson, Coll. Ky. Acts, 481. But on Dec.
22, i8o, Kentucky repealed this act. See 3 Litt. Ky. Laws, ch. 37, p. 8o. Com-
missioners were again appointed on Feb. 4, 1812, to act with the Tennessee com-
missioners. See Ky. Laws, 1811, 188. Kentucky refused to accept Walker's line,
but sought to secure a settlement by continuing negotiations with Tennessee.
See Ky. Laws, 1812-13, 93. Further action was taken by Tennessee to establish
Walker's line in 1817. See 2 Scott, op. cit. ch. 157, p. 425. Kentucky, however,
by legislative resolution of Feb. IO, 1816, adopted a variation of Walker's line.
&r 2 Scott. op. cit. ch. 67, p. 52o. 6i 4 Stat. at L. 161.
"Ky. Laws, iig, ch. 461, p.. 82o. "4 Stat. at L. 292.
Res. of Jan. 28, i82o, Ky. Laws, 18ig, 99o. ' 4 Stat. at L. 6o2.
"Ky. Laws, 18ig, ch. 546, p. 22. " Va. Laws, 1823-24, ch. 38, p. 41.
Md. Laws, 1824-25, ch. 79.
'"The act of assent is found in 4 Stat. at L. 82. A complete list of all the
acts is to be found in 4 Stat. at I. Appx. I.
"Pa. Acts, x825-26, ch. 7, p. 8, as amended by Act of Mar. 9, 1826, Pa. Acts,
1825-26, ch. 28, p. 73.
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of Maryland and Virginia, xith the requisite Congressional assent,
which could not be impaired by the independent action of Maryland.
(4) New York and New Jersey Compact of 1833:
(a) Congressional assent was given by the Act of June 28, I8346
s
(b) Commissioners were appointed by New York by the Act of
June I8, 1833,69 and by New Jersey under the Act of February 6,
1833. 70 The compact, concluded on September 16, 1833, dealt with
the boundary line between the States, the exercise of jurisdiction by
them over the waters of the Hudson River, and the title of the respect-
ive States to the river bed and the islands in the river. It was
ratified by New York on February 5, 1834,7
1 and by New Jersey on
February 16, 1834.
72
(c) This compact was considered in Central R. R. Co. v. Jersey
City (1908) 209 U. S. 473, 28 Sup. Ct. 592; State v. Babcock
(1862 , N. J.) i Vroom, 29; People v. C. R. R. of N. J. (1870) 42
N. Y. 293; Ferguson v. Ross (1891) 126 N. Y. 459, 27 N. E. 954.
(5) Missouri and Arkansas Boundary Compact of 1846:
(a) Congressional assent was given by the Act of February 15,
1848.
73
(b) Commissioners were appointed by Arkansas under the Act of
January 12, 1843, 74 and by Missouri under the Act of February 25,
1843.' 5 The agreement was ratified by Arkansas on December 23,
1846,76 and by Missouri on February 16, 1847.
77
(6) Massachusetts and New York Boundary Compact of 1853:
(a) Congressional assent was given by the Act of January 3,
1855.78
(b) By the Act of May 14, 1853,79 Massachusetts ceded to New
York certain territory on condition that the cession would be accepted
by the latter State. Acceptance by New York is found in the Act of
July 21, 1853-s0
(7) Massachusetts and Rhode Island Boundary Settlement of 1859:
(a) Congressional assent was given by the Act of February 9,
1858.1
(b) A boundary suit had been pending for many years in the
Supreme Court of the United States. By the Resolution of April q,
1859,2 Massachusetts authorized its attorney-general to conclude an
adjustment of this dispute that would be binding upon both States.
a4 Stat. at L. 708. "Mo. Laws, 1843, 23.
' N. Y. Laws 1833, ch. 6, p. 6. "' Dig. Ark. Laws, 1857, ch. 13, p. 154.
N' . J. Laws, 1832-1833, 54. 'Mo. Laws, 1847, 13.
N. Y. Laws, 1834, ch. 8, p. 8. 7S IO Stat. at L. 6o2.
N. J. Laws, 1833-1834, 118. Mass. Acts, 1852-1853, ch. 340, P. 564
Ig Stat. at L. 211. 66N. Y. Laws, 1853, ch. 586, p. 1102.
""Ark. Acts, 1
8 43-44, 53. ii Stat. at L. 382.
t, Mass. Acts, 1858-1859, ch. 69, p. 459.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
By the Act of March 8, i86o,8' Rhode Island invested its attorney-
general with similar authority.
(8) Prospective Agreement between Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas
of x86i:
(a) By a Joint Resolution of February 2r, i86i,11 Congress gave
its assent to joint action by these -States for the removal of raft from
the Red River.
(b) No evidence of any formal agreements between these States
concerning such a project has been found.
(9) Virginia and West Virginia Debt Agreement of 1862:
(a) Congressional assent to this agreement is found in the Act of
December 31, 1862,85 admitting West Virginia into the Union.
'R. I. Acts, i859-186o, ch. 320, p. 139. There have been other cases of an
agreement between counsel representing the interests of two States in a boundary
dispute, where an agreement was reached to avoid determination by a commis-
sion appointed by the Court Thus in Nebraska v. ,owa (1892) 143 U. S. 359,
12 Sup. Ct 396, the Court having held that avulsion did not affect the former
boundary line" between the States, permitted the two States to agree upon a
designation of the boundary to pass into the final decree, and provided that if
the parties could not agree a commission would be appointed by the Court to
survey the line. An agreement having been reached by the parties, its terms
were embodied in the final decree. Nebraska v. Iowa (1892) 145 U. S. 519,
12 Sup. Ct. 976. Exactly the same procedure was adopted in the case of a
boundary dispute between Missouri and Nebraska. Missouri v. Nebraska (19o4)'
196 U. S. 23, 25 Sup. Ct. 155. Here again the final decree was entered in
accordance with the agreement of the parties. Missouri v. Nebraska (19o4) 197
-U. S. 577, 25 Sup. Ct.58o. In Iowa v. Illinois (1893) 147 U. S. I, 13 Sup. Ct.
239, the Court having held that the boundary line between the two States was
the middle of the Mississippi River, ordered a commission to be appointed to
designate this line. The report of the commissioners was confirmed, but later
set aside on a showing that Illinois had not, contrary to the Court's belief, con-
curred in the motion for approval. Iowa v. Illinois (i894) 15I U. S. 238, 14
Sup. Ct. 333. Later both States moved to set aside the proceedings had in the
second case and the order of the court in the first case appointing a commission,
and the Court, upon their request, entered as its final decree a boundary line
agreed upon by the parties. Iowa v. Illinois (1906) 202 U. S. 59, 26 Sup. Ct 571.
84 12 Stat at L. 25o.
a12 Stat at L. 633. See also Virginia v. West Virginia (1911) 220 U. S. i,
26, 31 Sup. Ct. 330; 332. An agreement of a similar nature between Vermont
and New York has been omitted from the above list, because the status of
Vermont at the time of making the agreement did not bring it within the cate-
gory of a "State." With the establishment of an independent State out of
territory claimed partly by New York and by Massachusetts controversies as to
boundaries and the mutual rights of the parties naturally arose. Negotiations
for their settlement continued over a period of ten years. Finally in 1794
Vermont paid $3oooo for certain lands granted to it by New York in extinguish-
ment of claims which had theretofore been urged against the State by the New
York commissioners. The payment was in accordance with the terms of an
agreement entered into by commissioners of both States on Oct 15, 179o. A
collection of documents bearing on this controversy, and of the acts of the
Vermont legislature with reference to its settlement, is contained in 3 Records of
Governor and Council of Vermont Appx. H, 421-463.
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(b) By the Ordinance of Aug. 20, 1861, sec. 9,88 of the "Restored
State of Virginia" a provision was made for the payment by the State
of West Virginia for an equitable portion of the debt contracted
by the parent state. This obligation was accepted by West Virginia
and embodied in its Constitution.
8 7
(c) In Virginia v. West Virginia (19o7) 206 U. S. 290, 27 Sup.
Ct. 732, it was held that the Court had jurisdiction of a suit by Virginia
to enforce this obligation. In (19o8) 209 U. S. 514, 28 Sup. Ct. 614,
the Court rendered a decree referring the cause to a master. In (1911)
220 U. S. I, 31 Sup. Ct. 330, it was decided that West Virginia was
under a liability to pay an equitable portion of this debt. In (1911)
222 U. S. 17, 32 Sup. Ct. 4, a motion by Virginia that the Court proceed
to determine the questions left undecided by its earlier opinion, was
overruled. In (1913) 231 U. S. 89, 34 Sup. Ct. 29, the Court post-
poned action in order to allow a reasonable time for amicable settlement
of the controversy. In (1914) 234 U. S. 117, 34 Sup. Ct. 189, West
Virginia was permitted to file a supplemental answer asserting the
existence of new credits serving to reduce its liability. In (1915)
238 U. S. 202, 35 Sup. Ct. 795, the master's decree fixing the amount of
West Virginia's liability was affirmed. In (1916) 241 U. S. 531, 36
Sup. Ct. 719, a motion of Virginia for execution was denied, on the
ground that the legislature of West Virginia had not convened since the
rendering of the decree. In (1918) 246 U. S. 565, 38 Sup. Ct. 4oo,
the Court re-affirmed West Virginia's liability and announced itself as
capable and willing to resort to execution in the event of continued
refusal on the part of West Virginia to meet its adjudged liability.
A bill providing for the payment of this debt was passed by West
Virginia on April i, 1919.88 Payment was, to be partly in cash and
partly through a bond issue, Virginia having agreed to accept these
bonds at par in payment of the debt. The cash payment of $IO62,-
867.17 was made on April i8, 1919, and bonds for the remaining
$13,500,000 were issued. 9
(io) Virginia and West Virginia Boundary Agreement ot 1866:
(a) Congressional assent was given by Joint Resolution of March
IO, 1866.PO
(b) By the Acts of January 31, 1863,91 and February 4, 1863)92
of the General Assembly held at Wheeling, the two counties of Berkeley
and Jefferson were ceded to West Virginia in the event that a plebiscite
"Va. Acts (Wheeling) i861-i862, 16, Ig.
'West Va. Const. Art VIII, sec. 8.
aig19 W. Va. Acts (Ext. Sess.) ch. 1O, p. ig. On Feb. 2o, ig9g, it had been
resolved to accept Virginia's offer of settlement, and the preparation of bills for
the payment of the debt was directed. See W. Va. Acts, igig, 5o7.
" New York Times, Apr. 13, and i9, i919.
14 Stat. at L. 350.
TVa. Acts (Wheeling) 1862-1863, ch. 54, p. 38.
" Va. Acts (Wheeling) 1862-1863, ch. 78, p. 65.
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taken in the two counties would indicate this to be their choice. West
Virginia accepted this cession by the Acts of November 2, 1863,Y9
and August 5, 1863.1l These two Acts of the "Restored State of
Virginia" were repealed by Virginia by the Acts of December 5, 186595
and March I, 1866.98
(c) In Virginia v. West Virginia (i87O, U. S.) ii Wall. 39, it was
held that the later repeal of the Acts of cession by Virginia was
ineffective to terminate the compact concluded with Congressional
assent.
(Ii) Virginia and Maryland Boundary Agreement of 1877:
(a) Congressional assent was given by the Act of March 3, 1879.9
7
(b) By the Act of April 3, I876,1s Maryland bound itself to abide
by the award of the arbitrators appointed to determine the dispute.
The award was made on January 16, 1877, and approved by Virginia
by the Act of March 14, 1878.99
(12) New York and Vermont Boundary Agreement of i88o:
(a) Congressional assent was given by the Act of April 7, 188o.100
(b) Vermont ratified this agreement by the Act of November 27,
1876,101 and New York by the Act of March 2o, 1879.10
2 1
(13) New York and Connecticut Boundary Agreement of 1879:
(a) Congressional assent was given by the Act of February 26,
1881.103
(b) The agreement concluded on December 8, 1879, was ratified
by Connecticut on March 12, i88o,104 and by New York on May 8,
1880.105
(14) Connecticut and Rhode Island Boundary Agreement of 1887:
(a) Congressional assent was given by the Act of October 12,
1888.10 6
(b) The Agreement was ratified by Connecticut by the Act of
May 4, 1887y M and by Rhode Island by the Act of May 5, 1887 -108
"W. Va. Laws, 1863, ch. 90, p. 103. 'Va. Acts, 1865-1866, ch. 84, p. 194.
"W. Va. Laws, 1863, ch. 35, P. 33. "Va. Acts, 1865-1866, ch. 85, p. 195.
"20 Stat. at L. 48r. See, in general, Report and Proceedings of the Joint
Commissioners to adjust the Boundary Line, (1874); Report and Accompanying
Documents of the Virginia Commissioners (1873).
"Md. Laws, 3876, ch. 148, p. 317. 10 21 Stat. at L. 72.
"Va. Acts, 1877-1878, ch. 246, p. 233. ' Vt. Laws, 1876, No. 201, p. 380.
'" N..Y. Laws, r879, ch. 93, p. 338. An act further defining the boundary thus
established was passed on May 13, 19D7. See N. Y. Laws, 19o7, ch. 339, p. 617.
10321 Stat. at L. 351. This agreement is superseded by the later agreement con-
sented to by Congress on Jan. 10, 1925. See infra Appx. A, III, (37). See also
16 Conn. Spec. Laws, 31o4.
'8 Conn. Spec. Laws, 377. 10625 Stat at L. 553.
"'N. Y. Laws, i88o, ch. 213, p. 329. 107 io Conn. Spec. Laws, 717.
"'R. I. Laws, 1886-1887, ch. 635, p. 46.
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(15) New York and Pennsylvania Boundary Agreement of 1886:
(a) Congressional assent was given by the Act of August 
19,
1890.109
(b) This agreement, concluded on March 26, 1886, was ratified 
by
New" York on June 4, 1886,110 and by Pennsylvania on June 
6,
188711l
(16) South Dakota and Nebraska Boundary Agreement of 1897:
(a) Congressional assent was given by the 
Act of July 24, 1897.112
(b) By the Act of June 3, 1897,113 South Dakota authorized 
the
governor to sign the agreement. A similar Act was passed 
by
Nebraska on June 7, 1897.114
(17) Virginia and Tennessee Boundary Agreement 
of i9o1:
(a) Congressional assent was given by Joint Resolution of 
March
3, 1901.115
(b) The agreement was ratified by Tennessee on January 23,
19O1,116 and by Virginia on February 
9, x9oI.117
(c) In Tennessee v. Virginia (19o3) 19o U. S. 64, 23 Sup. Ct. 827,
the report of the boundary commissioners in accordance with 
this
compact was adopted by the Court.
(18) South Dakota and Nebraska Boundary Agreement of 19o5:
(a) Congressional assent was given by the Act of March I, i9o5.1
s
(b) The agreement was ratified by Nebraska on February 3,
I905119 Commissioners were appointed by South Dakota 
on March 9,
1903,y20 and the agreement was ratified February 5, 
1905. 2
(19) New Jersey and Delaware Agreement of 19o5:
(a) Congressional assent was given by the Act of January 24,
1907.122
(b) This agreement, dealing with jurisdiction and service of
process in penal causes over the Delaware River, was ratified by
Delaware on March 20, 1905,123 and by New Jersey on March 21,
1905.124
(20) Mississippi and Louisiana Agreement of 19o9:
(a) By Joint Resolution of January 26, 1909,125 Congress gave
= 26 Stat. at L. 329. 'Tenn. Laws, igoi, ch. 85, p. 128.
"'N. Y. Laws, 1886, ch. 56o, p. 787. " Va. Acts, igoi (Ext. Sess.) ch. 59, p. 57.
"'Pa. Sts. i92O, secs. 2o65-20080. " 33 Stat. at L. 82o.
"3o Stat. at L. 214. Neb. Laws, 1905, ch. 234, P. 792.
" S. D. Laws, 1897, ch. 80, p. 230. "'S. D. Laws, 19o3, ch. 16, p. 28.
Neb. Laws, 1897, ch. 121, p. 458. "'S. D. Laws, i9o5, ch. 95, P. 18.
31 Stat. at L. 1465. 34 Stat. at L. 858.
23 Del. Laws, 1905, ch. 5, P. 12.
"'N. J. Laws, i9o5, ch. 42, p. 67. Further legislation in furtherance of the
compact was enacted by New Jersey on May 7, 1907. See N. J. Laws, i9o7,
ch. 131, p. 302.
=35 Stat. at L. 116o.
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assent to any agreement which might be made between these States
dealing with their boundary line on the Mississippi and their penal
jurisdiction over its waters.
(b) By the Act of March 19, 1918,126 Mississippi appointed a
boundary commissioner to negotiate a compact which was not binding
until ratified by the Mississippi legislature. No evidence of action by
Louisiana has been found.
(21) Mississippi and Arkansas Agreement of i9o9:
(a) By the Joint Resolution of January 26, 19o9,1 2 7 Congress gave
assent to any agreement which might be made between these States
dealing with their boundaries and 'rtheir penal jurisdiction over the
Mississippi River.
(b) By the Act of May 31, 1909,128 Arkansas ratified an agreement
that had been concluded between the two States. Mississippi ratified
this agreement on April 12, 191o.129
(22) Arkansas and Tennessee Agreement of 19o9:
(a) By the Joint Resolution of February 4, 19o9, 130 Congress gave
assent to any agreement which might be reached by the two States
dealing with their boundaries and their penal jurisdiction over
the Mississippi River.
(b) By the Act of May 31, i9o9,131 Arkansas ratified an agreement
to become effective when similar action was taken by Tennessee. No
evidence of action by Tennessee has been found.
(23) Missouri and Kansas Agreement of 191o:
(a) By the Joint Resolution of June IO, 191o,82 Congress gave its
assent to any agreement which might be entered into by the two States
dealing with their boundaries and their criminal jurisdiction over
boundary waters. '
(b) No evidence of action taken by either State in furtherance
of such an agreement has been found.
(24) Oregon and Washington Agreement of i910:
(a) By the Joint Resolution of June IO, i9io, s Congress gave
its assent to any agreement that might be reached between the two
States dealing with their boundaries.
(b) No evidence of action taken under this has been found, but
by the Act of February 23, 1915,1 4 Oregon provided for a change in
its boundary conditioned on the assent of Washington and Congress.
(25) Lake Michigan Agreement of igio:
(a) By the Joint Resolution of June 22, i9io,135 Congress gave its
' Miss. Laws, i918, ch. 262, p. 317. "Ark. Laws, i9og, ch. 29o, p. 888.
=35 Stat at L. 1161. "n36 Stat at L. 88I.
Ark. Laws, Igog, ch. 29o, p. 888. in 36 Stat at L. 88I.
' Miss. Laws, igio, ch. 141, p. 132. 'HOre. laws, 19,5, ch. i5o, p. 179.n35 Stat. at'L. 1163. in36 Stat. at L. 882.
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assent to any agreement which might be reached by Wisconsin, Illinois,
Indiana, and Michigan as to their respective criminal jurisdiction over
the waters of Lake Michigan.
(b) No evidence of action under the terms of this Resolution has
been found.
(26) Forestry Conservation Agreement of 1911:
(a) By the Act of March I, 1911,11" Congress gave its assent to
any agreements which might be reached between States affecting the
conservation of forests
(b) No evidence of any such agreements has been found.
(27) Massachusetts and Connecticut Boundary Agreement of 1914:
(a) Congressional assent was given by the Act of October 3,
1914.187
(b) The agreement was ratified by Massachusetts by the Act of
March IO, 19o8,1 ss and by Connecticut by the Act of June 6, 1913.3*
(28) Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota Agreements of
1917:
(a) By the Act of August 8, 1917,140 Congress authorized these
States to enter into agreements for the improvement of navigation
and the control of floods on their boundary waters and their tributaries.
The Secretary of War was also authorized to make a survey of any
project which might be proposed for this purpose by the States.
(b) By two Acts passed on April 18, 1921,4, Minnesota provided
for co-operation of this nature with the United States and
South and North Dakota, investing the board of directors of any
drainage or flood control district to enter into contracts with similar
agencies of these two States. By the Act of March 13, 1919,142 North
Dakota created a Flood Control Commission with authority to co-oper-
ate with South Dakota and Minnesota, and the United States in making
surveys in preparation for flood control projects. By a Resolution of
March 5, 1921,143 this authority was extended to include Canada. By
the Act of February 24, 1917, sec. 3,144 South Dakota granted her
drainage commissioners the same powers.
(29) Oregon and Washington Agreement of i915:
(a) By the Act of April 8, 1918,115 Congress gave its assent to the
"m 36 ibid. 961, as amended by the Act of March 3, 1925, 68 Cong. 2d sess.
Public No. 59i.IS 38 ibid. 727.
" Mass. Acts, igo8, ch. 192, p. 141.
12 I6 Conn. Spec. Laws, No. 365, p. II04.
"04o Stat. at L. 250, 266.'Minn. Laws, i921, ch. 326, sec. 3, 481; Minn. Laws, i92i ch. 327, p. 488.
' N. D. Laws, ig, ch. 115, p. 138.
"'N. D. Laws, 192r, 241.
'"S. D. Laws, I916-I917, ch. 209, pp. 271, 274-
1440 Stat, at L. 515.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
agreement concluded between Washington and Oregon for the protec-
tion.of fish in the Columbia River.
(b) By the Act of February 23, 1915,146 Oregon entered into a
compact to the effect that no change should be made in the fishing
codes of either State save by mutual consent. This identical provision
was adopted by Washington in its Fishing. Code of March 6, 19151
(c) In Olin v. Kitzmiller (1922) 259 U. S. 260, 42 Sup. Ct. 510,
subsequent legislation respecting the rights of aliens to fish in the
river was held not to violate the terms of the compact. Similar results
were reached in State V. Gates (1922) 104 Ore. 112, 206 Pac. 863;
Alsor v. Kendall (1924:, Ore.) 227 Pac. 286. The compact was held not
to apply to the subject-matter of the complaint in Union Fisherman's
Co-operative Packing Co. v. Shoemaker (192o) 98 Ore. 659, 193 Pac.
476, rehearing denied in (1921) 98 Ore. 679, 194 Pac. 854; Vail v.
Seaborg, (1922) 12o Wash. 126,207 Pac. 15. In State v. Belknap (1918)
1O4 Wash. 221, 176 Pac. 5, a section of the Washington Fishing Code
was held unconstitutional in that it exceeded the proper limits of the
state police power.
(30) Wisconsin and Minnesota Boundary Agreement of 1917:
(a) Congressional assent was given -by the Act of September 13,
1918.148
(b) By the Act of March 26, 1917, '49 Minnesota ceded certain
territory to Wisconsin, to be effective upon a cession of corresponding
territory by Wisconsin and the consent of Congress, and authorizing
the governor to give formal acceptance to such act of cession by
Wisconsin. A siniilar act was passed-by Wisconsin on April 9, 1917
-150
(31) New York and New Jersey Tunnel Agreementof 1919:
(a) Congressional assent was given by the Act of July ii, 19 19.1
(b) By the Act of February 14, 1918,52 the New Jersey legislature
authorized the appointment of a commission with power to enter into
contracts for the construction and operation of "vehicular tunnels"
under the Hudson River. By the Act of April 8, 1919,153 this com-
mission was authorized to inter into compacts with commissioners from
New York, and form a joint commission for the development of this
scheme. By the At of April II, i919,54 a commission was appointed
by New York, and this commission was given the power to enter into
compacts that would be binding upon New York An agreement
between the commissioners was reached on December 30, 1919, which
was ratified by the New Jersey legislature on April 5, 1920.155
Or. Laws, 1915, sec. 2o, pp. 226, 233.
"Wash. Laws, 1915, cl. 31, sec. 116. "41 Stat at L. 158.
14 '4o Stat. at L. 959. UN. J. Laws, 'PIS, cL 50, P. 142.
" Minn. Laws, 1917, ci. I16, p. 142. N. J. Laws, 1919, clL 7o, p. 128.
" Wis. Laws, 1917, ci. 64, p. 171. '~ N. Y. Laws, 1919, ch. 178, p. 758.
"' N. J. Laws, I92O, ch. 76, p. 14o. By the Act of May ii, ig2o, New Jersey
provided for the issuance of bonds in an amount not exceeding $28,oooooo to
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(c) This agreement has not been passed upon by the courts.
(d) Reports: Reports of the New Jersey Interstate Bridge and
Tunnel Commission (1920-1924); Reports of the New York State
Bridge and Tunnel Commission (1920-1924). A complete history of
the movement culminating in the Compact of i919 and these com-
missions can be found in the 192o Reports of these Commissions.
(32) South Dakota and Minnesota Agreement of 1917:
(a) By the Joint Resolution of March 4, 1921,'11 Congress con-
sented to an agreement that had already been reached between these two
States and was under consideration by North Dakota, Wisconsin,
Iowa and Nebraska, dealing with the penal jurisdiction to be exercised
by them over their boundary waters.
(b) The agreement was ratified by Minnesota on April 2o, i917,157
and by South Dakota on February 13, 1917.158
(33) Pennsylvania and Delaware Boundary Agreement of 1921:
(a) Congressional assent was given by the Joint Resolution of
June 30, 1921.1 59
(b) The agreement was ratified by Pennsylvania on June 22,
1897,1"0 and by Delaware on March 28, I92I.181
(34) Colorado River Compact of 192:
(a) Congressional assent to negotiate an' agreement for the
equitable apportionment of the waters of the Colorado River among the
seven States forming the basin of this river, was given on August 19,
1921.62 The agreement was to be concluded before January I, 1923,
and thereafter subject to approval by the State legislatures.
(b) Commissioners to negotiate such an agreement were appointed
by these seven States in 1921-by Wyoming on February 22, I921,163
by Arizona on March 5, i921,164 by New Mexico on March II,
1921,165 by Utah on March 14, 192,1
66 by Nevada on March 21, 1921,1
67
by Colorado on April 2, 192I,18 and by California on May 12, 1921.169
The agreement was concluded at Sante Fe, New Mexico, on November
24, 1922. It was ratified by Wyoming on February 2, 1923,170 by
New Mexico on February 7, 1923,' by Utah on January 29, 1923,'
pay for the construction of bridges and tunnels across the Delaware and Hudson
Rivers. See N. J. Laws, 192o, ch. 352, p. 863.
41 Stat. at L. 1447.
1 Minn. Laws, i916-I917, ch. 505, P. 850.
IS. D. Laws, 1916-1917, ch. 248, p. 411.
S42 Stat. at L. io4. Ia42 Stat. at L. 171.
16 Pa. Laws, 1897, ch. I52, p. 182. 
1 6 Wyo. Laws, 1921, ch. 120, p. 166.
161Dela. Laws, 1921, ch. 4, P. 7. 1 'Ariz. Laws, 1921, ch. 46, P. 53.
1 'N. Mex. Laws, 1921, cL. 121, p. 217.
'"Utah Laws, ig2r, ch. 68, p. 184.
Nev. Laws, 1920-1921, ch. 1is, p. Igo.1 6 Colo. Laws, i92i, ch. 246, p. 8i. "'Wyo. Laws, 1923, ch. 3, P. 3.
lCalif. Sts. 1921, ch. 88, p. 85. 
m N. Mex. Laws, x923, ch. 6, p. 7.
'"Utah Laws, 1923, ch. 5, p. 4.
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by California on February 9, 1923,173 by Nevada on January 27,
1923,174 and by Colorado on April 2, 1923.175 Arizona has as yet failed
to ratify.
178
"(c) The compact has, of course, not yet come before the courts.
(d) Reports: Annual Report of the Secretary of Commerce for
1922, p. IO; Annual Report of the-Secretary of Commerce for 1923,
p. 25; Report of Delph E. Carpenter, in re H. R. 6821, 67 Cong.
xst sess. June 4, I92I; House Doc. 6o5, 67 Cong. 4th sess.; Cal. Leg.
45th sess., Assembly Daily Journal, January 9, January 25, 1923,
Senate Daily Journal, February 1, 1923, and reports therein contained;
Statement before Federal Power Commission by Arizona Colorado
River. Conference Commission, September, 24, 1923; Pamphlets
Containing Official Reports, etc. (Harvard Law School Library).
(35) Port of New York Authority Agreement of 1921:
(a) Congressional assent was given by Joint Resolution of August
23, 1921,177 and to the supplemental agreement by the Joint Resolution
of July I, 1922.171
(b) Commissioners were appointed by New York on May 8.
J917,171 and by New Jersey on March 26, 1917,180 to recommend a
policy to be pursued by the two States by "legislative enactment, treaty,
or otherwise," for the development of the Port of New York. New
York on April 2, 1921,81 and New Jersey on April 7, 1921,"12 author-
ized these commissioners to enter into the compact that had been
proposed, creating the Port of New York -Authority. Commissioners
were authorized to be appointed to this newly-created Port Authority
by New York on April 15, 1921,818 and by New Jersey on April 7,
1921.184 The comprehensive plan for the development of the port was
agreed to by New York on February 24, 1922,185 and by New Jersey
on February 23, 1922.188 Additional administrative powers were con-
ferred upon the Port of New York Authority by New York under
the Act of May 5, 1924.187 Authority to construct, operate and man-
tain a bridge from Staten Island to Elizabeth was conferred upon the
Port Authority by New York under the Act of April -i8, 1924,188
'"Calif. Sts. i923, ch. 17, p. 1530.
'Nev. Laws, 1923, No. 2, p. 393. See also Act of Feb. 20, 1923, as amended
by Act of Mar. 20, 1923, Nev. Laws, I923, chs. 29, 169, pp. 35, 286.
" Colo. Laws, 1923, ch. 189, p. 684.
'"Message of Gov. Hunt to Sixth State Legislature on Jan. 8, 1923, p. 3o;
Special Message of Gov. Hunt to Sixth State Legislature on Jan. 23, 1923;
Statement before Federal Power Commission of Arizona-Colorado River. Con-
ference Committee. See also Olson, Arizona's Point of Vieiv ath Respect to
Ratification (unpublished).
17 42 Stat at L. i74. "N. Y. Laws, 1921, ch. 203, p. 841.
42 Stat at L. 822 "'N. J. Laws, 1921, ch. 152, p. 423.
"'N. Y. Laws, I917, ch. 426, p. 1325. "sN. Y. Laws, i922, ch. 43, p. 61.
N. J. Laws, 1917, ch. 130, p. 288. N. J. Laws, 1922, ch. 9, p. 25.
N. Y. Laws, ig2i, ch.. 154, p. 492. N. Y. Laws, 1924, ch. 623, p. 1156.
'.N. J. Laws, 1921, ch. 151, p. 412. "'N. Y. Laws, 1924, ch. 186, p. 406.
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and by New Jersey under the Act of March 1I, 1924.189 Similar
authority to construct, operate and maintain a bridge from Perth
Amboy to Tottenville was conferred upon the Port Authority by New
York under the Act of April 23, i924,190 and by New Jersey under the
Act of March ii, Z924.111
(c) An injunction to prevent the commissioners from entering into
this projected agreement was denied by the court in City of New York
v. Willcox (1921, Sup. Ct.) 115 Misc. 351, i89 N. Y. Supp. 724. The
Compact was considered in Newark v. C. R. R. of N. J. (1925) 45 /
Sup. Ct. 328.
(d) Reports: Joint Report of New York, New Jersey Port and
Harbor Development Commission (1920) ; Port of New York Author-
ity, Annual Reports (1921-1925).
(36) Kansas City Waterworks Agreement of 1922:
(a) Congressional assent was given by the Joint Resolution of
September 22, 1922.192
(b) Kansas and Missouri entered into an agreement for the
development of waterworks at Kansas City, Kansas, and Kansas City,
Missouri. The agreement contemplated co-operation in the regulation
of these plants, whose facilities were situated in both States, and
particularly provided for immunity from taxation. This agreement
was ratified by Kansas on March 18, 1921,11 and by Missouri in the
same year.'
9 '
(c) The consent of Congress was held to have been properly given
in State v. Joslin (1924, Kan.) 227 Pac. 543, commented on by
Wigmore in (1925) 19 ILL. L. REv. 479.
(37) New York and Connecticut Boundary Agreement of 1911-192:
(a) Congressional assent was given by the Act of January Io,
I925.
1 95
(b) The agreement concluded on January 3, 1911, was ratified
by Connecticut on June 6, 1913,0" and by New York on April 15,
1912.1' 7 The ratifying act of New York was amended on February
14, 1913.19
(38) The La Plata River Compact of 1923:
(a) Congressional assent was given by the Act of January 29,
1925. 19 9
'* N. J. Laws, 1924, ch. 149. 1'N. Y. Laws, 1924, ch. 230, p. 457.
191 N. J. Laws, 3924, ch. 125. Congressional assent for the construction of both
these bridges has been recently given. See Boston Herald, Feb. 28, 1925.
V242 Stat at L. io58. " Kan. Laws, 1921, ch. 304, p. 471.
'Mo. House Journ. 1921, 1258; Mo. Sen. Journ. 1921, 932.
", 68th Cong. 2nd sess. Public No. 316.
Igo6 Conn. Spec. Laws, 1104.
"'N. Y. Laws, 1912, ch. 352, p. 692.
"N. Y. Laws, 1913, ch. I8, p. 27.
66 Cong. Rec. 2831, 68th Cong. 2nd sess.
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(b) Commissioners were appointed by New Mexico on March 12,
1921,20 and by Colorado on April 2, 1921.201 The compact negotiated
by them was ratified by New Mexico on February 7, 1923,"' and
by Colorado on April 13, 1923.203
(39) The Columbia River Compact of 1925:
(a) By the Act of March 4, 1925,2°  Congress assented to com-
pacts that might be entered into by Washington, Idaho, Oregon, and
Montana for the apportionment of the water supply of the Columbia
River, on the condition that a representative of the Department of the
Interior and the War Department should participate in the negotia-
tions as representatives of the United States and report to Congress any
agreement that might be entered into.
(b) No action has as yet been undertaken by these States.
IV.
COMPACTS AWAITING RATIFICATION BY THE STATES AND THE
CONSENT OF CONGRESS
(I) The South Platte River Compact:
The commissioner appointed by Colorado on April 2, 1921,204 had
his appointment continued by the Act of April 3, 1923.205 Nebraska
appointed a commissioner on April 28, 1923.200 The compact, con-
cluded between them, was ratified by Nebraska on May 3, 1923,20
It awaits ratification by Colorado and by the United States.
(2) The Delaware River Tri-State Compact:
Commissioners were appointed by New York on March 22, 1923,208
by New Jersey on March 19, 1923,209 and by Pennsylvania on May 24,
1923.21° A compact, dealing with the development and diversion of
the waters of the Delaware River, the construction of works in the
river, the disposal of sewage, the maintenance of an adequate forest
cover in the drainage area, the condemnation of riparian rights for
the purposes of hydraulic construction, and the creatiori of a super-
vising joint administrative agency, was negotiated on January 24,
1925.211 . It awaits ratification by the. legislatures of the three States
and the assent of Congress .
2
11
N. Mex. Laws, I92i, ch. 147, P. 413. Colo. Laws, 1923, ch. i9o, p. 694.
Colo. Laws, I921, ch. 244, p. 8o3. "'Neb. Laws, 1923, ch. 123, p. 297.
" N. Mex. Laws, 1923, ch. 7, P. 7. Neb. Laws, 1923, Cl. 125, p. 299.
Colo. Laws, 1923, ch. 191, p. 696. 10N. Y. Laws, 1923, ch. 56, p. 63.
"'a 68 Cong. 2d sess. Public No. 6og. I N. J. Laws, 1923, ch. 94, p. i8o.
Colo. Laws, ig2r, ch. 243, P. 799. 'Pa. Laws, 1923, ch. 239, p. 448.
Pamphlet Copy (Harv. Law School Library).
"a See Message of Governor Silzer to New Jersey Legislature on Jan. 27,
1925.
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(3) The Pecos River Compact:
Commissioners were appointed by New Mexico on March 8, 1923,212
and by Texas on March 24, 1923,213 for the purpose of negotiating
a compact dealing with the distribution of the waters of the Pecos
River for irrigation purposes. The agreement, concluded on Decem-
ber 19, 1924, and further amended on February io, 1925, awaits action
by the legislatures of the two States and Congress. 214
V.
ACTION BY STATES PROPOSING COMPACTS
(I) Nebraska:
By the Act of March 3o, 1905, 215 Nebraska requested action on the
part of the States of Missouri, Iowa, and South Dakota, with the
consent of Congress, concerning jurisdiction to be exercised by them
over any land which might be left adjoining one of these States as a
consequence of a change in the course of the Missouri River.
(2) Colorado and Kansas:
For the purpose of negotiating a compact dealing with the distribu-
tion of the waters of the Arkansas River for irrigation purposes,
Colorado appointed a commissioner on April 2, 1921,2. and continued
this appointment in force by the Act of April 3, 1923.217 A com-
missioner was also appointed by Kansas on March 21, 1923.218
(3) Colorado and New Mexico:
For the purpose of negotiating a compact dealing with the distribu-
tion of the waters of the Rio Grande River for irrigatign purposes,
Colorado appointed a commissioner on March 20, 1923.2 19 New
Mexico appointed a commissioner on March 12, 1923.220
(4) Colorado:
For the purpose of negotiating a compact dealing with the distribu-
tion of the waters of the Laramie River for irrigation purposes,
Colorado appointed a commissioner on April 2, 1921.221
VI.
INTERSTATE AGREEMENTS WITHOUT CONGRESSIONAL ASSENT
(I) Virginia and Tennessee Boundary Agreement of 18o3:
Commissioners were appointed by Tennessee on November 13,
i8Ol,222 and by Virginia on January 13, 180.2238 The agreement was
raN. Mex. Laws, 1923, ch. 64, p. 1O4. ='Tex. Laws, I923, ch. 133, p. 274.
'"Pamphlet Copy (Harm. Law School Library).
Neb. Laws, i9o5, ch. 153, p. 599. w Colo. Laws, 1923, ch. I92, p. 7o2.
'Colo. Laws, i92i, ch. 242, p. 795. 'N. Me= Laws, 1923, cl. 112, p. I75-
2,Colo. Laws, 1923, ch. I9O, p. 694. Colo. Laws, 1921, ch. z45, p. 8o7.
Kan. Laws, 1923, ch. 222, p. 313. I Scott, Tenn. Laws, ch, 49, p. 736.
Va. Laws, 18oo, 33.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
ratified by Virginia on January 22, 1803.224 and by Tennessee on
November 3, 18°3." 5
In Robinson v. Campbell (I818, U. S.) 3 Wheat. 212, the Supreme
Court assumed the validity of the compact. In Virginia v. Tennessee
(1893) 148 U. S. 503, the Supreme Court held that the compact was
to be deemed to have had the implied assent of Congress. In Tennes-
see v. Virginia (19oo) 177 U. S. 501, 20 Sup. Ct. 715, the Court decreed
the re-marking and re-ascertainment of the line established by the 18o3
agreement. A further development of this dispute was settled by com-
pact in 1901.221
.
(2) North Carolina and South Carolina Boundary Agreements ot
1813 and 1815:
Commissioners were appointed by North Carolina on November 21,
1803, 2 and by South Carolina on December 21, 1804.
-28 An agree-
ment was entered into on July ii, i8o8, and ratified by North Carolina
in the same year.2 29 South Carolina, however, on December 17,
i8o8, passed a resolution 23 0 calling for more definiteness in the
description of the boundaries. On December 14, 18o9, the South
Carolina boundary commission reported to the legislature that a fur-
ther change in the agreement was necessary.
231 A provisional agree-
ment was concluded on September 4, 1813, and ratified by South
Carolina on December 17, 1813,232 and by North Carolina during the
same year.23 3 Commissioners were appointed by North Carolina in
1814 to run the line established by this agreement.
23 4 Finally a
convention was entered into between the commissioners of the two
States, on November 2, 1815, ratified by South Carolina on December
15, 1815,2-35 and by North Carolina during the same 
year.236
(3) North Carolina and Georgia Boundary Agreement of i8z8:
Commissioners were appointed for this purpose by Georgia on
December IO, 1804,237 and by North Carolina during the same year.
23 8
An agreement concluded between them on June 18, 1807, together with
a supplemental agreement of June 27, 1807, was ratified by North
Carolina.2 39 Georgia, however, suspecting that its commissioners had
"'Va. Rev. Code, 3839, 63.
i Scott, Tenn. Laws, ch. 58, p. 798.
=Appx. A, III, (7); supra.
2 Martin, N. C. Rev. Acts, 1790-18o3, 214.
i Cooper, S. C. Sts. 415.
*'-92 N. C. Rev. Acts, 1796-182o, ch. 717, p. I130.
S. C. Acts, 18o8, io6. S. C. Acts, io9, 99.
i Cooper, S. C. Sts. 416.
2 N. C. Rev. Acts, 1796-1820, cl. 717, P. 1280.
2'2 ibid. ch. 88o, p. 1315. r 1 Cooper, S. C. Sts. 419.
2d2 N. C. Rev. Acts, 1796-1820, ch. 885, p. 3318.
I Clayton, Ga. Laws, 18oo-i8io, 189.
=82 N. C. Rev. Acts. 1796-i82o, ch. 654, p. 1013.
9 '2 ibid. ch. 717. p. 1110.
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betrayed her interests,4 0 expressed dissatisfaction with the line that
had thus been marked and appointed new commissioners. 241 North
Carolina refused to appoint new commissioners, even though in the
next year in December 18o8, Georgia passed a resolution requesting
action by North Carolina. 242 Her continued refusal to act caused
Georgia on December 15, 18o9, to address a memorial to Congress
praying for the appointment of a commissioner by the United States to
run the boundary line between the two States.243  Again failure to
secure any response from Congress caused the Georgia legislature on
December 15, i8io, to appoint new commissioners and request North
Carolina to do the same.2 "4  No action by North Carolina followed
this request. Finally, on November 13, 1818, commissioners were again
appointed to run the line with commissioners from North Carolina.2 4"5
On this occasion North Carolina acceded to Georgia's request, and the
line thus run, corresponding with the line that had been agreed upon in
1807, was ratified and confirmed by North Carolina in 1819,246 and
acquiesced in by Georgia.
(4) North Carolina and Tennessee Boundary Agreement of 1821:
Commissioners were appointed by both States in 179647 to survey
the line in accordance with the Act of cession by North Carolina of the
territory comprising the State of Tennessee to the United States in
1789.248 Differences having arisen as to the exact location of this line,
in 1819 North Carolina appointed commissioners to settle and adjust
these differences. 24 0 Tennessee appointed commissioners during the
following year.2 0 Their report, agreeing upon the location of the
boundary line, was ratified by both States.in 1821.251
In North Carolina v. Tennessee (1914) 235 U. S. I, 35 Sup. Ct. 8,
the Court made a determination of what the judgment of the com-
missioners, as to the exact location of the line agreed upon by them,
was with reference to the agreement of 1821. It was held that the
question of whether this agreement required for its validity the consent
of Congress was foreclosed by the decision in Virginia v. Tennessee
(893) 148 U. S. 503, 13 Sup. Ct. 728. The agreement was also con-
strued in the cases of Belding v. Hebard (I9oo, C. C. A. 6th) 103 Fed.
532, and Stevenson v. Fain (1902, C. C. A. 6th) 116 Fed. 147.
'Res. of Dec. 7, 28o7, Clayton, op. cit. 683.
" Res. of Dec. 5, 18o7, Clayton, op. cit. 682.
'Clayton, op. cit. 689. '-Ibid. 694.
"'Ibid. 69o. "' Ga. Acts, I818, 219.
24G2 N. C. Rev. Acts, 1796-i82o, ch. 1005, p. 1487.
2472 N. C. Rev. Acts, 1796-i820, ch. 461, p. 86.
" In 1784, North Carolina passed an act of cession. See i N. C. Rev. Acts,
1715-1796, ch. 299, p. 599. This was accepted by the United States on April 2,
1790. See i Stat. at L. io6.
N* . C. Laws, 18ig, ch. ii, p. 18.
=2 Scott, Tenn. Laws, ch. 22, p. 635.
2a2 N. C. Rev. Sts. 1837, 96; Tenn. Code, 1857-58, tit. 2, ch. r, art. 1, sec. 61, p. 8a
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(5) South Carolina and Georgia Navigation Agreement of 1825:
In I82O, at the instance of South Carolina, commissioners were
appointed by Georgia and South Carolina to negotiate a convention
concerning the improvem'ent of navigation on the Savannah and
Tugaloo Rivers. This convention, as negotiated, was to be effective
only upon ratification by the legislatures of both these States and the
consent of Congress. It was ratified by Georgia on December 20,
1823,52 and by South Carolina on December 20, 1825.253 However,
Congress never assented,to the compact and it failed to come into
effect. On November 29, 1828, the Georgia legislature passed a
resolution declaring "that under present circumstances, it is impolitic
on the part of Georgia, to attempt to procure a full and entire ratifica-
tion of the Convention with South, Carolina. ' '25 4
(6) Georgia and Tennessee Agreement of 1837:
By the Act of January :24, 1838,255 Tennessee granted a railroad
company the privilege of a right of way through the State, on
condition that upon the extension of its line through Georgia the latter
State would give it the same privileges. By the Act of December 23,
1847,256 Georgia granted the railroad the same privileges.
In Union 4 R. R. Co. v.'E. T. & Ga. R. R. Co. (1853) 14 Ga.
327, the Court held that this was not such a compact as required the
assent of Congress in order to make it valid.
25 7
(7) Vermont and Canada Extradition Agreement of 1839:
The governor of Vermont authorized the seizure and extradition of
one Holmes, who'had committed a crime in Canada and fled to Ver-
mont. His writ of habeas corpus was denied by the lower Court, and
the Supreme Court of the United States being divided upon the appeal,
the decision was affirmed. Holmes v. Jennison (I84O, U. S.) 14 Pet.
540. Taney C. J., assumes that there was a tacit agreement between
the Governor of Vermont and the Canadian authorities to deliver
Holmes into the custody of the latter,25 8 and asserts that such an
'Ga. Laws, 1823, 1o2. i Cooper, S. C. Sts. 422.
' Ga. Laws, 1828, 239.
Tenn. Laws, 1837-I838, ch. 221, p. 319.
'Ga. Laws, 1847, 171.
" In St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co. v. James (1896) i6i U. S. 545, 562,
x6 Sup. Ct. 621, 627, the Court said: "It is competent for a railroad corporation
organized under the laws of one State, when authorized so to do by the consent
of the State which created it, to accept authority from another State to extend
its railroad into such State and to receive a grant of powers to own and control,
by lease or purchase, railroads therein, and to subject itself to such rules and
regulations as may be prescribed by the second State. Such legislation on the
part of two or more States is not, in the absence of inhibitory legislation by Con-
gress, regarded as within the constitutional prohibition of agreements or com-
pacts between States."
I'It is submitted that such an assumption is unwarranted in the face of the
express assertion that there was- no request by Canada for extradition. See
Holmes v. Jennison (1840, U. S.) 34 Pet. 540, 595.
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agreement, without the assent of Congress, is a violation of the Com-
pact Clause of the Constitution.
25 9
(8) Massachusetts and Connecticut Agreement of 1871:
By the Act of April 5, 1872,280 the Massachusetts legislature in con-
junction with the Connecticut legislature, who had already enacted the
necessary legislation on July 26, 1871,28" accomplished the merger of a
Connecticut and Massachusetts railway corporation in order to subject
this corporation to the laws of each State as to the portion of the
road within its boundaries.
In Mackay v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co., (i9o9) 82 Conn.
73, 72 At. 583, it was held that this was not a compact, within the
meaning of the Constitution, requiring the assent of Congress.
2 62
(9) Louisiana and Arkansas Levee Agreement of 188 6 :
In 1886 Louisiana provided that certain State taxes should be placed
to the credit of certain levee districts "to be used... in constructing,
repairing, and maintaining any and all levees in the State of Arkansas
(said State consenting) that will protect said district from over-
flow. ' '26s There is no evidence that Arkansas consented by any other
action than mere acquiescence.
In Fisher v. Steele (1887) 39 La. Ann. 447, I So. 882 (1887), this
Act and action under it were held not to be in violation of the Compact
Clause of the Federal Constitution.
(Io) New Hampshire and Massachusetts Boundary Agreements of
1889 and 1894:
An agreement, reached between the commissioners of these two
States on August 16, I888, defining their respective boundaries, was
assented to by Massachusetts on June I6, i89O,264 and by New Hamp-
shire on August 16, J889.265 A similar agreement, concluded on June
13, 1894, was assented to by Massachusetts on May 25, 1895,26 and by
New Hampshire on June 30, I895.267.
(II) North Dakota Drainage Agreement of i9o9:
The joint drainage boards of two North Dakota counties entered
into a contract on February 24, 19o9, with the municipality of Arthur,
Manitoba, permitting the drainage boards to make improvements
extending fourteen miles across the Canadian border, providing that the
'"Taney's dictum has been cited with approval in United States v. Rascher,
(1886) 119 U. S. 407, 414, 7 Sup. Ct. 234, 237, and People v. Curtis (872) 5o
N. Y. 321, 325.
'Mass. Acts, 1872, ch. 171, p. 124. 'f m7 Conn. Spec. Laws, 252.
' So also Dover v. Portsmouth Bridge (1845) 17 N. H. 200, which held that
the incorporation of a bridge company by two States, to construct a bridge across
the boundary river between them, was no violation of the compact clause.
--La. Acts, 1886, No. 79, p. 120. "'N. H. Laws, 1889, ch. I59, p. 143.
2" 6 Mass. Spec. Laws, ch. 73, p. 546. "1'7 Mass. Spec. Laws, ch. io6, p. 787.
IEN. H. Laws, ±895, ch. 124, p. 488.
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expenses of these improvements would be borne by the North Dakota
drainage boards, who should also be surety to the municipality of
Arthur for any taxes or losses which might result as a consequence of
such construction, and that the construction of all additional improve-
ments were to be controlled by the municipality of Arthur and the
North Dakota joint drainage board.
In McHenry County v. Brady (1917) 37 N. D. 59, 163 N. W. 540,
it was held that such an agreement was not a violation of the Compact
Clause of the Federal Constitution.
APPENDIX B.
SUMMARY OF SELECTED BOUNDARY CONTROVERSIES
I.
COLONIAL PERIOD
(I) New Hampshire and Massachusetts Boundary Controversy of
1726-1768:
A dispute over the boundary line between these two provinces had
been a continuing source of conflict between them.1 In 1726 the con-
troversy was submitted to the King for settlement.2 Under advice
from the King,3 the commissions that had been appointed by both the
colonies4 were authorized to act in conjunction with each -other.5 They
failed, however, to come to an agreement. From 1731-1735 further
attempts at settlement were made but without success.' Finally in
1735, a royal commission was appointed.7 The claims of both prov-
inces were presented to this commission," which in 1737 announced its
decision.9 Both sides appealed from this decision to the Privy Coun-
cil, 0 but it was affirmed by the King in 174o. Massachusetts, still
'For references to this dispute, see 9 Mass. Prov. Acts, 442, 6o8, 68o, 7oi ; IO
ibid. 19, 414; II ibid. 5. See, in general, Adams, Founding of New England
(1921) 183, 216, 382; Akagi, Town Proprietors of the New England Colonies
(1924) 194-195, 200; Smith, Massachusetts and New Hampshire Boundary Line
Controversy (igog) Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings, 79.
'See ii Mass. Prov. Acts, 1O8, 268.
'See Instructions of the King to Governor Belcher, 2 Batchellor, N. H. Laws,
486.
'See ixI Mass. Prov. Acts, 396.
'See Act of Oct. 13, 1730, II Mass. Prov. Acts, 517; Act of Dec. 3, 1730,
2 Batchellor, op. cit. 521.
'See ii Mass. Prov. Acts, 61o, 617; 12 ibid. 129.
" See 2 Batchellor, op. cit. 768; 12 Mass. Prov. Acts, 392.
'See 12 Mass. Prov. Acts, 396, 398, 400, 402.
'See 2 Batchellor, op. cit. 77o.
" See 2 Batchellor, op. cit. 771, 773, 780, 783; 12 Mass. Prov. Acts, 407, 409.
For prosecution of the appeal, see x2 Mass. Prov. Acts, 413, 559, 562.
" See 2 Batchellor, op. cit. 513, 634, 790. Z
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dissatisfied with the decision,1 2 made some further attempts to prose-
cute a supplementary appeal but without success.1 3
(2) Massachusetts and Rhode Island Boundary Controversy of 174o:
A dispute over a portion of the boundary line, which had been left
unsettled by the agreement of I7IO,14 continued over a period of
twenty years. Various ineffective attempts to come to an agreement
were made during this period.15 Finally in 1739 Rhode Island refused
to appoint any more commissions and determined to submit the dispute
to the King.16 Royal commissioners were then appointed to settle the
controversy," and the claims of the two provinces presented before
them.' Their decision"6  was appealed from by Massachusetts.
20
Agents were appointed to prosecute the appeal before the Privy Council
in England.2 ' The hearing upon the appeal was delayed for several
years, but the judgment of the commissioners was eventually affirmed
on May 28, 1746.22 Rhode Island in the same year appointed com-
missioners to run the line in- accordance with this decision.2 3  This
ex parte act was never assented to by Massachusetts,'24 and in 1792
objected to as an unwarranted encroachment upon its boundaries. 25
It was one of the points left for determination by the Supreme Court
in the suit by Rhode Island against Massachusetts, which was finally
settled by a compromise between the attorneys-general of the two
States.2
8
(3) New York and New Jersey Boundary Controversy of 1771:
The boundary line run by a joint commission of New York and
New Jersey in 171927 was affirmed by the Privy Council in 1756 as a
"Massachusetts' objection to the decision can be gathered from the numerous
acts of the General Assembly appropriating land to aid grantees who had been
ousted from their former holdings by New Hampshire. See 13 Mass. Prov.
Acts, 272, 548; 15 ibid. 45.
"See 14 Mass. Prov. Acts, 541; 18 ibid. 208, 211, 289.
"See supra Appx. A, I, (4).
' For appointments of boundary commissioners by Massachusetts, see 9 Mass.
Prov. Acts, 680, 681; 1o ibid. i9; 12 ibid. 129, 572, 6oi, 66o. For appointments
by Rhode Island, see 4 R. I. Col. Rec. 431, 445, 453, 546, 559. See J. Noble,
An Incident in 1731 in the long Dispute of Massachusetts and Rhode Island over
their Boundary Line (igo5) i9 Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc. 2o.
"See 4 R. I. Col. Rec. 562.
'7 See 4 R. I. Col. Rec. 586, note.
,See 12 Mass. Prov. Acts, 723, 726, 732.
See Mass. Sen. Doc. 1848, No. 14, Appx. 8.
"See 13 Mass. Prov. Acts, 24.
' See 13 Mass. Prov. Acts, 75, 76, 77, i6o, 232; 5 R. I. Col. Rec. 35, Ix6, 121.
See also Acts of Privy Council (Col. Ser. Unbound Papers) sec. 470.
'See Mass. Sen. Doc. 1848, No. 14, pp. ig, 43.
'See Mass. Sen. Doc. 1848, No. 14, Appx. io.
See ibid. Appx. 9.
See ibid. Appx. ii.
See supra Appx. A, III, (7).
See N. J. Acts, 1719, 105.
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provisional line until the true line of division should be determined by
royal commissioners. 2' Such a commission was appointed in 1764 and
the boundary was determined by them.29 Although an appeal was
taken from their decision,"' New York, during the pendency of this
appeal, on February I6, 1771, passed an Act3 ' confirming the line
announced by the commissioners on condition that New Jersey would
pass a similar. Act. This was done by New Jersey in 1772,32 and
both Acts were confirmed by the Privy Council in 1773.83
II.
UNDER THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
(I) Massachusetts and New York Boundary Controversy of z784-
z786:
This arose out of the agreement signed by the governors of the
States in 1773.8 Commissioners were appointed by New York on
March 17, I783,s5 but they failed to reach any agreement acceptable
to Massachusetts. Consequently the latter State on June 29, 1785,
authorized the Continental Congress to appoint three commissioners to
run the line between the two States." New York on March 7, 1785,
also authorized Congress to appoint three commissioners to run the
line.37 A resolution to this effect was made in the Continental Congress
and approved on September 29, 1785,8 and on December 2, 1785,
three commissioners were appointed. 9 New York by the Act of
April 28, 1786,40 and Massachusetts by the Act of June 27, I786,"1
= See 4 Acts of Privy Council (Col. Ser.) 214, 3oi. New York had submitted
the controversy to the King for determination by the Act of Dec. 7, 1754. See
3 N. Y. Col. Laws, io36.
= See 4 Acts of Privy Council (Col. Ser.), 686.
See Act of Feb. 6, 1768, 4 N. Y. Col Laws, Ioo3.
See 5 N. Y. Col. Laws, I85.
See N. J. Acts, 1772, 12.
See 5 Acts of Privy Council (Col. Ser.) 45.
See 4upra Appx. A, I, (7).
UN. Y. Laws, 1777-1784, ch. 28, p. 545, as amended by Act of Nov. I, 1784,
N. Y. Laws, I785-1788, ch. 2, p. 2.
" Mass. Laws, 1784-1785, ch. II, p. 446.
"N. Y. Laws, 1785-1788, ch. 4, P. 3, and ch. 49, P. 293. Governor Clinton had
advised the appointment of commissioners to deal with the claim of Massachu-
setts before the Continental Congress. See Report of the Regents of the Uni-
versity on the Boundaries of New York, i873, p. 213. See also Acts of Mar. 7,
1785, April 29, 1786, Mar. I, 1787, and April II, 1787, N. Y. Laws, 1785-1788,
ch. 28, p. 57, ch. 53, P. 298, ch. 46, p. 443, ch. 79, p. 5o7. These Acts successively
xtended the powers of the New York commission in order to enable them to
deal with the commissioners of the Continental Congress as well as come to any
acceptable agreement with the commissioners appointed by Massachusetts.
1o Journ. Cont. Cong. 237.
U 11 ibid. zo.
4N. Y. Laws, 1785-1788, ch. 49, P. 293.
"Mass. Acts, 1786-1787, ch. 8, p. 18. Additional authority was given by the
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authorized their commissioners to conclude an agreement. An agree-
ment was negotiated on December 16, 1786.42 and a final settlement
was made on July 21, 1787." They were referred to the legislatures
of both States but no action was taken upon them."
III.
SINCE 1789
(i) Connecticut and Rhode Island Attempted Settlement of 1840:
Commissioners were appointed by both States in 1839,45 and an agree-
ment was reached between them on April 27, 184o. This was
confirmed by Connecticut during the same year. 6 Though the agree-
ment was reported to the Rhode Island legislature, they refused to
confirm it.47  The controversy was finally settled through compact in
,888.4
s
(2) Massachusetts and Rhode Island Attempted Settlement of x848:
Commissioners were appointed by Rhode Island in 1844,49 and by
Massachusetts on February 27, 1844.10 They were given full powers
of arbitration a year later.51 Two agreements were reached between
them, relating to different portions of the boundary line. Massa-
chusetts gave its assent to the first agreement on April 19, 1847,52 but
on May IO, 1848, repealed this Act of assent.53 Both agreements were
assented to'and ratified by Rhode Island in 1847.54 Massachusetts,
however, refused its assent. 5 A final unsuccessful attempt was made
Act of July 5, 1786, ibid. ch. I8, p. 53. The time for reaching an agreement was
extended by the Act of Mar. I, 1787, ibid. ch. 7o, p. 2i9.
" Report of the Regents of the University on the Boundaries of New York,
1873, P. 220.
"A resolution that an agreement bearing this date be recorded was made
before the Massachusetts Assembly on Nov. 21, 1787. See Mass. Laws, 1786-
,787, ch. IOI, P. 794-
"Governor Clinton on Jan. 13, 1787, laid the agreement of Dec. 16, 1786,
before the New York legislature. See Report of the Regents of the University
on the Boundaries of New York, 1873, p. 224. The same agreement was referred
to the Massachusetts Assembly by Governor Bowdoin on Feb. 13, 1787. See
Mass. Laws, 1786-1787, ch. 21. A report of the later agreement was laid before
the Massachusetts Assembly by Governor Hancock on Nov. 8, 1787. See Mass.
Laws, 1786-1787, p. 995.
4 1839 R. I. Acts, 55; Conn. Priv. Acts, 1839, 27.
" Conn. Priv. Acts, i84o, 4. "See supra Appx. A. III, (14).
,TR. I. Acis, 1846, io. R.I L Acts, 1844, 69.
'Mass. Acts, 1843-1845, ch. 41, P. 304.-
I See R. I. Acts, 1845, 3; See Mass. Acts, 1843-1845, ch. io, 587; Mass. Acts,
1846-1848, ch. 115, p. 239.
"See Mass. Acts, 1846-1848, ch. 5I, p. 522.
"See Mass. Acts, 1846-1848, ch. 75, P. 839. The effect of this repeal was never
judicially determined. Cf. Virginia v. West Virginia (187o, U. S.) ii Wall. 39.
"See R. I. Acts, 1847, 85-94. See also R. L Acts, 1848, 68-78.
"See Mass. Sen. Doc. 1848, No. 14, passim.
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by Massachusetts to appoint another commission on May io, I848.5
The provision in this resolution, that upon failure the matter should
be submitted to the courts for determination, took effect when Rhode
Island instituted suit in the Supreme Court of the United States.
However, before decision the matter was settled by a compact between
the two States.51
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